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14 June 1982

Worldwide Report

TERRORISM

FOUO 2/82



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This new JPRS serial, WORLDWIDE REPORT: TERRORISM, is  
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WORLDWIDE REPORT

TERRORISM

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COLOMBIA

I AM COMMANDER ONE

Bogota SOY EL COMANDANTE 1 in Spanish 30 Apr 82 pp 3, 131-158, 180-195

[Section 2, chapter 4, extract from chapter 6 and table of contents from book "I Am Commander One" by Jose Fajardo and Miguelangel Raldan, Editorial La Oveja Negra, Bogota, April 1980, 10,000 copies, 220 pages]

[Excerpts] 2. Concept and Structure of the Political and Military Organization of the M-19 (Sixth National Conference held in March 1978)

Chapter 1

The Sixth Conference of the 19 April Movement (M-19) approved the following structure and concept for the political and military organization in March of 1978, after a discussion in all of the units and three months of practice in which the justness and the necessity of this concept was put to the test.

It is not nor has it been difficult for our organization to maintain a critical spirit with regard to our own practice. We keep the theoretical theses we have not tested by our own experience on the level of resources, hypotheses, and we only relate the applicability of these theories to concrete practice in the process of practice and later systematization.

It took long years of struggle and painful frustration to achieve this evaluation of the political and military organization, not only in our country, but in the whole of America. These and other experiences have clearly revealed the need to compare any theoretical thesis with the historical conditions and circumstances and the experience in struggle of our people. No thesis which has not been incorporated on the basis of our experience can be endorsed as a strategic or political line for our organization. But when our experience is inadequate, we must adopt these theses provisionally, and proceed to test them constantly in action.

This is what is happening with this document. Although it is not a finished primer, it does represent our basic principles for future work. This is the reason for the importance of study and application of it, which is how we can proceed to enrich it.

The same thing happens with the political resources, which we have to continue to compare with the masses, to see if they are sterile or ineffective. We have

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defined our policy in general as a strategy of power the basic elements in which are found in the definition of our enemies (U. S. imperialism and the Colombian oligarchy and our friends (workers, peasants, popular sectors). The definition of these two irreconcilable camps leads us to the conclusion that the problems of our people can only be resolved in our country through a national liberation revolution, leading the people to guide their destiny and their state, in other words, a revolution which can mobilize the majority of the people for a concrete goal--total liberation from the oligarchic and imperialist bonds, which necessarily leads to the construction of the socialist fatherland.

But these goals cannot be achieved except through a long and difficult struggle wherein the political struggle must have popular participation as its central and basic axis. To achieve this it is necessary to utilize all those forms of struggle and popular organization making it possible to proceed to deprive the enemy of power in this process, and to proceed to create a popular authority capable of political, trade union and military dealings until the long-term goals are achieved.

And when one speaks of politics, one must speak of organized forces. This is why the central idea of linking the people with a struggle against the enemies mentioned above, who are organized, disciplined, armed and aware of their tasks, aware of the difficulties and weaknesses of the people, also requires that the people learn to organize and discipline themselves and to have an overall view of the necessary tasks in a long and difficult struggle. And if these are the tasks of the people, to a much greater extent they must be the tasks of the most conscientious sector of the people--the revolutionaries. They must in addition equip themselves with a clear understanding of the process, of the organizational and military elements. In the final analysis, launching a strategy of power without having an organization capable of planning development and training men to assume leadership of the process in the trade union, political and military struggles, capable of resisting the enemy's attacks and of achieving the final results means drafting plans without any concrete results and continuing the long path of frustration and defeat.

Part II--On the Political-Military Organizational Concept

2.1 The Experience in Latin America

The political history of Latin America provides us with dozens of examples of organizations which have had initial development which could not be checked but have ended up in less time than one could imagine as small groups of pro-Marxists or organizations in exile, split into thousands of factions or simply eliminated from the political picture. Guatemala, Venezuela, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia and Peru have provided us with valuable experience concerning what we should and should not do in the implementation of a revolutionary policy, in the choice and treatment of our allies and our enemies, in the motive forces of revolution and the enemy forces, and the ways of combining ideology with politics, the armed struggle and the broad mass struggle, between reformism and vanguardism.

What should have been the unity of opposites became the antagonization and elimination of one of the extremes. Either armed struggle or mass struggle, either political or military, either political leadership or military leadership, either socialist revolution or democratic revolution. Such polarization of the contradiction within a given strategy became simple paths adopted by one of the two elements as the basic and unique way. As a product of the Cuban revolution, the decade of the '60s blinded revolutionaries, and everybody plunged into armed struggle, contrasting it with mass struggle and its multiple expressions, with results which are known to all. In the decade of the '70s, a formidable mass movement developed throughout the Southern Cone but was never completed by armed struggle, being on the contrary defined as antagonistic. The results were no better than in the preceding case, with the difference that in some instances (Chile), they ended in violent terrorist dictatorships.

When within a given concept of revolution, elements which should coincide and in some cases be simultaneous are viewed as antagonistic, the very process develops such that some of them experience a shift and reject the others. This is what has happened with the Latin American revolution, wherein the discussion of revolutionary paths has become the leading mechanism for drying up the imagination which the people themselves revealed to us in the struggle.

2.2 The Colombian Experience

It is a secret to no one that the polarization between the vanguard struggle and the mass struggle in our country has come about in almost absolute terms. As early as the fifth conference the following statement was made:

". . . The left wing has fragmented the problem of revolution, setting forth dilemmas in which the incapacity of each of the groups has prevented them from fully assuming the complex tasks of the revolutionary process. The complementary tasks have been converted into antagonistic and exclusive elements.

"Let us see how false alternatives are postulated: either armed struggle or legal struggle, either construction of the party or construction of the army, either a vanguard struggle or a mass struggle, either creation of a front of exploited classes or creation of a political organization of the proletariat, etc. These are false alternatives because we regard them as dialectic elements and complementary aspects of a single struggle, the struggle to seize power, to destroy the oligarchic state and to build a state of workers, laborers and peasants" (fifth conference).

In general, and despite the conditions under which the class struggle has developed and the peculiarities of each group or party, their options and proposals have been limited by a linear view: either elections or armed struggle, either the workers class or the peasants, either revolution or reform, etc. Those who have neither been antagonized or denied either of the two extremes have simply contented themselves with a tactical accumulation of forms of struggle without integrating them in strategy, dividing them by geographic zone. This calls for one form of struggle for the cities and another for the countryside, without seeing one as the continuation of the other, integrated within a single

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strategy, as complementary parts tactically. This is the case with the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC) and the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]. The ELN [National Liberation Army] provided a typical instance of antagonization of the vanguard, ideological and military pole and deception or destruction of the mass or political pole.

To be clearer, we can identify the various factors in revolutionary strategy with two main poles--the ideological and the political. All of those factors which have to do with the final or strategic aspects are grouped around the ideological pole, while everything functioning in terms of the training and mobilization of forces and mass mobilization is associated with the political pole. Where did the error lie? In the fact that these two poles were taken as irreconcilable opposites and not as the permanent and constantly changing integration of the various components.

If we adopt the principle that the workers class is the vanguard class, which when faced with the possible alliance with the antimonopolistic bourgeoisie rejected that alliance because it (the bourgeoisie) only produces reforms, and continued to wage the struggle for socialism with the workers class alone, then we are dealing with a principle which is correct--reliance on the basic class. But at the same time we are rejecting the possibility of winning political space and mobilizing forces. At the present time, this is pure ideologism.

At the risk of being simplistic and schematic we would like to illustrate this point graphically:

| Ideological Pole | Political Pole |
|---------------------|----------------|
| revolution..... | reform |
| power..... | government |
| basic class..... | people |
| vanguard..... | masses |
| armed struggle..... | legal struggle |
| principles..... | alliances |
| strategy..... | tactics |

If we as revolutionaries function in daily life solely on the basis of the factors having to do with ideology, strategy and principle, we will perhaps prove to be very firm, solid and pure revolutionaries, revolutionaries who know that the workers class is the basic class, who know about the need to organize the most conscientious sectors into a vanguard organization (party), a struggle for power and socialism. But we will be, with absolute certainty, very isolated and lonely revolutionaries who are not interested in the lagging masses, revolutionaries without allies because alliance means dealing with interests different from those of the basic class. We will be revolutionaries who do not seek organizational forms for the less aware sectors of the people, giving the enemy the gift of ample space for reforms, legal struggles, etc. This is what we call ideologism, excessive reliance on strategy, purism, overemphasis on principle. And this inclination leads only to inefficiency, isolation and failure to multiply the effort invested.

If on the contrary our action is based solely on the level of reform, using only legal struggle, always in terms of the masses, while forgetting the vanguard organization aspect, moving from tactic to tactic and engaging in alliances without principles or defined goals, we will be able to point to a broad mass audience, concrete achievements in the struggle to gain recognition of demands, etc., as the fruit of our labor. But these political forces, when faced with the enemy onslaught, will have neither goal nor organization, neither the forms of struggle needed to defend or to advance in what has already been won in the political or trade union sector. In other words, revolution does not appear on its political horizon. This is what we term reformism, tacticism, politicism, etc. This inclination, then, leads only to the defeats which have bathed the great hopes of our continent in blood, repression and death.

What is needed then is to join both poles together and to integrate them permanently. It is not a question of adding one to the other or creating rigid schemes. It is a matter of bearing the mass problem always in mind, anchored in solid ideological principles. In other words, strategy makes sense if it is reflected in flexible and effective tactics. The vanguard makes sense if it is linked with a mass process. The basic class serves its vanguard function when it is capable of rallying around it the various popular sectors. The armed struggle makes sense if it is a tool of the people in general, of the struggling masses. In short, ideology makes sense if it is capable of developing forces, projecting proposals and drafting tasks in the political sector.

2.3 Our Own Experience

In our case, although the organization has tended clearly toward the pole concerned with the vanguard, mechanism, military and ideological aspects, basically because of our class origins and our relative isolation from the masses, it is also true that we have been able to deal with the contradiction without antagonizing it, without destroying either one of the two poles. At the fifth conference we succeeded in reorienting the path, better synthesizing our experience and regaining the indispensable level with regard to the political struggle pole. This explains why the organization, although it has committed innumerable errors, has always kept itself on an ascending line of development, for despite everything, we have kept the political pole and the ideological pole, in the course of continuing struggle, coexistent within the contradiction.

Therefore, one of the general conclusions of the fifth conference which we must stress is that pertaining to the impetus and importance we must give politics as compared with ideology, and the mass struggle as compared with the vanguard struggle.

"The basic direction of our work from now on will be an orientation toward serving the masses, being with the masses, through:

1. Political agitation, armed propaganda; mass organization, based on the interests of the masses;
2. Political and military action, working from the smaller to the larger in the course of further linking the people with armed struggle; and

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3. Establishment and consolidation of the political-military bodies" (fifth conference).

To give priority to all political activity over the activity of our apparatus, to our mass activity over our internal activity, and to our political-social weapons over our military weapons does not in any way mean abandoning the apparatus or neglecting internal tasks. Quite the contrary. The mass struggle, the training of the masses without an apparatus, without cadres trained for everything, without the infrastructure, is an impossibility, an absurdity.

When we say "giving priority to the political," we mean for example that all or at least the majority of our actions should basically support the struggles of the masses themselves and have to do with concrete matters, not simply involving principles or ideology or stopping at mere denunciation. Also, in our finances, the greater part of our budget should be directed toward work with the masses, with a lesser sum devoted to maintaining the apparatus. And this does not mean a change of attitude. It simply means being consistent with the line of developing the war of the people which we have approved. "If we withdraw into the apparatus, into compartments, into our own forces, we will be doing the enemy a favor, because thus, by confining ourselves within limits we have set, we can more readily isolate ourselves. If we plunge into mass work with a very clear political-military concept, we will be gaining a broad political-military space which it would be difficult, not to say impossible, to destroy.

2.4 We Are Not a Party

As to concept and content, the fifth conference was right in its assertion of the basic need to sink our roots in the masses and to train ourselves as integral cadres in the period of transition between the initial apparatus we established and the party we want to build.

". . . With the first stage--the construction of a political-military apparatus--completed, what is wanted of us now is to break with earlier concepts and to plunge into the task of taking on the struggles of the people and the masses as such, rather than the simple struggles of specialized apparatuses" (fifth conference).

This stage already completed was a necessary one or a "necessary evil," since it allowed us to acquire the basic prerequisites for the development of a political-military organization. What was not needed was to begin to slide, as we were doing, into overemphasis on the apparatus, in other words the tendency to isolate ourselves from the masses, to rely solely on the infrastructure, to think only of our own forces.

". . . A period of transition is then necessary, involving the creation of political-military units which in their mass work will lead the exploited classes to take on the tasks of their own liberation, a period of transition which, breaking with the concepts, practice and organizational forms of the apparatus, will incorporate the positive things already achieved and prepare us for the future tasks of the party and the army...."

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And we visualized a necessary period of transition in the following terms:

"... Creation of a revolutionary (political-military) organization with mass support and influence capable of combining and centralizing the most varied forms of struggle and different demands of the people, waging a battle for conscious and combative unity, toward alliances with and integration of various revolutionary forces, an organization with cadres armed with a political-military concept and practice which will promote the war of the people."

But although these concepts were valid and accepted, we were not capable of giving them a truly adequate structure and organizational form. We leaped thoughtlessly from the political-military apparatus to the establishment of party cells without having completed the required period for the shaping of the necessary organizational, ideological and political bases. We say "leaped" because we wanted to be a party without the minimal prerequisites for the purpose; because we have no influence with a large part of the population, especially the workers class and the peasantry; because we have not succeeded in establishing popular organizational forms reflecting the leadership of the vanguard organization; because we have not learned to articulate, to combine, to integrate the forms of political work with the forms of military work; because we do not have the integral cadres capable of directing the masses in all sectors and under all conditions of struggle; because we still do not have a completed strategic plan converted into a material force on being adopted by the masses themselves; and because ideological schemes which had no parallel in our reality nor any place in its transformation still weigh heavily in our thinking.

2.5 In What Stage Are We?

We are not in the stage of planning an offensive against our enemies. We are only in the phase we have defined as strategic defense. We are preparing the conditions for launching our efforts in truly active defense, which will lead us, based on small successes, to confront the enemy forces. In short, then, it is a matter of accumulating power. We speak of accumulation because power is not a question of contemplating an imminent attack on the oligarchic state. Power is a question of capacity to impose our will on our enemy or at least to neutralize our enemy. Therefore, then, the accumulation of power is essentially a mass action. If the masses move toward satisfaction of their demands, if the trade union organization is a weapon for struggle and triumph, and in its development it is given political weapons, we will be creating power, and this political power requires and involves our own military force to consolidate, expand and create new spaces for our advance. In this period of strategic defense, it is not simply a question of proceeding to create a trade union force, a political force, a military force or an organizational force. What is involved is relating each of these forces to the others so that they can be converted into power.

This process of accumulating power is the only way of making a revolutionary strategy real and concrete, the only way of proceeding to complete stages which will change the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves. In other words, it is a matter of proceeding to create a real shift in the social forces

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while increasing ours. Normally we speak of proceeding to create popular power from below. What we have never gone into more deeply is how this power is developed, defended and expanded. We must be much more than propagandists. We must be much more than agitators. We must be builders who not only conceive of large undertakings but also implement them, make them a reality.

Power is something which is being built, being accumulated. For example, when the organization undertakes to carry out any type of operation, it takes three factors into account:

1. Planning, wherein we study the political, social and military conditions, analyze the future development and consequences, as well as our capacity and that of the enemy.
2. Execution, including the implementation of all that has been planned through individual responsibilities.
3. Consolidation, in which the operation should become a mass and forceful event, not only because of the organizational results achieved in the trade union or political sectors, but because it coincides with a given project and situation of the masses.

In conclusion, the accumulation of power means in the final analysis making of all of our political, organizational, military, propaganda, financial and ideological activity deeds which need to be or can be materialized in mass organizations, in an increase in our influence, in an increase in our infrastructure and in the consolidation of what has been won with a view to a further future advance.

2.6 What Are We and What Should We Be?

The current situation of the organization, along with undeniable advances, mass receptivity, increase in political space and limitations on development, reveals to us that we are still not the organization we need to be.

Any organizational structure must be able to meet four basic requirements:

1. It must be capable of responding to the strategic concept established. We have said that the participation of the people in their own destiny, in the management of their struggle and in the use of the methods of struggle the process requires are basic to the implementation of our strategic plan. This obviously requires an organization capable of establishing policies, capable of proposing solutions, creating organizational forms and also of implementing, executing and integrating military activities with the level of mass demands and politics. These tasks are only possible at the current stage reached by our forces and given our political space through a structure integrating the political and military aspects, the ideological and the political, in a single whole, in other words, merging its vanguard and mass leadership functions. In the final analysis, it must specifically expand its political space, strengthen and defend it and open up new prospects for it through political-military action, in order thus to continue to accumulate power.

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2. A structure capable of ensuring and reproducing its functions. The operation of such an organization is nothing other than its capacity to respond in each concrete situation (neighborhood, factory, peasant sector, etc.) to the political and military requirements of the struggles the masses are waging. It is not a question of isolated little groups which aid the masses from outside. It is a question of advancing in integrating the political with the military, and not only in general (conceptual) terms, but under real and concrete conditions. Base units whose sole function is to study and applaud the organizational activities they read about in the newspapers are groups which in no way guarantee or carry out any political project. Groups which have failed in their trade union or legal work and call upon sectors of the organization to undertake the military effort, without the slightest concern about the development of these tasks, are either groups which have not realized that the unity between the political-military concept and practice is implemented in each of the parts of the structure or are groups which having understood this, have not had capacity enough to develop this concept in their sector.

3. A structure which reproduces the cadres needed for the plan. A capacity to produce cadres is an indispensable requirement for any organizational structure, and in our case, it is one of the key elements in the decision to develop a political-military organization now and not a party. That is not our task now, much less is it to train only trade union or political or military cadres in the present stage. Our task today is to train ourselves as integral cadres capable of later assuming specialized tasks, in other words integral cadres which can in the future devote themselves to trade union, military, peasant and other sectors of work.

It is impossible that cadres required to provide the masses with military and political leadership would have no vision, concept, plan or overall practice in the process. It is no longer conceivable that our militants in the mass sector would be incapable of proposing a military action to support, create an opening for or consolidate the political struggle, or on the other hand, that officers capable of planning military operations would be inefficient and mute when it comes to making political proposals in an invasion neighborhood or a trade union. Our intention is to train them as men capable of making political proposals to the masses, of organizing them, of supporting them and facilitating their advance through military means, while characterized by a new and socialist morality.

4. A structure which guarantees control of development as a whole rather than separate parts. This means that the structure will be subject to control mechanisms, such that each movement in a specific area corresponds to a generally established goal. Planning is not only a problem of analysis or the undertaking of tasks, but also a problem of efficient mechanisms for control and evaluation of its fulfillment. Indiscriminate growth without prior determination of what the principal thing is, or action subject only to local or regional requirements and methods of work and functional analysis which are the product of improvisational individual criteria prevent political efficiency, scatter efforts and leave room for error which would otherwise not have been committed. For all of these reasons, centralization in leadership, planning, decentralized

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execution, rigid discipline, responsibility and command are not formal problems but a requirement for the rational use of the forces for internal development and for the fulfillment of the requirements of the current period in the class struggle.

The four basic requirements we have listed should be the basic supports on which a political-military structure is built. We need a political-military organization which integrates both ideological and political aspects, the vanguard tasks and the mass tasks, sinking our roots in the masses and training us as integral cadres. In other words, it is a question of taking on the tasks, the requirements and the functioning of a political-military organization with all its consequences, politically and organizationally, functionally and individually.

The tasks of such a structure are none other than the tasks required for the political plan we have established. And this plan is based on a fundamental axis--the masses. If the people are to begin to accumulate power, a policy for each concrete sector, a joint policy and political-military action to support and consolidate the tasks of the masses are urgently needed.

It is not a question then of an organizational structure making it possible to implement both political and military aspects, or of carrying out the two activities at the same time. What is involved, and this is very different, is integrating and combining the political and the military in a single strategy, making progress in the relation of the two elements which are parts of a single practice. Political-military activity provides the only possibility for consolidating, increasing and expanding power. Anything else is a reformist or militaristic combination, for even though armed struggle is waged with technical efficiency, if the plan is reformist, the general concept with which the struggle is carried out continues to be reformist.

And if one engages in politics tactically, but strategy is solely a function of the military, this is nothing other than militarism.

2.7 Criteria for Integral Cadres

a. Criteria of wholeness. The characteristic of wholeness does not depend merely on the time we devote to each of our activities. It is not sufficient for us to study, to be involved in mass work and to participate in military operations in order to claim that we are being integrally trained. It is the very nature of our activities, the concept with which they are carried out which provides this characteristic. If our studies are purely academic, if our mass work is undertaken with reformist concepts, and if our participation in the military sector is purely mechanical, however much we engage in these three things we will not be acquiring training as integral cadres. The aspect of wholeness in this stage has an axis providing cohesion which is our link with the masses. On the political level, this involves our incorporation in the dynamics of mass struggle. On the military level, this means actions which are within the reach of the masses, which affect their most immediate interests, which reflect their feelings and which open up new prospects for the development of the struggle. On the theoretical level, this means acquiring tools for

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investigation and interpretation enabling us to know in what country we are operating, enabling us to situate ourselves more justly at various times, and allowing us to formulate proposals for action and work toward a concrete reality.

b. Difficulties in integral training. As we said above, the history of the recent struggles on the American continent has been developed by revolutionaries on the basis of antagonistic contrast of the forms of struggle, and on this basis, each organization yields very special fruit. Some produce only theoreticians, others only activists on the mass level, and still others only military technicians. This leftist heritage has its logical repercussions on an organization which for better or for worse is still affected by it, and this is where the organization should focus all its effort so that, incorporating the best of the experience in the revolutionary struggle, it will be able to extract from each unit and each officer the product of a new concept and a new style. Surmounting this heritage of schematism, dogmatism and excessive emphasis on ideology is not something we can claim to have already accomplished. It is true that doing so has been a constant concern, and that we are now beginning to see a new type of cadres, more committed to our reality than to the international conflict of the socialist camp, cadres beginning to give theory its true meaning as a dynamizing element in revolutionary practice, provided always it is mass practice--new cadres who in their language and thinking do not lose their national and popular identity, their Colombian nature, when they engage in analysis, speak to the masses, or plan or implement a political-military action. These values which are now beginning to crop up within the organization, and which break with a whole tradition of leftist orthodoxy, must be developed much further. They must become a characteristic of the collective and not the privilege of just some cadres.

c. Steps taken toward integral training. Our organization is not the product of a group of enlightened theoreticians, nor was it born of any abstract principles. Neither is it the product of the need to demonstrate that this or that method of struggle is the correct one. We have developed in response to a mass need, and since our origins, we have known that our main interlocutor was these masses and not leftist groups. We were not born tied to a single method of struggle. Since the beginning we have tried to develop various forms of combat, aware that we were testing a new path. We have tried to keep an open mind, acknowledging the mistakes made and correcting them and launching new proposals in order to continue to advance. Naturally, the impression of covering the easy, beaten path of proleftist schematism has always been present, but it has been possible to reject it not because it is a beaten or easy or proleftist path, but because it is inefficient.

We believe that we still suffer from many shortcomings in terms of the integral training of cadres. Shortcomings such as believing that the official cadres know everything. Man must orchestrate. Integral cadres are those who have mastered a series of political, military, trade union and other techniques. A step farther in the evaluation and assessment of the tasks is necessary to overcome these failings. We must not be content to know if things were done: we must know how they were done. We must not be content with the fact that a given unit fulfilled its pamphlet goal. We must know how that quota was fulfilled,

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how the action was organized, if it was evaluated later. We must know if each such effort raised the technical, political, military and organizational levels.

Part III--What Is the OPM?

An OPM [political-military organization] is then a structure which allows the political-military leadership to use all methods of struggle in a single culture and a single plan. It is a structure which exists as a function of a mass policy, a part of the level of awareness of the masses and a part of the organizational level with which to progress with the masses, using the political-military concept as the basis for the accumulation of power. If this is the task of such a structure and if political-military action exists as a function of the masses, it will then be possible to achieve two goals: achieving roots in the masses and the training of integral cadres. The first is necessary because the people will always see us struggling for satisfaction of their demands, struggling not for a future they do not yet understand but for their concrete and real needs. Then they will understand that the military aspect represents a weapon for winning, for achieving goals, for defending what has been won, for growing or dealing blows to their enemies.

The OPM is a structure which allows a complete demand to respond to each mass demand, rather than a simple ideological proposal. When the masses demand higher salaries, public freedoms or seek implementation of a list of demands, it is absurd to respond with a ideological slogan such as "Long Live the Armed Struggle," "Support the Popular War," "Long Live Socialism," etc. What is involved is providing the political, military and organizational weapons to fight, to win, to consolidate what has been won and to fight again.

The second goal, integral cadres, is the basic requirement for proper and real leadership of a mass process. If our political proposal requires the organization and mobilization of the complex of masses with a view to winning power, what is needed then is men and women provided with an overall view of this process, capable of the political planning of the political, organizational and military proposals, based on a mass approach and mass practice.

The integral cadres take on the political-military leadership of the masses, on the basis of their needs, develop and deepen the established policy and enrich it in their daily activity. They interpret the political responses for each period, launch organizational and military proposals valid for each situation, and translate our policy plans in thousands of proposals consistent with concrete situations. They are the directors and it is they who regularly supply the tools and mechanisms which make it possible to achieve the goals of the revolution, to seize power.

We are not preparing to gain power solely by electoral triumph. If this were the case, the legal leaders of the masses would suffice. We are not preparing for the destruction of the state by a handful of bold and well-armed men. If this were the case, we would only need the military cadres. Nor are we preparing to have power wrested for us by a spontaneous popular rebellion.

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It is a question, and this should be reiterated, of a prolonged war in which the masses, using all the methods of struggle, will increase their power with each specific instance of struggle for economic or political gain. The power won will be consolidated and expanded, necessarily making use of the political-military aspect as the main axis in each neighborhood, each factory, along each path and in each mass work effort.

3.1 Centralization and Vertical Structure of the OPM

In addition to sinking roots in the masses and the training of integral cadres, the OPM needs centralized leadership and decentralized implementation, and therefore verticality is needed in the structure and the command.

Centralized leadership is needed so that the organization can function as a whole, as a complex, overcoming heterogeneity or inequality in development, so that it can establish general directives and plans, assigning responsibility both to the collective and to individuals, and, finally, to maintain strict and rational control over the plans and these specific work areas.

Centralized leadership presumes that the vices which prevent the necessary development toward concrete goals will be overcome. On the one hand, there is absolute dependence on the orders issued by the leadership, thus restricting initiative, concrete analysis of one's own situation, and planning consistent with concrete needs and general requirements, while on the other, there are liberalism, anarchy, and absolute autonomy, in which each individual does what he wants as a function of his own and petty local or group interests, thus losing the overall perspective, whether pertaining to the nation or the organization.

We need then first of all a general plan and general guidelines, and secondly, analysis for the execution of general policies and their implementation on the local and regional levels as well on the basis of plans; strict fulfillment of the plan and control mechanisms on all levels; and finally, reports on the fulfillment of plans, on contributions and shortcomings and a synthesis undertaken by the national leadership, on the basis of the participation of the entire organization.

Any organization is a complex whole made up of parts which implement the general policy which has been set forth in the general plan. A revolutionary organization is made up of parts, including men and organizational units belonging to an apparatus allowing the classes interested in revolution to pursue the joint struggle of the people organically in order to win political power. Thus we have a goal (national liberation) and a joint plan, involving:

- a. The experience of the masses and their forms of organization;
- b. The program making it possible to rally the greatest possible social efforts around the workers class and the people against the principle enemy (the anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist program with regard to socialism); and
- c. The strategy for winning power (the combined popular war).

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Thus each part of the organization participates in the drafting and constant revision of the overall plan (through its task in each unit, on each intermediary level, in each column and on each regional level, as well as in the mass fronts and apparatus). At the same time, each part is constantly subordinate to that plan as it is formulated by the central bodies.

In short, what causes the revolutionary organization to exist and develop are the actions adapted to the general plan, and this is the final basis of discipline, that is to say the subordination of the parties to the whole. If actions are not carried out or are partially carried out, some parts of the organization deteriorate, always affecting the whole. Here again is a reason for the importance of centralization as the only means of discipline and control, and a vertical structure as the form in which the concept of centralization is expressed.

In order for an organization to function as a whole, homogeneity not only in the political and the ideological aspects, but also in the political-military practice in various situations and in different class sectors is indispensable.

Until a certain level of homogeneity is achieved, the leadership bodies must be much more centralized and must carry out a more dynamic function in the achievement of this goal.

Moreover, the levels of consultation and that of the democratic bodies become factors in disintegration for lack of a common framework, and fail to carry out their task of collective drafting and synthesis.

In addition to the need for greater homogeneity in the sector where the leadership carries out its basic task, the fact of engaging in political-military activity makes it necessary for us to adapt the organizational structure in order to adhere to the laws of war wherein, in addition to leadership of the masses, a single command and rapid decisions are required for the implementation of the political-military decisions. The urgent need for a clandestine organization to have bodies which can at any time and without delay adopt the decisions which the political circumstances dictate is much greater when that organization is in charge of leadership of the armed and unarmed political struggle. These decision-making bodies (leaderships) must exist on a permanent basis in order for the life of the organization to expand. In this way, centralization and the vertical structure and their main consequence, which is the subordination of the whole to the decisions of the leadership, are expressed.

The democratic aspect does not always exist on a permanent basis. It appears only at certain moments. This means that the democratic aspect of the organization of joint participation in the decisions comes during the national conference. The conference is the point of greatest democracy, and it should not be viewed as a large gathering of delegates, which may occur under circumstances of maximal legality, but basically as a process in which the organization as a whole discusses the political, military and organizational theses, and in this way shares in the collective planning.

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3.2 Democracy in the OPM

In order to implement democracy in the OPM, it must be stressed that in it and in any revolutionary organization, we speak not abstractly but in concrete form. However much democracy there may be, if training is not of the best kind, the participation in the discussion and in decision making becomes mechanical and slavish. If on the contrary we promote integral training, we make it possible for each one of us to assume his responsibilities, and on the basis of political-military capability, we are establishing the real foundations for building the principles of democratic centralism. If the cadres heading the organization have neither the training nor the conviction that they are struggling as a function of the masses, the development of bossism and militarism becomes possible, and if the internal mechanisms allowing a comparison between their leading role and achievements in practice are lacking, we will readily lapse into bureaucracy.

Thus we must advance in the method of operation and leadership called democratic centralism, a method which establishes a relation between absolute centralization and democracy, providing a given combination of these elements allowing us to respond to two questions:

- a. The need for the existence of decision-making bodies which have the authority on a permanent basis to make decisions by themselves, without consulting any organizational level; and
- b. Participation by all of the members of the organization in its decisions.

If we consider only the first of these two aspects, we will have a centralist system in which there will be no participation by the whole, while if we consider only the second of these two elements, we will have an operational system of continuing consultations or assemblies for the adoption of any decision, leading the organization to total inoperability.

A whole range of possibilities exists between these two extremes in which one or the other aspect may prevail. Under democratic centralism, the central aspect prevails, for which this term is used rather than centralized democracy.


In order for this method to function fully, there must be in the organization a substantial degree of homogeneity, making the organization a living body which seeks a single goal based on the same criteria.

The current mechanisms for leadership, evaluation, consultation, criticism and self-criticism must be deepened, bearing in mind that we must no longer channel them toward the discussion or the formulation of plans which are scattered or isolated from the general policy established, but in such a way as to implement the overall plan, adapting it to the concrete conditions of each group and sector of the masses affected, and the product of a discussion, of these assessments, should be taken up and centralized by the leadership for the making of future decisions.

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3.3 Hierarchic Structure of the OPM

The organizational structure must correspond with the political line, and is not a complementary element. We can say that the structure is the materialization of the political line at a given moment in its development. We cannot conceive of an organization which has the goal of seizing power, while its form of organization does not correspond to that goal. The organization is the tool with which the revolutionary social force directs the struggle for political power. Therefore, its organizational structures express the concept of power and the political strategy. The organization guarantees the possibility of directing the development of the ideology of the workers class through popular policies.

Organizational Structure
of the M-19

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Our own policy is based on the mobilization and organization of the masses, so as to proceed to accumulate political-military power guided by a revolutionary party, which must develop a tool capable of using force to challenge our enemies for power.

This purpose requires the training of revolutionaries who will combine the armed policy and the nonarmed policy in theory and in practice. It requires an organizational structure which allows us and helps us to adopt this double concept beginning now, a structure which wisely reconciles the tasks suited to the present period with the longer-term tasks, a structure capable of preparing us internally and of projecting political goals outward. To summarize, we need an organizational structure to develop the prolonged combined and mass war.

The highest organizational authority is the national conference, made up of the national leadership and the sectorial and regional delegates.

The national leadership is made up of the national officers and the high-ranking officials.

The high command, the highest permanent body, is made up of the leading officials.

Below it, on a regional or geographic basis, are the regional, column and intermediary leaderships and the base units, as well as the groups of candidates and collaborators.

This entire structure, the ranks and hierarchies, the elements and symbols, make no sense if the basic goal of an organization is not sufficiently clear. The goal of our organization is not to contribute a "grain of sand" to the process, to add to its development, or to make some contributions forced by circumstance, but to become the vanguard force in this process. To do this the OPM will have to be organized to carry out the leadership functions which result from this task. This does not mean that we are a vanguard today, if that is the fear, but we must indeed constantly combat the deviations of those who refuse to accept that the process needs a vanguard for its development, and we must combat those who say that the organization problem is a matter of a simple sum of cadres with an already completed program.

The goal of the vanguard in the process, and this is the role we want our organization to play, can only be achieved through development which has two stages. The first is the construction of the organization, and the second is that in which the organization becomes the real leadership of the revolutionary process. This division is not absolute. Both elements in the revolutionary process are present in both stages, except that one or the other takes on the leading role in each of the two, in other words the OPM is constantly being built, just as the need to exercise leadership is also a constant. For a time we mainly stressed the tasks of constructing the organization. Now, without neglecting this task, the conditions in the country and our political plan force us to place the basic stress on leadership tasks.

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In making political propositions to the people, it is necessary to bear in mind that they can only be imposed to the extent that they are correct. It is a problem of the quality of the proposals and the quantity of those adopted, of the leadership in the tasks and their execution. This is the basic problem for our revolutionary process. Either we are an organization of cadres for internal operation (all of the tasks and actions for the apparatus, financing, propaganda, logistics), or we are an organization incorporated in the masses which sets forth proposals which because of their quality, correctness and breadth are accepted.

Within this situation we have two limiting factors. One occurs when proposals are not put forth or they are insufficient and we then seek to compensate for them, using our military capacity, and the other occurs when we propose broad goals to the masses but they are only taken up by the activists or our own members. These problems derive basically from the manner and the criteria on the basis of which the organization is extended into the masses. In other words, what underlies each organization officer? In our view extension of the political-military structure to the mass level is not the important thing. The political-military structure is established, is created in a qualifying process in order to put forth proposals and plans on the mass level. But if each organization officer who is the final link in this pyramid lacks a direct relation with the masses, what we mentioned above happens, and either he is bolstered by military actions or he himself must do this. Therefore, it is also true that not just any individual can be an organization officer. Being an organization officer equals leading the masses. A comrade who does not represent the masses but represents himself has no reason to be an organization officer.

But this is not a disqualifying process. On the contrary, our structure recognizes the member of the organization (different from an officer) on this intermediary level between the people as a whole and the organization officer, that individual we have termed a collaborator and candidate, who because of the acceptance of some of our views and support of some of our activities is regarded as a participant in a strategic project. In other words, the organization should be capable of responding on each level of awareness with organizational and political proposals for each concrete cadre or mass situation. We have always spoken of the need for the masses to have (and they do have) political-demand and even military bodies, such as the self-defense and civil defense groups, committees for support of the organization and committees to propagate our proposals, etc. They must have their own structure, which cannot be that of the organization, their own tools of struggle, their own propaganda, etc.

3.4 Election and Evaluation Mechanisms

In a compartmented and centralized organization, the election of individuals to leadership posts on any level cannot be carried out by means of the old voting criterion, nor by personal election either. In our OPM structure, the leadership is elected from the top down, based on the criterion of evaluation of each comrade and collective work. In the unit, intermediary, column, regional and national leaderships, those chosen must be the comrades with the best evaluations on each level, in other words, the cadres with the most nearly integral training.

Evaluation, which is a system of measuring the capabilities of the members, taking their practice and their political, military, organizational and ideological concepts into account, is based on the criterion of integrality.

In the evaluation of each comrade, the following aspects will be taken into account:

1. Political--In this connection, the concept implemented by the comrade on the mass level and in the handling of the political line of the organization will be analyzed, along with the implementation of the organizational line in mass work, political practice, the method used and the proposals put forth.
2. Military--The concept of combined and mass war and the implementation of it in practice will be analyzed, taking into account command capability, discipline, capacity for planning and for operations.
3. Organizational--Concept of the OPM, the centralized structure and the relationship of the OPM to the mass movement, organizational capacity, functioning within the structure, work with candidate members or officers within his jurisdiction, leadership capacity, command practice, criticism and self-criticism.
4. Ideological--Concept and practice with regard to the people, the individual's comrades and his family, as well as matters pertaining to revolutionary morality, the ideological values reflected in his daily life, etc.

Part IV

4.1 Differences Between the OPM and the Party

The OPM is a necessary and prior stage for the construction of the party. Without real mass leadership, no party is a real party, but rather formalism and self-definition. The party is the first organizational level existing in revolutionary leadership. It develops under precise and specific conditions, and is not based on the existence of small groups of men affiliated or identified with a common program.

The party emerges when the political, organizational, ideological and military requirements can no longer be met under the old leadership structure.

Often there is confusion between the party and the formal facts of a plan, congress and democracy. When it is forgotten that the basic fact of a party, above all in our reality, is political and military leadership of the masses, one is forgetting the basic principle which gives it reality and defines it as the leadership of the masses and a simple internal organization.

The difference between the OPM and the party does not lie in the difference in concepts. The concept continues to be the same and continues to become more profound. This reveals the need to define the forms of party organization, which is a dialectical development of the tasks of the OPM. When its roots in the masses and the scope of the class struggle exceed the capacity of the OPM, due

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to its verticality, its centralism or the integral cadre requirements, a centralized structure, but one with greater participation by the masses and the cadres in decisions and in political decision making becomes necessary. In this structure, it is no longer for all of us to do everything: rather it is then required that cadres specialize in trade union, political, legal, and other work. In other words, the requirement of integrality does not exist in the party for the militant, but for the whole of the structure. When the breadth and complexity of the military tasks makes them a mass phenomenon, then the emergence of another specialized structure, the army, becomes indispensable.

4.2 Differences Between the OPM and the Political-Military Party

Unlike what happens with the party, the differences between the political-military organization and the political-military apparatus are differences of concept, practice and criteria.

The apparatus concept is based in the final analysis on the idea that it is revolutionary organizations which defeat the enemy, denying in fact that this task is the task of the masses.

The basic and essential thing in the apparatus is the determining weight of the technical infrastructure, its own forces and the internal needs, or rather the also internal potential and rhythm. For the apparatus, the masses are always an object on which it acts in order to dynamize, guide, enlighten, teach them, etc. The vanguard is elitist, with overemphasis on ideology and strategy. We have given this entire policy the name "apparatism." The typical militant with such a concept is in the best of cases an individual identifying with the political line but lacking in concrete activity with the masses; an individual with technical resources -- above the popular average and with military operational techniques beyond the reach of the masses. The rear guard is the infrastructure itself, the technology and the apparatus itself, while the organizational structure is determined by results, functional efficiency and technical level. Democracy does not function, centralism is based on execution, and the criterion for selecting militants does not go beyond their functional efficiency.

The differences between this and the OPM are obvious--the difference in political criteria, the focus always placed on the masses as the subjects of the revolutionary process, the requirement of integrality in the political, organizational, military and biological aspects--these contrast with and differ from the apparatus criterion of technical specialization.

The technical level of functional capability is reduced in the OPM for a time, but with the advantage that it is generalized to all the members. This occurs in order to open up, expand and basically consolidate the political space (without neglecting infrastructure needs) and is in the short run within the reach of the technical level of the masses, since the technique is less complex, the weapons are more popular and the goals to be sought more immediate. The structure therefore is different. It is no longer a specialized structure for operation, for functioning, but is a centralized structure for drafting, planning and directing organizational, trade union and military proposals within the same political plan.

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Part V--Internal Regulations

The internal regulations are designed to be a complex of norms which will guarantee collective functioning and serve as a framework for the development of the members along an integral approach toward a single goal.

Thus they are designed to be functional, providing a leadership structure, individual responsibilities and specific tasks suited to a combat organization, and political leadership for a strategy seeking power for the masses.

Article 1--Goals and Methods

The 19 April Movement is a part and the continuation of the people's struggles for national liberation and for socialism. It reflects the national aspiration for true independence, the need of the people for social justice, and the workers' struggles for a socialist fatherland.

These struggles for independence, social justice and a socialist fatherland join together the needs of the nation and the people and basically of the workers class, and they will be victorious through the participation of the people as a whole in winning their own power. This requires the development of political and military power such as to confront and defeat the attacks of the oligarchic power.

The 19 April Movement is developing and encouraging the power of the masses, and to this end it is organizing and waging the struggle as a political-military body capable of reflecting the aspirations, the battles and the forms of organization and struggle in a single process leading to power.

Thus we are a nationalist, revolutionary and prosocialist political-military organization.

Article 2--Members

That complex of men and women who accept these goals, contribute their concrete and voluntary efforts, and work in orderly fashion for such goals are members of the 19 April Movement.

In this voluntary integration and coordination of efforts and goals, there are various levels depending on degree and discipline, availability and concept. They include officers, candidates and collaborators.

1. The officers of the organization are those members who:
 - a. Implement and develop the line of the organization;
 - b. Carry out and endorse these internal regulations;
 - c. Are always ready to execute the tasks assigned by the organization; and

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- d. Participate permanently on some internal organizational level.
2. Candidates for the organization are those members who:
 - a. Accept and implement the line of the organization;
 - b. Accept and observe the internal regulations;
 - c. Participate in a candidates' unit; and
 - d. Aspire to reach the officers' level through continuing discipline and conscious participation in the life of the organization.
3. Organizational collaborators are those members who:
 - a. Accept our general proposals; and
 - b. Collaborate consciously and voluntarily in some tasks assigned by the organization.

Article 3--Promotion and Officers' Posts

1. Officer hierarchy. The officers of the organization come under a hierarchy of command with the following designations: officer, second officer, first officer, higher officer, highest officer.
2. Numbers. Each officer in the organization has a number within his unit and on his level. This numerical order dictates authority for political-military and organizational leadership, as circumstances require.
3. Evaluation. The entire officers' body will be evaluated on the basis of the criteria existing in their respective units. To this end, a commission will be appointed on the immediately higher level. The results of this evaluation will dictate rank and numerical order.
4. Advancement. The promotion of collaborators and candidates is carried out on the basis of their attitudes and activities within the organization, on the recommendation of their superior officers and with the approval of a higher level, which may be the second officer.

Article 4--Organization

1. Candidates' unit. This is the unit for political-military training for the assumption of the tasks of an organization officer. The candidates' unit is commanded by an officer of the organization as its political-military leader. Each unit is made up of three to five members.

The following are the functions of each candidate:

- a. Political--He must carry out mass political orientation tasks, constantly strengthen his character as a popular guide in a specific sector, and as such, encourage and direct the political-military activity of the masses consistent with the line of the organization.

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b. Military--He must participate in the planning, execution and evaluation of all the military operations assigned to his unit, carrying out therein the tasks assigned to him and contributing to the integral capacity of the unit.

c. Organizational--He must be an active element in the cohesion of his unit, carrying out the leadership tasks assigned to him by his officer, and basically, he must struggle to encourage mass organizational forms on a broad political and the military level, as well as new popular self-defense groups.

2. Base Unit--This is the basic unit of the organization, made up of a minimum of three and a maximum of five officers. A second officer is in command of the base unit as its political-military leader. He will be chosen by the intermediary leadership and confirmed by the immediately higher level on the basis of his respective evaluation.

The functions of each officer are:

a. Political--To carry out, broaden and develop the tasks of leadership and political guidance of the masses, becoming the integral leader of the sector in which he functions.

b. Military--To participate in the planning, execution and evaluation of all the military operations assigned to his unit. In addition to activities on the mass level, he may be called upon to carry out military actions of greater scope.

c. Organizational--To supervise the collaborators' and candidates' units, serving as the regular channel between them and his immediate superior.

d. Ideological--The officer is trained as a part of the integral cadres, participating in the study and deepening of the organizational line. He struggles to have his daily life reflect his attitude as a conscientious fighter, always placing collective needs above his individual needs.

The functions of a second officer are:

a. Political--To work to ensure that all the officers in his unit deepen and broaden our political proposal on a mass level, such that each officer becomes a true director, and to control and direct the political-military work of the officers on the basis of the established plans.

b. Military--To propose, plan and direct the execution of the plans and military operations assigned to his unit, guaranteeing the integral nature of the operations.

c. Organizational--He is the axis of the base unit and directly responsible for the political-military development of its officers, as well as the regular channel between them and the first officer.

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3. Intermediary Leadership--This level is under the command of a first officer and is made up of three or five second officers. It directs and guides the tasks of the organization in a column sector, implementing, supervising and coordinating its task fulfillment.

Functions of the first officer:

He is the regular channel between second officers and the higher officer, being in charge of all of the comrades assigned to the sector. He is appointed after his evaluation by the head of the region, with confirmation by the higher command. He guides and directs the implementation of the mass policies, military plans and the organizational development of the sector. He makes tactical decisions within the established plans.

4. Column Leadership--Under the command of a higher officer or the first officer with the best evaluation in the column, such units are made up of three, four or five first officers heading intermediary leadership units. They implement, check on and direct such units, and through them, all of the base units assigned to them. The higher officers will answer to the regional leadership for the functioning, plan fulfillment, mass work, implementation of operations, intelligence, officer training and everything pertaining to the development of the personnel under their command. They are the regular channel between the first officers and the highest officer level. They are in direct command of their first and second officers and are responsible directly to a highest level officer or the commander of the regional leadership.

5. Regional Leadership--It is under the command of a highest level officer or the higher officer with the best evaluation in the region. It also includes three, four or five higher officers in command of columns.

The highest level officer proposes, carries out, directs and checks on the tasks of the organization on the national level and in a preestablished area. Highest level officers carry out national plans and are the directors responsible for the mass policy, political proposals, military proposals, organizational control and the development of the infrastructure. The highest level officer or commander of a regional leadership unit is the regular channel between the higher officers and the high command.

6. High Command. This level is under the command of the highest level officer with the best evaluation in the organization, in other words the political-military commander, and it is made up of the highest level officers. The high command drafts the policies, the national plans and the specific projects on the mass movement and internal level. In addition it makes the tactical and situational decisions within the general guidelines approved by the national leadership. It drafts the financial plans and checks on the expenditures of the organization, as well as its assets and infrastructure. It is in charge of the national newspaper office, appoints the evaluation commissions for the national level, and is responsible for relations with national and international organizations.

7. National Leadership--This body is made up of the highest level officers and the higher officers under the command of the political-military leader of the

organization. Meeting in national conference, it is the highest authority of the organization. Its functioning is democratic and its duties include discussing, analyzing in greater depth, correcting and establishing the policies, plans and proposals on the strategic level of the organization. It approves or rejects the policies implemented by the high command. It also has authority to evaluate the high command and the higher officers, to approve or amend the internal regulations and to establish the general guidelines of the organization on basic issues in the revolutionary process. A conference is convoked by the high command or when the majority of the organization so requests.

In addition to the national leadership, other members can participate in the national conference if the high command deems their attendance desirable because of their organizational position, mass work or any other special reason.

Article 5--General Norms

The drafting of the policy expressed in plans, projects and proposals and decision making are centralized in the high command.

There is decentralization among the regional leadership units for implementation. These units in turn adapt their plans to the concrete situation and draft plans for their respective columns. Leadership is centralized and implementation is decentralized equally from the top downward. The decisions on political, organizational and military matters adopted by the high command are binding on all the officers, just as all decisions adopted by a higher level are binding on all those under its jurisdiction.

Criticism and self-criticism are included as methods for all tasks, to which end every task, simple or complex, individual or collective, is evaluated, once completed, in all its aspects (political, organizational, military and ideological), and the immediately higher body is informed of the assessment made.

Article 6--Officers' Responsibilities

1. To participate actively in the life of the OPM, adhering to its ideology and its policy and strictly observing the internal regulations. In this respect, the higher ranks are not excused from absolute adherence. On the contrary, the higher the rank, the greater the responsibility.
2. To work actively in the assigned body.
3. To be available for the fulfillment of tasks, without regard to how agreeable or desirable they may seem.
4. To utilize criticism and self-criticism as a norm for dealing with problems and as a method of constant improvement.
5. To raise the political-military capability of the various bodies steadily, as well as that of each of the members.

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6. To struggle tirelessly for unity of action among all the popular and revolutionary forces in the country and for the elimination of sectarianism, "groupism" and dogmatism.
7. To carry out the resolutions adopted by the leadership units and the commanders.
8. To respect the hierarchy and regular channels.
9. To maintain absolute secrecy about internal activities and special, individual and collective tasks before and after their execution.
10. To keep revolutionary vigilance on a high level against anything threatening the unity of the organization and the popular movement in general, and also to remain vigilant against enemy intelligence and infiltration efforts.
11. The conduct of all officers must be concretely seen in their honesty, truthfulness, self-sacrifice and courage in battle, whatever the field in which they must function, and in fulfillment of all the organizational norms.
12. To exercise vigilance at all times over the integrity of all of the organization's members and sources of information, and also to see to the maintenance and preservation of individual equipment and the means and assets of the organization.
13. For the safety of the organization, no member should know or inquire into anything not strictly necessary for his individual work.
14. To participate actively in the political, military and ideological life of the organization with suggestions, proposals, projects, plans, etc.
15. To encourage a spirit of constant improvement, to take on the leadership work assigned to him and to accept willingly the responsibilities which a promotion in hierarchic rank imply.
16. To criticize the behavior of any member of the organization, without regard to his rank, using the proper channels.
17. To participate in discussion when his conduct is in question.
18. To appeal to higher bodies, proceeding to the immediately higher level.

Article 7--Disciplinary Norm

Although membership is voluntary, once accepted, members are bound by the internal norms. Failure to observe them will lead to the implementation of ordinary or special steps, as the case may be.

These steps have a double purpose: a) educational, not only for the member penalized, but for the organization as a whole and the masses as well. Thus it

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does not suffice to apply penalties mechanically. This step must be given the full educational dimension it merits so that an error committed will be transformed into a factor to advance the revolutionary process. b) Repressive, in an effort to prevent individual errors from being committed or repeated, by punishing the individual or individuals responsible for them, in order thus to safeguard the organization and the popular movement.

With ordinary penalties, the educational factor takes priority over the repressive factor, while the punishment factor is the dominant one in special penalties.

1. Ordinary penalties. The following are justification for ordinary penalties:

- a. Repeated lapses into sectarianism, dogmatism, "groupism," favoritism or any other deviation which threatens the policy of the organization with regard to the people, the unity of the revolutionary forces or organizational unity.
- b. Interpretation or discussion of our political proposals in improper form, characterized by vanguardism, lack of modesty or lack of respect for the popular organizations.
- c. Disrespect for comrades.
- d. Irresponsible or destructive use of criticism or self-criticism.
- e. False modesty, expressed in the refusal to assume leadership tasks, disrespect for political-military rank, or any of those attitudes which in one way or another work toward discouraging the spirit of constant improvement and its recognition within the hierarchic structures of the OPM.
- f. Weakness in command.
- g. Failure to fulfill tasks.
- h. Insubordination (ignoring orders or refusal to carry out tasks).
- i. Abuse of authority.
- j. Improper use of the political, organizational or military infrastructure.
- k. Failure to carry out disciplinary steps or prohibitions issued for security purposes.
- l. Violation of compartmentalization.
- m. Verbal liberalism or any action threatening the security of the organization or any of its members.
- n. Simple desertion.

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These violations are penalized on the basis of the seriousness of the act committed or the omission, ranging from:

- a. Warning.
 - b. Closed order penalties.
 - c. Surrender of weapons.
 - d. Incarceration.
 - e. Temporary suspension of rank or responsibilities.
 - f. Hierarchic demotion.
 - g. Removal from the respective body.
 - h. Supervised exclusion.
 - i. Expulsion.
2. Special penalties. The following are justification for special penalties:
- a. Misuse of the organization's funds or general assets.
 - b. Death of a comrade, with responsibility proven.
 - c. Crimes against the interests of the people, such as rape, blackmail, extortion.
 - d. Use of the organization name to carry out deeds for personal benefit, threatening its prestige and harming the popular interests.
 - e. Aggravated insubordination.
 - f. Denunciation.
 - g. Aggravated desertion.
 - h. Betrayal.

The ordinary penalties specified under letters a, b, c, d, e and g will be determined and applied by the body to which the person being penalized belongs. Hierarchic demotion must be decided by the levels of command which authorized the corresponding ranks, or by higher commands. The ordinary penalties specified in letters h and i will be imposed by the national leadership on the recommendation of the corresponding regional leadership unit.

Special penalties will be discussed and approved by a disciplinary council appointed by the high command.

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The implementation of these measures is binding upon all the members of the organization.

Article 8--Finances

The finances of the organization are made up of:

- a. The organization's own finances;
- b. The ordinary and compulsory contributions of each member of the organization, which will be established by the bodies to which they belong, based on one day's wages; and
- c. The contributions of collaborators.

Article 9--Special Action

Sabotage, execution and other special actions are necessary tasks in the development of the war, but in view of the political implications they involve they must be discussed and approved by the high command. The same is true of actions which because of their national repercussions or intervening forces threaten the development of the organization as a whole.

Article 10--Revolutionary Morality

All of the candidates and officers of the organization must study and implement the basic concepts of revolutionary morality, which are considered to be:

- a. Promoting the spirit of collective work.
- b. Fraternity and solidarity among comrades, without lapsing into paternalism or favoritism.
- c. Mutual respect.
- d. Truthfulness with the organization and a self-critical spirit.
- e. Respect for the beliefs, customs and assets of the people.
- f. Constant vigilance to prevent vices such as alcoholism, drugs, narcotics and gambling from penetrating the organization.
- g. Private life consistent with being a true revolutionary.

Part VI--Closed Order Drill in the OPM

1. The General Provisions

These regulations contain all of the closed order exercises which should be practiced both individually and collectively by candidates and officers of the organization.

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As a result of the above, practice of the various exercises should be characterized by discipline, energy, precision and speed.

The purpose of closed order training is:

- a. To train the command personnel to mobilize their units in orderly fashion and to develop simple formations from which combat maneuvers can be speedily effected.
- b. To discipline the personnel and inculcate in them habits of precision and speedy reaction to the orders of their commanders.
- c. To develop a means of promoting morale among the combatants and developing their spirit of cohesion.
- d. To awaken an awareness in the people that our organization, through its cohesion and discipline, is taking firm steps toward the development of the future army of the people.

2. Commands

A command is the directly and verbally expressed order of a commander, using words in prescribed succession and requiring immediate execution.

Commands are made up of two clearly defined parts:

- a. The alerting command, the purpose of which is to warn those who will carry out the movement or exercise as to what it will be.
- b. The executory command, the purpose of which is the execution of the movement or exercise.

The alerting command should be issued, beginning on one note, more or less, above the tone of voice used in normal conversation. It may have any number of syllables, and should have an upward stress, such that the final or the penultimate and final syllables (if the pronunciation of the word so dictates) are voiced two or three notes above the first. The last syllable of this command should be drawn out.

The executory command should begin at least two notes higher than the final syllable of the alerting command. This command is typically short, decisive and energetic, such as to produce immediate execution on the part of those hearing it.

In some commands, the alerting and executory parts are combined or made up of a single word.

In such cases, the procedure is to give the name of the unit as the alerting command and to instruct the troops that execution will only begin when the executory command is completed.

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3. Individual Training Without Weapons

3.1 Basic Position

a. Command: Attention...Fire!

b. Description of the exercise:

1. The heels should be as close together as the individual's build allows.
2. The feet should be positioned at a 45 degree angle.
3. The legs should be straight, without rigidity.
4. Body weight should rest entirely on the soles of the feet.
5. Hips balanced, trunk straight, chest naturally thrust forward, shoulders slightly to the rear and level.
6. Arms hanging relaxed, elbows slightly bent and a little forward, with the palms of the hands in contact with the thighs along the trouser seams, with the fingers extended and close together.
7. Neck and head held naturally, chin slightly drawn in, eyes focused straight ahead on a reference point slightly above eye level.

c. To assume this position, the left foot is drawn smartly against the right, while the arms simultaneously fall naturally along the legs such that the hands touch the thighs. The individual must remain motionless in this position (taken from the magazine GUION, March 1980).

Extract from 16 October 1979 speech by Gen Luis Carlos Camacho Leyva, minister of national defense, to the Chamber of Representatives

Subversive Groups

Something has been developing which is inherent in the current problem of democracy, i.e., the failure of democracy to defend itself. The result is that people talk against against democracy and no one rises up to defend that which we are enjoying. Now paradoxically, we see the communist bench in the congress defending freedom of thought, freedom of opinion and freedom of assembly. This is natural, because they are yearning for what is behind the iron curtain, accustomed as they are to being accorded all these freedoms in those countries where communism holds sway, and they want them for Colombia as well.

And there is a belief that nothing is happening here, that we are like madmen, that the government does not know what its obligations are nor have the military forces any reason to emerge from the barracks, because this is a country of the Sacred Heart where there is no need to adopt exemplary legal measures nor for the military forces to reduce subversion to impotence either.

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But I am going to take the liberty of rapidly sketching what is happening, because matters are not what they are sometimes said to be. What then is the reason we are acting in more forceful fashion than we normally should? The fact is that innumerable subversive groups have developed in the country, including among others the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, which says in all of its writings that it is the armed branch of the Communist Party of Colombia.

I said that innumerable subversive groups have been developing and are precisely the reasons for the unease in the country. It is they which have created the anxiety in the rural and agricultural sector, it is they who have murdered peasants as "stool pigeons," as Representative Cardona said in a famous statement, and it is they whose banners with their legend we find above the corpses of these poor people, uselessly martyred. It is the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the National Liberation Army and the M-19, it is the Pedro Leon Arboleda or PLA Group, the Workers' Self-Defense and the Popular United Front for Guerrilla Action and the Revolutionary Organization of the People--it is these movements, which as I said before, are disturbing the public peace. Let us see, if only briefly, what is happening with these movements.

M-19

The members of the M-19 undertook distributions of milk and market goods, seizures of buses and speeches at secondary schools, hospitals, etc. However, following its failure, after penetrating the North Canton, where the republic warehouses were located, we were able to see immediately that this was not the somewhat sympathetic M-19 movement which we gave credit only for speed of action with a certain ingenuity in order to affect public opinion, but rather that this movement was also engaged in kidnapping. There they held the manager of the Texas Company, Nicolas Escobar Soto, who died the death of a martyr after being held in a cell or "people's prison," as they call it, for more than 6 months, under truly inhuman conditions.


I would invite the honorable representatives to go and visit one of these so-called "people's prisons" which we still have one fine day, in order to learn under what conditions the kidnapped people were and are being martyred. And they were also involved in the kidnapping of Miguel de German Ribon, and with innumerable problems, suffocating infiltrations and, of course, simultaneously engaging internally in innumerable forms of depravation such as homosexuality, prostitution, swindling, bank robberies, etc. But financing was not going badly. One of the members, Duplat Sanjuan, received a salary of 50,000 pesos monthly and 40,000 for his expenditures as an agent.

We have in our possession the books we seized from the gentlemen in the M-19.

What then is their organization? Let us see (see Organizational Chart No 1).

The high command of the Bogota region was in turn organized as shown in Organizational Chart No 2. What is shown as gray on this chart has already been captured. We still have to capture the sections with lighter shading, and we will have to do so even if the subversives claim that we are torturing them.

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And what had these individuals done up to 1978 and the beginning of 1979?

| | |
|-----------------------------|----|
| Kidnappings..... | 7 |
| Robberies..... | 4 |
| Explosions..... | 47 |
| Incursions..... | 3 |
| Incendiary bombs..... | 9 |
| Leaflet releases | 11 |
| M-19 banner hoistings | 2 |
| Vehicles stopped | 2 |
| Total | 85 |

But the most serious thing, and that challenged by Representative Cardona, was the removal of weapons from the North Canton. The official figure is 4,303, of which, as I said before, we have recovered 95 percent. But in addition to those recovered, as we will see later on, we have been able to capture other weapons, and perhaps more, speaking potentially.

This group had the capacity to falsify identity cards, drivers licenses, search warrants, customs seals, vehicle ownership and registration certificates, credit cards, permits to carry weapons and military identification papers.


This group, according to the information we have, was able to obtain illegally, in attacks on banking and credit institutions, a total of 84 million pesos.

And what has been done? Well, as of the present, from 2 January to 1 October, the military forces have arrested 673 individuals, of whom 346 were released on


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Organizational Chart No 2



Organizational Chart No 3



Note: The above chart shows M-19 activities in the rural sector.

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the brigade level and 138 were released by the courts. Arrest warrants were issued for 180, of whom 106 have confessed.

Therefore there remain to be found and brought before the proper authorities 207 individuals for whom the military records show serious charges of involvement in the activities of the M-19.

The final results of the operations against the M-19 are as follows:

| | |
|------------------------------------|---------|
| Total captured | 673 |
| Released by the courts..... | 138 |
| Released on the brigade level..... | 346 |
| Arrest warrants..... | 180 |
| In the hands of the court..... | -- |
| Being detained..... | -- |
| Executed..... | 9 |
| Total..... | 673 673 |

Recovery of North Canton Weapons Stolen

| | |
|---|--------|
| Criminals shot..... | 9 |
| Individuals arrested and charged with membership in the M-19..... | 180 |
| Weapons seized from the movement..... | 197 |
| Ammunition seized..... | 18,400 |
| Radio equipment and vehicles seized..... | 137 |
| Automobile plates..... | 30 |
| People's jails found..... | 9 |
| M-19 hoods seized..... | 178 |
| Dental equipment seized..... | 6 |
| First-aid equipment..... | 38 |

Workers' Self-Defense Organization (ADO)


Now let us look at the so-called Workers' Self-Defense organization (see Organizational Chart No 4).

The 14 September Command shown on Chart No 4 was that which eliminated the illustrious public figure Dr Pardo Buelvas, in a manner known to all of us. Let us recall that after the courts investigated and sentenced its members in rather spectacular, bold and challenging fashion, two of them escaped from the National Model Prison. I imagine that when they are captured, if they are captured, those who want to say that we are torturing them will immediately raise their voices. This does not matter to us.

But what has this group done in addition to the murder of Pardo Buelvas? Let us see:

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
Organizational Chart No 4

ORGANIZACION AUTODEFENSA OBRERA⁽¹⁾

Key:

1. Workers' Self-defense Organization
2. Central Commission: high commander, political leadership, military leadership, propaganda commissioner, finance commissioner
3. Camilo Torres Command Unit -- commander
4. Cells
5. 14 September Command Unit -- commander
6. Cell -- of 3 or 4 members, headed by a member
7. Member
8. Collaborator
9. Sympathizer


Organizational Chart No 5



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Organizational Chart No 6




Key:

1. National Liberation Army
2. National Liberation Army organization
3. Front organizations
4. Revised
5. Traditional -- national leadership
6. Sociopolitical
7. Infiltrated
8. Propaganda
9. Planning
10. Region 1 and 2 officials
11. National Urban Leadership (DUN)
12. Urban support networks
13. Armed branch
14. Fronts
15. National leadership (a = alias)
16. NN = no name (Zapata is alias)
17. Jose Antonio Galan, 25-30 men, zone of influence --
Caceres, Antioquia - Cordoba boundary
18. Camilo Torres R., 30-40 men, zone of influence -- Motilones
Mountains - south of Cesar
19. Jose Solano Sepulveda, 20-30 men, Alejandro Chavez
(captured), zone of influence -- San Lucas Mountains and
south of Bolivar

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Organizational Chart No 7



Key:

1. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Fronts
2. Bogota Federal District, Urban Front, number of men -- 27
3. Santander, Eighth Front, number of men -- 45 number of weapons -- 30
4. Caqueta, First Front, number of men -- 50 number of weapons -- 45
5. Meta, Seventh Front, number of men -- 42 number of weapons -- 37
6. Huila, Second Front, number of men -- 99 number of weapons -- 60
7. Pato Region, Third Front, number of men -- 143 number of weapons -- 89
8. Middle Magdalena, Fourth Front, number of men -- 268 number of weapons -- 103
9. Uraba, Fifth Front number of men -- 60 number of weapons -- 40
10. Tolima-Cauca-Valle-Quindio, Quindio, Sixth Front, number of men -- 68 number of weapons -- 24

Note: a = alias

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| | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| Broadcasting facilities seized..... | 4 |
| Bank robberies..... | 9 |
| Incursions into public offices..... | 3 |
| Bombs placed..... | 8 |
| Attack on model prison..... | 1 |

We have captured and court-martialed 10 of the members of this group. Eight are in prison now and two have escaped and are being sought.

Pedro Leon Arboleda (PLA) Command (see Organizational Chart No 5)

I would not like to tire this honorable chamber and the honorable representatives with statistics and tables, but we will review the charts one by one with a view to understanding all of what is in the hands of military intelligence. The PLA, which is in turn a subversive organization dependent on the self-styled Popular Liberation Army (EPL), has engaged in the following activities:

| | |
|------------------------------|----|
| Bank robberies..... | 12 |
| Bombs placed..... | 10 |
| Incursions..... | 6 |
| Attacks on settlements | 4 |

On the other hand, in operations carried out against the PLA, the military forces have carried out the following actions:

| | |
|---------------------------------------|----|
| Criminals captured..... | 87 |
| Criminals killed..... | 17 |
| Criminals wounded..... | 10 |
| Long-barrelled weapons recovered..... | 24 |
| Side arms recovered..... | 14 |

National Liberation Army (ELN)

Now let us examine the ELN, which has a reorganizational commission responsible for seeking new horizons for it. This group is organized as shown in Organizational Chart No 6.

Thanks to the activity of the military forces, the ELN has not succeeded in carrying out significant activities, but on the contrary has suffered harsh blows dealt by the army, as can be seen by the following:

| | |
|-------------------------------------|-----|
| Weapons recovered..... | 34 |
| Grenades..... | 314 |
| Rural auxiliaries captured..... | 4 |
| Armed branch bandits captured..... | 2 |
| Urban network members captured..... | 33 |

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

The FARC is organized on the national level as shown in Organizational Chart No 7.

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On this organizational basis, this subversive group, which says it is affiliated with the Communist Party of Colombia, succeeded in carrying out the following criminal activities between 7 August 1978 and 9 October 1979:

| | |
|------------------------------|-----|
| Troop personnel killed..... | 36 |
| Troop personnel wounded..... | 34 |
| Private assassinations..... | 145 |
| Attacks on settlements..... | 16 |
| Kidnappings..... | 9 |

The greater percentage of these criminal actions were carried out by the Fourth and Fifth Fronts of this organization, which are those located in Uraba, Santander and Puerto Berrio. The troops themselves, for their part, inflicted the following losses on the FARC:

Since 7 August 1978

| Frent = front | I | II | III | IV | V | VI | VII | VIII | FRENTE | TOTAL |
|------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| | FRONT | FRONT | FRONT | FRONT | FRONT | FRONT | FRONT | FRONT | URBANO | |
| (2) ANTISOCIALES MUERTOS | 4 | | | 29 | 3 | | | | (1) | 36 |
| (3) AUXILIADORES MUERTOS | | | 1 | 2 | 1 | | | | | 4 |
| (4) ANTISOCIALES CAPTURADOS | 6 | | | 25 | 11 | 29 | 2 | | 63 | 135 |
| (5) AUXILIADORES CAPTURADOS | 11 | 17 | | 42 | 10 | 1 | 1 | | | 82 |
| (6) ARMAS LARGAS RECUPERADAS | 1 | | | 20 | 9 | 8 | | | 28 | 66 |
| (7) DINAMITA TACOS | | | | | | | | | 730 | 730 |
| (8) RADIOS SSB. | | | | | | | | | 9 | 9 |
| (9) MUNICIONES VARIAS | | | | | | | | | 11,500 | 11,500 |

Key:

- | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Urban Front | 6. Long-barreled guns captured |
| 2. Criminals killed | 7. Dynamite plugs |
| 3. Auxiliaries killed | 8. Single-side band radios |
| 4. Criminals captured | 9. Miscellaneous ammunition |
| 5. Auxiliaries captured | |

As the honorable representatives will be able to see, it is not for their political ideas, but for their actions, which are criminal rather than political, that we have clashed with the FARC.

Meanwhile, the military forces made the following sacrifices between 7 August 1978 and 7 August 1979:

| | <u>Killed</u> | <u>Wounded</u> |
|-----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Military forces | 39 | 140 |
| Police | 88 | 775 |
| Civilians | 162 | 18 |

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All they do, seeking to represent itself to the country as a decent, altruistic republic of thinking people, people who are seeking new horizons, is a lie. The government is faced with subversion of its institutions, subversion which is supported not only by domestic individuals, some of whom have had occasion to come to the national congress, but has also been aided by Uruguayans, Argentines, Chileans, Germans, Hungarians, Frenchmen, Venezuelans and Arabs.

The Communist Party and Subversion

And the most serious aspect of all of this confusion, Mr President and Honorable Representatives, is that in the specific case of the FARC, as I have already said, they continue to indicate that they are the armed branch of the communist party. And concerning this we must speak the real truth, because the fact is I have not seen, nor has the country, any unanimous rejection by the communists regarding the assertion the FARC is making, and on the other hand, every time an individual in one of these groups is arrested, there always appears another from Committee A, B, or Z of the party to demand his provisional release.

Without being asked to say anything, honorable representatives, they have begun to make statements to the effect that they were not supporters of violence, but of the mass phenomenon and some of the things on which, if you will allow me to say so, they have been vacillating. But the fact is that with regard to this statement made by the FARC, and the failure of the leadership of the communist party to make any statement against it, and in view of the statement made by the intellectuals of the party, it has to be concluded that someone, as I have already said, who has had the opportunity to occupy a seat in the congress itself, is involved, if only in a spiritual sense, in subversion.

Let us note the statement by Luis Morantes (Jacobo Arenas), one of the leading ideologists of the FARC and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia, on page 66 of the DIARIO MARQUETALIA: "Manuel Marulanda Velez, alias Tirofijo, is an outstanding member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party."

Issue No 113 of ALTERNATIVA for the week of 9-15 May 1977--and I also hope that this paper will not claim to be a government publication--says that Luis Morantes (Jacobo Arenas) has been a "member of the Central Committee of the Party since 1958, and is today one of the main ideologists and leaders of the FARC," also commenting that "he had been linked with the armed struggle for more than 13 years when he was sent to Marquetalia by the communist party."

And this individual, whom this paper interviewed, said the following:

"We have a general staff which directs and checks on the plans drafted by the national conferences of the FARC. Then each front, or more exactly each column, has a general staff, or, not to be immodest, a leadership command elected by the general staff.

"Getting into the organic structure of the FARC, what is called a squad in the army and a guerrilla unit in the FARC, made up of 12 men, there is here another

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leadership mechanism for a given radius of action. This mechanism is called the political cell and it is in essence a communist cell. More clearly, our smallest unit is the guerrilla unit of 12 men, which is at the same time the political group or a party cell.

"These leadership mechanisms, beginning with the general staff, are guided by the general line of the FARC, set forth in national conferences of the movement with a view to concrete action, and, as is natural, by Marxist-Leninist principles, and in politics, by the program and political resolutions of the communist congresses. I am speaking of the congresses of the Communist party of Colombia.

"Our organization as a party is governed by the party statutes, which deal with the life and the activities of the communist membership. But if something is lacking, we have available to us the internal military regulations of the FARC and the norms of the general staff and commands."

And what do Articles 2 and 10 of the internal regulations of the FARC say? Let us see.

Article 2 says that "The FARC are an integral part of the party. Each squadron or basic or smallest unit is at the same time a party cell.

"The conclusions and plans of the national conferences of the FARC are available to the Central Committee."

Article 10 says that "The discipline of the FARC is political-military, and it is covered in the party statutes."

And what about Article 11 of the FARC Command Norms?

11: "The highest authority in political matters is the Central Committee of the party, and therefore the members of the Central Executive Committee are worthy of military honors in the FARC."

And this, Honorable Representatives, is not being said by the minister of defense or by a government publication, but by an individual who is an active member of the communist party, and in a journal which, as I said before, cannot be considered as a government publication.

On the other hand, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia says in a historical summary published under the title "30 Years of Communist Party Struggle" (Los Comuneros Publications):

a. Page 94: "Our party salutes the guerrilla fighters as heroes of the popular resistance." The 14th Plenum of the Central Committee expressed the view that "The armed struggle which has been waged in some regions is a heroic expression of the resistance of our people to the terrorist repression of the dictatorship and the violence of the reactionary gangs."

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b. Page 96: The 14th Plenum of the Central Committee urged that "We should talk to the guerrilla fighters in full frankness and honesty, trying to educate them politically, showing them that they are waging a prolonged struggle with great prospects for the future, when it will be combined with a revolutionary mass movement." Our party made contact with representatives of various guerrilla detachments, which established a national coordination council and organized multiple forms of aid to the popular combatants, and was able to make wise orientation decisions on various occasions. In 1952, our party collaborated decisively in the preparations for and holding of the National Guerrilla Fighters Conference, known since then as the Boyaca Conference, which was attended by delegates from the majority of the guerrilla forces. At this conference, a platform of struggle designed to link the guerrilla resistance with the achievement of agrarian reform was approved.

And Representative Gilberto Vieira, who is also secretary of the Communist Party of Colombia, said in his report to the 10th congress, which was included in a publication entitled "For the National Liberation Patriotic Front" printed by the Colombia Nueva Publishing House in January of 1976, the following:

a. Page 41: "The armed struggle is emerging and developing in Colombia, in its guerrilla warfare form, even though no revolutionary situation yet exists in the country."

"There is no contradiction at all between the mass struggle and the armed guerrilla struggle. The guerrilla war is one of the highest forms of the mass struggle."

Again, and this time in the political report he submitted to the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of Colombia, which was included in the publication entitled "Forward to the Battle Against the Oligarchy and Imperialism" (Colombia Nueva Publishing House), Representative Gilberto Vieira said:

a. Page 35: "The guerrilla movement of the FARC has been maintained and developed in these recent years with singular firmness, working against very difficult conditions. The solidity of this movement shows that the persistence of this form of struggle corresponds to the social realities."

b. Page 36: "The guerrilla movement, with its heroic resistance, has shown that it responds to real needs..."

c. Page 37: "The active fighters in the ELN and the EPL are revolutionaries with whom we differ, but in whose resistance we join in solidarity."

And to be still more explicit, Gilberto Vieira, in reasserting his thesis set forth in the book "Politics and Revolution in Colombia" (Alcaravan Publishing House, 1977), said under the subtitle "The Leninist Tactics of the Communist Party of Colombia," the following:

a. Page 16: "We communists have been, and not just recently but since 1949, committed to the activities of many guerrilla movements."

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The above quotations, Mr President and Honorable Representatives, confirm what I said before to the effect that there are people participating in this body who are encouraging subversion in Colombia and who have the authority at the same time to summon ministers to explain the reasons they are defending our institutions.

Mr President, I believe that it is my duty to refer again, if only briefly, to some statements, which as I said at the beginning of my address, were made in this chamber by representatives who have claimed to be friends of the government but have surprisingly joined in the debate being promoted against it and against the armed forces.

It has been said here by Representative Leon Arango Paucar that he came from the very scene of the events, that things were terrible and that he wanted to help the government. There is a tactic according to which when an attack is directed at subordinates, one says that "Their superiors do not know what they are doing." And when the attack is directed at their superiors, one says "They were functioning without the support of their subordinates."

But I will take the liberty of reading to you the document drafted in Puerto Berrio, which makes it clear what happened with regard to the meeting which was held in the central square, in connection with which the honorable representative said that the chief of the general staff of the Fourth Brigade had threatened the peasants, saying that there would be more bloodshed and more orphans and widows. This superficiality, perhaps due to a hasty analysis and a lack of time before the plane was to leave Puerto Berrio for Bogota, is completely contradicted by what I will show, based on a document in my possession.

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GUATEMALA

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Part I: What Security Means

Security means keeping the organization out of danger or harm from the enemy. To achieve this, criteria and measures that guarantee its functioning and development must be adopted. Those security measures or norms must permit clandestine militancy at all levels from collaborators to militants and soldiers.

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Right here we can state that constant militancy, constant mistrust and complete clandestineness have maximum application. These principles inherent to any revolutionary organization are indispensable requirements to guarantee success in our work.

A) Security: A Constant in the War Process

In the first place, we must state that security is acquired to the degree that we are clear about our position within the system and achieve a high degree of responsibility within the organization. This is a constant for all stages of war which, by necessity, implies maintaining from the beginning solid security criteria and appropriate methods and procedures for the situations we are in.

Clandestineness, our best weapon within the war process, must be well implemented from the very beginning of our revolutionary activity. We feel that absolute perseverance in this keeps us safe and strong in order to advance in any stage or phase of the war.

Security is the constant that permits us to do our work efficiently from the beginning to its expansion or growth. Security must always be present in the development of war if we do not want to meet serious obstacles or failures and endanger our lives, the life of the organization and, consequently, the cause itself of our people.

B) Security of the Militant

We do a large part of our militant work as individuals. Therefore, it is an indispensable requirement to be sure that we are free from danger from the repressive machine. We achieve this security through constant effort and systematic attention to our legal and clandestine activity and through the timely and precise application of norms to preserve optimum security.

At this level of individual security of the militant, we must be extremely careful about the following points:

1. We must not reveal our clandestine activity and our political position to people outside the organization.
2. We must not make comments to people in our "confidence." This way we will not reveal our position and we will avoid raising suspicions about us. If we do political work, the level of each prospect must be carefully determined, we must be trained for this and, especially, we must have the proper authorization to do it.
3. We must not leave sensitive documents in view of people outside the organization, whether in the house or in another place. We must be careful to keep them in a suitable place, even anticipating a search by enemy agents.
4. We must maintain and polish our pretext or cover for all our clandestine activities. The pretext or cover must not have contradictions--that is, it

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must seem completely reasonable and justify even the smallest details of our activity.

5. We must organize our activities so that our arrivals and departures are normal and correspond to our cover.

6. We must not read books or documents in unsuitable places like vans or some house where anyone could discover our reading.

7. We must not talk on the telephone about political matters. We especially must not establish contacts or meetings by telephone, whether for convenience, ease or overconfidence.

8. We must not wear "mafioso" clothes or unsuitable clothes for the site of our activities. For example, excessively long hair can give the enemy a clue or can make us look like common criminals.

9. We must always carry all our identification documents with us. When leaving the house, we must check to see if we have our residence card, military inscription, work verification or card, etc.

10. We must not do political work to recruit anyone if we are not sufficiently trained for it and if we are not authorized by the responsible person.

11. We must not directly participate in political activities like, for example, student activities or unimportant demonstrations. In other words, we must not publicly reveal our positions except in exceptional cases for which we must have the express authorization of the organization.

12. We must use a pseudonym for our clandestine work or use several for work of greater scope. This pseudonym must be complete with first and last name and must have a background.

13. We must not use or carry military equipment if we do not have authorization or when it is unnecessary and dangerous.

14. We must avoid relations with people of doubtful political position, people who might be monitored and also with the lumpen proletariat.

When we receive principles, procedures and work methods that are the product of knowledge and experience, we accept them most of the time and we say that they are accepted. However, it is all just good intentions and wishful thinking. Our obligation and our responsibility are to practice them constantly and strictly and evaluate them in practice. This is basic to guarantee our individual security.

C) Security of the Unit

Individual work has great risks as does the work of units (two or more militants). The security of this work must be guaranteed by a collective effort.

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We must all be aware of the responsibility implied in working in teams and we must all concern ourselves together with the security of all.

Below are some criteria and norms for the security of the unit:

1. We must periodically discuss and evaluate the clandestineness and secretiveness of the unit.
2. Within the internal structure of the unit, we must designate one person to be specifically responsible for security although this task is also collective. That person will have certain specific tasks concerning this activity.
3. We must establish communications systems and contacts to avoid dispersion and lack of continuity in the work. Basically we must plan communications so that they are quick, precise and timely.
4. We must establish work sites that offer the necessary conditions to protect the militants and resources used. This includes places for political study, discussion of problems and any type of military training.
5. We must be careful about talking loudly. We must also replace certain words with others in order not to reveal our activity. We must never mention words like socialism, communism, guerrilla, policy, etc.
6. We must maintain absolute compartmentalization with respect to other units, other sectors or individuals outside the unit based on the appropriate criteria. It is sometimes necessary to practice compartmentalization within the unit itself.
7. We must establish quick and effective communications to detect or solve any security problem. We must establish a quick and precise system of communications and contacts within the unit.
8. We must have emergency plans to anticipate any difficult situation that occurs during the collective work.
9. As to contacts in public places, we should wait 10 minutes under normal conditions and 5 minutes in critical situations. In both normal and critical situations, punctuality must be our principle. It is also advisable to establish emergency points for subsequent communication.

D) One Weakness: Laxity in Individual and Collective Security

Laxity basically means weakening and relaxation of security observed in some militants and units with the passing of time. We are talking about it in order to prevent or overcome this laxity.

Both at the individual as well as the collective level, the length of time as a militant operates negatively because of acquired confidence and imprudent friendliness.

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Knowledge and acquired confidence with comrades lead to knowing them legally, guessing the scope of work done, knowing the sites of legal and clandestine work, exchanging secret information, etc. In other words, compartmentalization is gradually lost.

This weakness is also observed in the functioning of the unit. This is a greater danger since mistrust and vigilance toward the enemy or politically undefined people are gradually lost. If we do not uproot this weakness, it can cause very serious consequences as occurred in the past.

Below are some concrete cases where we have observed laxity:

1. The same work sites are used without prior check; the argument is that it has always been used without problems.
2. The same contact places are used for convenience or ignorance of the method.
3. Waiting for a comrade gets longer each time and work meetings go on too long.
4. The telephone is used to pass on information related to a certain political or organizational situation instead of doing it by a direct and safe means.
5. A vehicle is no longer compartmentalized due to a false idea of solidarity.
6. Marked places or places in the process of being marked are used instead of seeking less known and more secure ones. Most of the time, places are used inappropriately--for example, coffee shops or other places that we know, by principle, are monitored by the repressive forces.

In a word, the same methods and mechanisms for the development of our activities are followed routinely without changing them or adapting them to increasingly more complex and dangerous situations in the urban and rural environment. Sticking to a routine definitely does not constitute part of our work style and must be eliminated.

Part II: Some Concrete Security Norms

In urban clandestine activity, communications, contacts and meetings are the most delicate part. Past experience demonstrates this to us. Neglect and noncompliance with basic security norms caused unfortunate casualties in revolutionary ranks. We could summarize the reasons for the vulnerability of these activities in the city as follows:

- 1) Most of our activities have to be done through legal channels of communication: telephones, telegrams, buses, etc. There must be public contact; houses and public recreational areas must be used where the operational situation is adverse for us due to the specific physical and social conditions of the city.

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2) The enemy concentrates massive human and technical resources in the city: many policemen, informers, radio patrols, lookouts, military barracks, etc. This implies better vigilance and mobility on the part of the enemy.

3) Frequently the urban militant conducts his activity in a loose, disorganized, liberal or undisciplined way. This is the most important reason. We must fight strictly and intransigently from now on to completely eliminate it.

The repression is not an unfortunate, uncontrollable force; its success or lack of it mainly depends on us. The militants' mistakes give the enemy a chance to identify us and cause serious and regrettable problems. Therefore, the elimination of those mistakes is extremely urgent. We cannot blindly trust or adapt comfortably to temporary calm periods. We must have security habits capable of resisting the most ferocious repression. We must not lose the initiative in this aspect or permit events to overtake us and surprise us. We must immediately put all the security norms into practice in communications, contacts and meetings.

A) Communications

The greatest enemy to security is convenience. This tempts us to use channels of communication monitored by the enemy such as the telephone, letters, telegrams, etc.

The enemy periodically monitors the telephone of any person suspected of clandestine activities; for this reason we say it is a resource at the service of the repression if not used correctly and prudently. The enemy has technical equipment to monitor all telephone calls. Even when a public telephone is used, there is the risk that the telephone we call is monitored. For this reason, its use for clandestine communications must be very limited. All those "clever" calls that we improvise ("are you going to the fiesta tomorrow," "bring the book I loaned you to the park at 1200 hours tomorrow," etc.) leave enough clues to an expert in decoding messages. The only ones deceived are the alleged deceivers.

The use of letters and telegrams is less frequent in our area. We must not use these communications in the city and we must use extreme caution in correspondence within as well as outside the country. The counterinsurgency forces have offices and experts for examining letters and deciphering codes: collecting false names and addresses, messages between lines, number codes and all those resources used to hide a message. The same thing is true about telegrams.

We must not view the enemy as omnipotent. It is impossible for it to exercise absolute control over all these types of communication since it would need a very large budget to monitor everyone. However, it invariably monitors all people who have shown signs of clandestine activity. Calling or writing a comrade through legal channels using a pseudonym is a direct denunciation. The risks that this implies if it is not done properly, using your legal name, can be seen.

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Some norms in the use of vehicles must also be observed:

1. It is not usually necessary to drive at great speed.
2. Traffic signs must be strictly obeyed.
3. It is not necessary to look back suspiciously; it is better to use the rearview mirror.
4. All vehicle documents must always be carried.
5. It is not necessary to use vehicles directly in operations.
6. Vehicles must be given legal, correct and compartmentalized use to keep them from being marked.
7. They must be kept in good condition with sufficient fuel and minimal repairs.

On urban buses any conversation on political aspects, militant work or anything that can reveal us must be absolutely avoided. It is necessary to remember this because, on every bus, there is someone interested in detecting us--passengers, inspectors, etc.

Preferably buses with two doors should be used and you should place yourself where you have perfect control of the situation. We must not go to a comrade's house any time we want him; this is very easy but it is very dangerous and is a bad habit. We must not leave messages with his relatives.

One resource that can be used is passes. They have the great advantage of being a completely clandestine and compartmentalized channel since only those who use it know of it. This is a fast way to communicate; a written message is transmitted, covering up the contents well and destroying it after reading it.

Passes can be done in two ways: personally and impersonally.

A personal pass is when it is done directly--for example, making the pass quickly on a corner and continuing to walk separately as if nothing happened. It can also be done while looking in a store window, etc. This must be done with planning and with preestablished sites where there is knowledge of the operational situation.

The impersonal pass is done using the resources of the environment, specifically hiding places: cracks in a wall, the hollow of a tree, gaps in a bench at a public park, etc. In other words, anything that our imagination can discover to increase our operational resources can be used. This pass requires more planning, control of the operational situation, good coordination, naturalness in filling and emptying the hiding places and absolute security that no one observed. This is very functional during harsh times of the

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repression when it is necessary to restrict personal contacts. Useful hiding places must be found.

B) Contacts

When a militant has given the first sign to the enemy of his activity and suspects that the enemy is investigating him, it is indispensable and obligatory that he countercheck before making a contact.

The objective of the countercheck is to confirm the investigation and, if it exists, to misinform and defeat it. It is very important that we not show any sign of our intention and activity or show that we know countercheck techniques.

The enemy has two basic objectives for the investigation:

- a. To detect and verify the clandestine activity of suspects.
- b. To detect people, houses, places, etc., where the suspect carries out his clandestine activity.

We can define two types of investigations:

1) Subtle investigation: done with the intention that the target not realize that he is being investigated. The investigator usually stops his activity when he is detected; he is replaced by another so that the target is not aware of the monitoring.

An investigating team generally consists of three men using different modalities: ordinary, zig-zag and stationary. They coordinate through hand signals. When the man near the target is detected by him, he is replaced by his successor and so on. They use a support vehicle; its characteristic can be (although not always) a radio transmitter antenna to communicate directly with the center of operations where the investigation is monitored. This is when they follow on foot. There are different modalities for following targets in different types of motorized vehicles.

There are fixed control points--kiosk vendors, janitors, street sweepers, waiters, etc.--in streets, schools and coffee shops frequented by the person of interest. There are also moving control points like salesmen, electricians, fumigators, etc., to check the suspect's house.

In addition to these resources that the enemy puts into play, there are also technical resources: different vehicles, binoculars, small telescopes for long-distance monitoring, portable and vehicle radio transmitters, cameras, etc. (A detailed list of these and other aspects exceeds the objective of these simple security norms.)

2) Obvious or Japanese investigation: done so that the target realizes that he is being watched everywhere and at every moment to pressure him psychologically and limit his movements. In our area, this type of investigation is generally done for purposes of elimination and intimidation.

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Some norms that we must observe for a successful countercheck are:

1. In the first place, it must be done with naturalness, not giving any indication of this activity. Otherwise, the countercheck will not have the desired result.

The countercheck technique permits us to neutralize the enemy's activities if we do it carefully and intelligently. However, if we show knowledge of these techniques, if we do them crudely or if we break the countercheck by running (showing that we realized that we were being watched), we will automatically be revealing our militancy, fulfilling the first basic objective of the investigation.

2. When entering or leaving our house, we must check to see if there is any stranger, looking at aspects that he cannot easily change like obvious physical defects, etc. We must not look at superfluous and easily changed features like mustaches, clothing, hats, etc. We must also check vehicles in the area and their characteristics.

3. In a countercheck, it is very important to establish a route in advance, making a careful study of the operational situation, the physical, social and economic environment, the movement of the enemy, etc. It is necessary to stipulate the time of the trip, points of verification and break-off points --in other words, everything that guarantees successfully reaching the contact at the agreed upon time.

4. The route must be consistent with the direction of the contact place. For example, if I live in Guajitos and I have a contact in Trebol, it would be a mistake to include Sixth Avenue on my route with the pretext of seeing a movie poster. Then I would have to turn around to go to the contact place. This route is abnormal and illogical. The correct way is to establish a route with a probable break-off point at the School of Engineering, pretending to have school work, leaving there calmly and securely for the contact. This is done with the objective of confusing the enemy with a number of activities.

5. The verification point that is part of ordinary life gives us a pretext or justification to use as cover so we can do this with naturalness. It can be a movie poster, a store window, an ice cream shop, etc., where we can carefully verify whether we are being watched. We can use resources that the occasion itself provides as a good pretext: a girl walking by, a luxury car, people who dress strangely, etc.

6. The break-off point is the place that, due to its particular nature, forces the investigator to show himself clearly or lose sight of us; he cannot be immediately replaced in the first case and the investigation is frustrated in both cases. Examples are an elevator, a stairway, a narrow alley, open ground, etc. If we try, we will find many places with these characteristics. Except in extreme cases, there should never be a violent break off; it must be done with naturalness.

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7. We must avoid suspicious actions: looking behind us all the time, walking without a definite route, etc. We must arrive at the contact with complete security that we are totally free of investigators. When we verify the existence of an investigation and cannot break it, we must avoid the contact since this would mark the other comrades. After the last verification point, we must go to the contact without counterchecking and we must always walk against traffic to monitor the movements of vehicles and keep them from following us by the same route.

Below are some important security norms for contacts:

1. We must not make contacts in mafioso places frequented by drug addicts, criminals, prostitutes, etc.
2. We must not make contacts in centers of political activity, especially those of the opposition: political parties, student associations, unions, etc. There is vigilance and monitoring in these places since they constitute centers of interest for the counterinsurgency forces.
3. We must not make contacts in inappropriate places.
4. Punctuality demonstrates our degree of awareness and responsibility. Lack of punctuality greatly increases the possibility of detection by the repression because of the time risked while waiting for someone who is late. As we have already noted, the waiting period normally is 10 minutes maximum and, in bad times, 5 minutes maximum.
5. Before reaching the point agreed upon, we must make a quick study of the operational situation at the contact place.
6. It is useful to communicate with people, asking for directions, the time, etc., in order not to go directly to the contact who will be only one among different people we have encountered.
7. If we sometimes have to make contact with some unknown comrade, we must use signs and countersigns which can be certain articles of clothing or objects that are carried in an agreed upon way, all accompanied by a discreet verbal sign or countersign. This must be established by comrades with greater responsibility when the contact is planned.
8. We must dress according to the contact place in order to be confused with the people there. For example, if we make contact in a residential zone, it is necessary to be well dressed. We must imitate the environment.
9. We must not show caution, vigilance or mistrust to avoid attracting attention.
10. We must not carry any compromising papers or other types of things. If it is necessary, the responsible comrade will centralize them and transport them by a more secure means. This is also true for weapons which must never

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be carried unnecessarily but only for strictly operational objectives. The maturity of our militants must help them understand this aspect well.

11. We must carefully justify why we are at the contact place at that time. This has to be prepared beforehand, making sure that the pretext is consistent with the place and time.

12. When a militant contacts his collaborator, he must do a prior countercheck for him of a route established beforehand, many times without him realizing it, since the collaborator is not used to security habits.

The different types of contact can be:

1) Regular contact: made the same day of the week and at the same time or four different places a month.

2) Reserve contact: established for another time that day or on subsequent days in another place if the regular contact fails for any reason.

3) Emergency contact: made at a stipulated place and time in case there is an unexpected situation which requires urgent treatment. A warning signal through any legal and safe channel at a permanent time is indispensable: a completely normal, ordinary telephone call; a greeting through a radio station; etc. We must create and practice all these security mechanisms, avoiding improvisations which are so dangerous for our work.

Signals are an excellent security measure for contacts. Every militant and every unit must establish a signal code. Creativity and initiative (not merely abstract requirements for the militant) are indispensable here. For example, in the sectors near the contact there might be a post, a wall, etc. The person responsible--or any other militant--goes to the contact place beforehand; if he notes danger, he warns the rest of his comrades by a very safe means without running any risk so that the others can spread out calmly. We call these passive signals: a cross on a certain post indicates danger or a circle indicates normalcy. Using active signals, taking out a handkerchief will indicate danger, for example, while combing our hair will indicate normalcy.

C) Meetings

With respect to meetings, we can note the following:

1. Something that we must always remember in our clandestine activity is not to follow routines. Entering and leaving a house at the same time, regularly frequenting a coffee shop, a movie, recreation parks, etc., using the same places for contacts, not varying meeting places, using a bus route at the same time, always walking through the same sector--all these help the repressive forces detect our movements. Therefore, we must frequently change all these aspects in order not to fall into this serious mistake of following a routine.

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2. We must not hold meetings in the same place as contacts because if someone is detected, we would be putting the group within reach of the enemy. We must avoid meetings in places that do not offer the right conditions. The place where the meeting is held must permit control of the situation itself and movements outside the place; that is, we must not meet where we are isolated and can be easily surprised.
3. Arrivals to the meeting must be staggered and only the members of a unit should participate. A large group attracts attention.
4. We must have a pretext for the meeting--that is, a logical and consistent explanation that can stand up under questioning and verification by the enemy. This must be adapted to our personality and the information that we give must be fictitious and simple, without going into great detail. If we are in a political study meeting, we can use the pretext that we are university students studying for an exam. This must be reinforced with the cover of having university books or texts on hand.
5. In each unit there must be one person responsible for security. He must first study the security conditions for the meeting and report on this at the beginning of the meeting.
6. The meetings must necessarily be brief but with enough time to cover all the aspects. The meeting must not be unnecessarily prolonged for impertinent matters.
7. There must be an agenda, giving priority to the more important and urgent aspects.
8. We must have a plan for emergency retreat, specifying the duty of each comrade and the order that must be followed in the retreat. There must be a field team and protection depending on the legal situation of the comrades and the nature of the meeting.
9. We must have all personal identification documents on hand.
10. We must be careful about speaking loudly and whispering; both forms equally attract attention. We must avoid explicitly mentioning words like guerrillas, skunk, control, squeeze, socialism, etc. When strangers approach, the subject must be changed naturally, not interrupting the conversation abruptly and loudly. Our language offers many resources for expressing the same thing in very different ways.
11. We must not get upset when a comrade calls attention to us by speaking loudly or acting suspiciously.
12. It is not appropriate to have two or more collaborators meeting at the same time since this would end compartmentalization. We must not take any collaborator to an organization house where a militant lives. We should always use the resources of the collaborator.

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13. We must use unsuspecting security signals, the resources that the meeting situation offers. For example when there is a meeting in a house, if the curtains are closed, it is a signal of danger and if the curtains are open, it is a signal of normalcy.

14. When a house is used, it is advantageous to turn on the radio to limit hearing what we say outside. In open, public places, we must remember that it is easy to hear what is said.

D) Liaisons

The term liaison is synonymous with contact but we use it for comrades with greater responsibility in the organization. An indispensable factor in every clandestine organization is to maintain vertical relations: between the militants and the unit, the unit and the person responsible for the sector and this person and the members of the leadership. This verticalness means that the detection, arrest and possible "singing" of a comrade due to the abominable methods that the enemy uses will not affect other comrades; that is, it will not have repercussions that hurt the rest of the organization.

We must correctly understand that this verticalness is not at all due to a military hierarchy of command or a desire for subordination or exclusive privileges. It is a vital necessity for a clandestine organization that wants to develop a war responsibly.

We must remember the following points:

1. We must not know the names or residences of these comrades nor meet unnecessarily; we must eliminate that risk.
2. We must avoid meeting other militants and persons connected with the movement.
3. We must not learn addresses, places of work or study of comrades; this reduces the possibilities of denunciation to the minimum.
4. We must always use pseudonyms.
5. We must not go directly to the houses of comrades.
6. Houses must be used exclusively for the designated operational objectives. They must not be used for others and only strictly necessary comrades must know about them. For example, if it is a security house, meetings or other types of activities must not be held there.
7. We must not interact legally with other militants in order not to entangle clandestine activity and legal activity. This would increase the possibilities of detection. We must not mix places where we do clandestine work with legal activities. Depending on the nature of meetings and the responsibility of the comrades that attend them, we must reach the meeting place several hours early or even a day ahead.

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Part III: Importance of Legality in Clandestine Activity of the Militant

In these observations, we necessarily start with our criteria of general organization, particularly clandestineness and secrecy. The importance of this aspect for the preservation, growth and development of our organization is given. In passing, we should point out that, without knowledge and mastery of our political and ideological principles and without militant discipline, we could not carry out any clandestine activity without endangering our security and that of our comrades.

The objective of these observations is to clarify the correct position of legality in human, material and operational resources which permits us to exploit them for our security. We also want to note some technical observations to preserve security in order to avoid the mistakes that we commit most frequently.

A) Three Erroneous Attitudes

Some of our militants, due to lack of understanding of the use of legality, fall into three erroneous attitudes in their clandestine work. We will list them according to their frequency:

1. In the first place, some comrades consider their legal activity a neutralizing factor in their militancy and this causes them uneasiness and frustration. They think legal and clandestine activity are irreconcilable, parallel but exclusive circumstances; you are irremediably in one or the other. They get lost in trifles which limit continual and responsible militancy. That situation is often revealed through nonfulfillment of assigned tasks.
2. There are comrades who, consciously or unconsciously, underestimate legality and reveal their militancy. They express ideological positions that characterize our organization in places where they mistakenly think they can carry out open political activity. This leads to a relaxation of security norms. These can be small mistakes that often pass unnoticed but when they reach the ears of people with certain information, they can make deductions that can hurt our organization.
3. In the third place (this does not happen in our organization), there are people who seek immediate professionalism which they consider a basic premise to be able to carry out militant activity. They forget that professionalism has a training process and a need for concrete organizational development. It cannot be a subjective decision by anyone or a way to evade personal, family and economic problems.

We must not forget that, in the past, there were serious mistakes in organizations that developed "open clandestineness." Those errors continue. There are organizations that voluntarily tie their own hands because of an enormous contingent of "marked" members which results in isolation and detection. This does not permit rational exploitation of the vast energy of the people; even more serious, it facilitates repressive activity.

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Unquestionably, this is due to more profound reasons: sectarianism derived from the class position of the leaders imbued with colonialism and the ideological dogmatism of the left; strategic and tactical concepts divorced from the reality of the country--legalistic and electoral ones at one extreme and adventurous ones at the other extreme--ignorance of norms of clandestine work, etc.

It is urgent and necessary to examine this situation. (Naturally, this is not the intention of these observations but we have done this in other materials.) The blood of comrades who ended up firing shots without representing anything or anyone is still fresh. There are "mass organizations" that, after dozens of fights, lost what they had constructed with such prolonged efforts in one fateful moment. Whole teams of veteran leaders fell in a single criminal blow of the repression that continually refines its methods and procedures of counterinsurgency with imperialist advice.

We must not make a mistake in this. Our country is backward in structure but it is one of the most advanced in methods of mass repression. A large part of the national budget, the plans for economic pseudodevelopment, demagogic speeches, the genocidal actions of the enemy, etc., all respond to one motive: counterinsurgency.

B) Cover and Pretext: Resources and Guarantees for Clandestine Activity

The rural guerrilla has invaluable technical resources: the olive drab that mimics the environment, vigilance, discipline, constant mobility, the thousand eyes and ears of the people and the physical condition of the terrain. (Of course, the resources of the guerrilla are not reduced to this alone.) On the urban front, it is materially impossible to obtain most of these resources. We cannot dress in olive drab or count directly on the support of our neighbor. We are not subjected to constant combat discipline. Therefore, we must constantly use all the technical resources that the particular conditions of the city give us. We must remember that stern individual discipline is decisive for the urban militant.

We also have effective technical resources, resources that we do not have to invent or improvise since we would do a mediocre job and we would create a situation easily detectable by the enemy. These resources are within reach and give us our own legal status: our work in a factory or office, our studies, our friends and relatives, etc.

At times this situation is handled wrong, giving away concessions through an incorrect interpretation of revolutionary conduct. If we handle it correctly, though, it should not become an obstacle. On the contrary, it is a resource we can really exploit for the development of our organization. Everything depends on how we understand and carry out our legal life. Our legal life must be creative, productive and progressively support our life as revolutionaries. It must not be a legal life that condemns us to immobility, frustration or accommodation. Legal life in this sense is completely antagonistic to clandestine militancy. It is obvious that this implies deprivation and effort. As we have already noted, each one must carry out his own fight for liberation.

The revolutionary is not someone who comes down from his "ivory tower" to do spectacular actions alone, isolated from the economic and social activity of the system. This inevitably ends in dogmatic and subjective positions. Our objective is to keep ourselves, under legal cover, in areas where there are possibilities, areas which represent sectors of organizational interest. It is not our intention to isolate ourselves as was done mistakenly in the past. This gives us four very important advantages.

1. The first is cover for clandestine activity (we will discuss this now).
2. The second is cover for enlistment, incorporation and organization of new people, adapting and channeling the spontaneous sympathy that our actions arouse. "We should not close the oven after the first batch is done." That permits us to penetrate the sector of interest with security, naturalness and selectivity, thus preserving quality in organizational growth.
3. The third is to pay the conventional expenses of the organization through our legal resources. This is important because it permits us to use all our forces for political, organizational and developmental tasks, avoiding the problem in the past when mere subsistence monopolized the efforts of the organizations.
4. The fourth permits us to directly experience the problems and needs of the people in the different sectors. It permits us to experience the social, military and political activity in the area. It permits us to exploit the rich flow of different types of information that we can extract by mobilization in all the social and productive sectors and in the institutions that interest us. In this way, we can rationally open the channels of popular participation and we can extract work criteria in harmony with concrete circumstances.

We can use these major resources for clandestine work--cover and pretext.

Cover means the legal cover for our clandestine activity. It must be solid and consistent so that it safeguards us from any suspicion. We must take care of it and reinforce it day after day.

In general, for militants on the urban front, the cover is work, home, social relations, studies, etc. Nevertheless, there are small errors that make us vulnerable, making us the focus of interest for enemy activity. Therefore, we must take special care in preserving it and reinforcing it day after day.

The cover is a constant and stable resource like an "intentionally controlled double nature."

Pretext means a tactical, operational resource adapted to the needs of the specific task. Naturally, it must also be adapted to our personality. The pretext becomes a coherent, legal and inoffensive explanation for concrete clandestine activities (whether control, a meeting, material, etc.) blending in with the work and circumstances in which we develop the work.

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The pretext must be prepared beforehand to prevent possible questioning and verification by the enemy. It can be profound, serious or light, depending on the legal level of the comrade and his task. We must express it with ease and naturalness, without nervousness and without giving details of times, places, persons, areas, etc., which would not be normal for an ordinary individual.

Knowledge of the operational situation where the activity will be developed is indispensable for the pretext: the social atmosphere, friends, residences, enemy posts, etc. We can also count on resources to reinforce it: clothing, wigs, mustaches, glasses, etc.

Through the above notations, we can measure the importance of legality and the care we must take to preserve it. It is the armor that makes us invisible to the enemy and gives us good conditions for relaxation and psychological and operational stability, permitting us to penetrate, confuse and destroy the enemy with the least sacrifice.

Anyone who hurts his legality, whether through immaturity, negligence or lack of discipline, commits a serious mistake. The price is often his own life and always hurts the interests of the revolution. Using the classic image, the fish voluntarily bites the hook and dies outside the popular sea.

C) Don't Give Indications to the Enemy

The enemy is not omnipotent and cannot monitor all the individuals in a society. However, he does maintain vigilance on centers and persons of interest: centers openly opposed to the regime or naive and talkative people who boast about their position as revolutionaries. A militant can reveal a sign of his clandestine activity which makes the repression watch his movements in order to detect, infiltrate and eliminate the largest number of revolutionaries. Therefore, the security of the militant is not subject to fate or bad luck or the infallibility of the enemy; it is his absolute responsibility.

We feel that the security of the militant is guaranteed to a great degree if all the security norms are observed with discipline including the cover and pretext. In this way, he can operate in the midst of the enemy without the enemy realizing it.

Below are some examples of indications to the enemy of our clandestine activity:

1. Carelessness in the use, transportation and protection of the materials of the organization.
2. Frequenting and openly acting in centers of interest to enemy intelligence like student associations, political parties of the opposition, unions, etc.
3. A faulty countercheck or trite verifications, assuming suspicious positions or making unnecessary violent break offs; becoming easy prey to

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emotions, making ideological attacks in inappropriate situations and becoming involved in unproductive situations without weighing the information that the enemy can get from them.

4. Engaging in relations with militants or known leaders of the public left; brandishing our radicalism at the slightest opportunity.

5. Using incorrect places for contacts, meetings, passes, etc., and cowering unnecessarily at enemy movements.

6. Underestimating the importance of the cover and not giving a pretext for each militant activity.

7. Passing on tactical or strategic information to give more force to what we say when we begin political incorporation work.

8. Isolating ourselves and not maintaining good neighbor relations, not concerning ourselves with winning their sympathy.

9. Participating in criminal, drunken, scandalous acts, etc.

We have an objective analysis of society and a strategic concept whose validity is demonstrated to us daily in practice. We have a work style consistent with our ideological and political statements. We are becoming stronger organizationally step by step through our quiet, daily activity which is fruitful although without "strong emotions." In a word, we are solidly laying the foundations of the revolution, not a self-proclaimed revolution through convenient pamphlets.

Therefore, our revolutionary conduct must adapt itself to the dynamics of the process and the needs of the present stage of preparation for war. We must not let ourselves be carried away by spectacular actions which is the easy and irresponsible (and tragic) way not to do anything. The popular war does not allow unilateral actions; it is a complex and dynamic situation where the many potentials and initiatives of our people must be exploited.

To conclude these observations, we will say that we need militants with legal status on which all our armed systems can be solidly supported. We emphasize our opinion that study, information and the armed expression have equal importance in the different tasks of the war (although with different characteristics). One could not exist without the other; all are oriented toward the same objective and are part of the enormous popular impetus in the revolutionary war.

We can see the mutual understanding and dialectic identity between legality and clandestineness in its full dimension. We know how to rank activities and problems with the sincere conviction that the interests of the people have priority. (The disciplinary and ideological training of an unconcerned person or someone without productive experience is harder; in the end, the workers make the revolution.)

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Part IV: Compartmentalization

Although this aspect is different from the previous ones, it is also of primary importance for all our work plans. Of course, it is nothing new but its neglect brings catastrophic results. It must be a cornerstone in the work method of every clandestine organization.

A) Political and Operational Work

Compartmentalization is essentially a method of protection and preservation of work and resources as well as the security of the militants or cadres (the most important). It consists fundamentally in keeping knowledge and information of the operation restricted to the aspects and responsibilities of the work of each person.

It must be stated that we mention operational work as an area of restriction but not political work. We must demarcate the fields well to avoid confusion or misunderstanding.

We understand that everything related to statements, lines, positions, general opinions and orientations within the organization belong to the scope of political work. There should not be compartmentalization here although there is responsibility for the militants or cadres based on the use made of it in publicity, communication and circulation, particularly outside the organization.

This precaution must be well understood since it is tied to security and corresponds to a very specific and vital need in this stage. The organization must be preserved from breach of trust, denunciation disguised as "ideological battle" or any risk of this type. This is achieved through collective vigilance and the correct use of our materials and positions.

There is a boundary that is not marked well initially because political and operational factors directly affect it. This includes new incorporations, resources obtained, relations established, new places included, etc. We understand that compartmentalization must prevail almost automatically although the information supplied is general. Of course, there will be exceptions depending on the case but these must be exceptions, not the norm.

B) Operational Aspects

The operational aspects clearly include three points:

What is being done or planned?

How and where is it being done?

Who and how many are doing it?

We include strategic and tactical aspects on this list. Obviously, compartmentalization here must be strict and does not allow doubts or whimsical

interpretations. Violation shows extreme irresponsibility, disloyalty or bad faith that can become treason. In these cases, the causes do not matter if the effects are the same.

1. The first point covers the particular work plans that are being carried out or will be in the future.

For anyone who is not familiar with security criteria, this type of caution can appear exaggerated and extreme. It suffices to say, in explanation, that the slightest indication or detail of this type, even if isolated, is a lode of information about us to a good intelligence analyst, a lode of greater interest or more important than finding a weapons depot or recording names of militants.

Even if one believes the opposite, frequently there is not enough experience to evaluate the significance and importance that apparently useless and unimportant information can have in the hands of the enemy. We must not think naively that the information channels of the enemy are limited to its direct agents. We could give the example of a system of sound waves like an echo. It is not necessary to directly hear the noise but only to follow the echo to determine what happened. That is exactly what happens with intelligence networks; they obtain appreciable valuable information in this way.

2. The second question related to where and how things are done covers method. However, it is not reduced exclusively to that since, at the same time, it shows the type of resources that are available or planned to develop which is very important for obvious reasons.

Let us always remember that the essence of clandestineness and the point of its effectiveness are enemy ignorance about us and skillful and consistent cover for our activity. Protecting the work site and future sites is an indispensable element that is valuable in itself and complements what we saw in the paragraph above. Any indication in this sense enormously facilitates enemy activity.

The above observations must help us correctly orient work but never paralyze it, immobilize it or limit it. Irresponsibility is as harmful as a persecution complex. There are a thousand opportunities that can and must be exploited no matter how fine the net of the enemy is.

3. Compartmentalization to safeguard the identity of who and how many do certain work is extraordinarily important. The life and security of these and other comrades usually depend on it.

If we look at the function of operativeness and work possibilities, if the enemy can locate those who can do legal work and clandestine fight, it immediately limits work possibilities and better mobilization and yield. Therefore, this aspect of compartmentalization is always in effect.

The number of cadres or militants on a job must always be kept secret. Among other things, it reveals the importance allocated to a certain sector or the magnitude of the work developed in a certain sense or place.

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C) Attitudes of the Militant

To complete our view and practice of compartmentalization, we must add some ideas aimed especially at the militant.

The militant will have to rid himself of every feeling of suspicion or misplaced sensitivity. The fact that information on work and plans of the organization is kept from him must not be interpreted as lack of confidence in him in particular. Rather it must be understood as an important and indispensable work method. Instead of bothering him, he must aid its fulfillment.

There are other mistaken attitudes that must be corrected. There are comrades who share information that they have, not related to their specific work and without any reason to pass it on, with others with whom they have particular "friendship and confidence." We want to establish this objective that compartmentalization must not be disrupted just because the one with whom we share it is a comrade in our complete confidence.

Lastly, we must cultivate discretion so that even if we are accidentally depositories of some information, we fully guarantee that it will not come out of us improperly for any reason.

Conclusion

Our revolutionary responsibility must prevent us from giving the enemy indications of our clandestine activity through lack of fulfillment of these security norms and others that practice itself will teach us. Otherwise, the enemy would focus his activity on us which would constitute a serious danger to our lives, limit our movements and our revolutionary activity and hurt the security and preservation of the organization.

We must practice all these norms daily. We must observe them with perseverance and responsibility until they become part of our very life.

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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

RAF LEADER ON CONCEPT OF URBAN GUERRILLA: BLACK SEPTEMBER

Malmo TEXTE: DER RAF in German 1977 pp75-111, 337-367, 598-600

/Text/ Chapter X--Andreas on 26 August 1975

That happened on 26 August

A. was able to speak then--interrupted by Prinzing only 21 times--
because a delegation of French lawyers attended the trial as obser-
vers. He analyzes the course of the trial from its contradiction

--correctly as was demonstrated 7 weeks later

--of course confirmed by the Third Senate of the Federal Court:

We are excluded.

The problem with the motion--at this and any juridical attempt by the attorneys to defend us (and in the meantime themselves, their legal function and, within it, the ruin of the constitution)--is its hopelessness, something already demonstrated in the fact that Prinzing announced he would reject this defense motion for dismissal in 4 hours, even before it was argued.

The trial cannot be legally stayed since it has been conducted illegally or, in Maihofer's words, supralegally conducted for 5 years, and conducted not by the apparatus of justice but as a function of a militarily conceived counterrevolutionary mobilization by the executive.

I am using a quotation from Herold at the Hessenforum--seeing that he has been using us so excessively for 5 years--for example to bloat his apparatus: Herold asks himself about the causes of terrorism, thereby distorting the concept in line with the needs of psychological warfare--turned upside down as we have already explained here, because urban guerrilla is to be understood neither as the political concept of terrorism nor its action in terms of military tactics in the historical and military definition of this concept. Herold thus asks at the Hessenforum

"Whether, in its outward form in Germany and the entire world it is a product of the actors brains, of the Baaders and Meinhofs--a strong plural--or whether terrorism is actually a reflection of certain social situations in the Western world--and the Eastern world also--and that terrorism, so to speak, in its superstructure simply reflects problems that have an objective existence."

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This must be commented--(because it gets difficult when one gets involved: It must be dissolved; and Schily is to be reproached for not dissolving it)--that all these categories are being used wrongly. How silly it sounds for a cop to try and express himself in Marxist lingo; after all, superstructure here can only mean the state superstructure of the method of production, of the economy; that term cannot be used this way in reference to a revolutionary organization--and so that turns out to be the truth, that we have explained a few days ago--state terrorism indeed reflects the problems of capital, existing at the base, as objectives: "Ripeness of the tendency," crisis, dissolution of the law of values, economic, political and ideological repercussions of the wars of liberation, and so on--

While the strategy of the urban guerrilla only--only, he says--can arise only from the social reflex of the contradictions he calls problems, as a revolutionary transmission. That would for once be the correct definition.

But then he goes on to ask

"...Whether terrorism in Germany is not an indication of the objective inevitability of a historic development, or, to put it briefly, whether terrorism here does not represent a new kind of substitute war, popular war, guerrilla warfare, whether it replaces the great war. If we are dealing here with objective rather than subjective factors, we must adopt a different method of dealing with it, it is then no good to clout heads or, as some people demand, cut off heads, then it is necessary to affect precisely the historic causes, the inevitabilities."

It seems to me important to repeat that this reveals two approaches, especially, that is the approach "to clout heads," and that is the line Prinzing pursues by his isolation order, and that is the approach taken by the federal prosecutor general's office for 3 years now, by torment, by torture, and there is the attempt--I will explain that in greater detail later--to cope with the problem--such as it appears to Herold--within legal standards.

We note here briefly--the reason is the break between the base--the socialization of production, international concentration of capital and superstructure--here to maintain the bourgeois state in its function, the capitalist production relation against the worldwide trend of productive forces toward socialism. As a general definition, guerrilla becomes possible as a revolutionary strategy, is generated and advances in the course of this break.

At the same time this break foreordains reaction. The governmentally and institutionally handled strategy of capital is able only to try to settle the contradiction by fascist means. This fascism differs from the former--nationalist and obtuse fascism insofar as it does not take over the state and pervades society as a reactionary strategy of national monopolies, of national capital--filtered through nationalist movement/mobilization. Instead, consonant with the trend of the international process of concentration and monopolization, as the strategy of the leading capital, that is U.S. capital, it bends to its purpose the national state as the function of its world internal politics and, by way of the national state, pervades the national societies. In other words the national state becomes the engine of internationally organized capital against the nation, against the people. The bourgeois constitutional state as the expression of class contradictions within

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the national framework must be dissolved or transformed by the strong state as it is described nowadays--in other words fascist--in the antagonistic development between the socialization of production and international capital concentration; otherwise the dissolution of capital positions disintegrates it in the ripeness of this contradiction and is abolished by revolution.

This is the contradiction within which and against, in other words by revolutionary initiative, by armed politics in the urban centers, is surrendered the semblance--and this trial is exemplary here--I say the semblance, bourgeois ideology, the bourgeois conception of the state. De-ideologization is an essential transmission of insurrection--breaking down against its strategy is the governmental apologia (of the natural law) of capital--breaking down against it is the project of the total constitutionalization of the class contradiction, and the state is compelled openly to appear as the tool of warring capital, antagonistic toward society.

This process already foreshadows how the attack of small groups assumes a different and new quality by the means of an open countermovement--a quality in the course of which it may turn into a mass movement.

In the contradiction fascism:revolution our politics represent a concrete reflection of that which Herold calls 'objective problems,' in order to offer his apparatus and his strategy of turning society into a police society as the program of reactionary accomplishment. I would say that this is particularly evident in Herold's case, because he is also the man to conduct the war here, ultimately. He says--"the tendency of turning war into a police action" and "shift of military conflicts to the interior" and--I am the man who has to run this war, therefore give me the tools, give me the money, and above all give me the political power. He says that constantly. For his military apparatus he asserts a "privilege of social acknowledgment"--that is his creation of a totalitarian term and he requests legislative authority vested in the constitution--in other words he demands to make laws if the existing ones are inadequate for his requirements. He thereby demands political power. In fact this reflects the strategic compulsion of reaction to dissolve the distinction between police and politics.

That is how we must interpret it, and we can only see it as a whole, when he defines the issue of the 'objective causes' as significant for 'the relation between police and politics,' for 'who needs to combat terrorism'--politics or the police, and he then follows on quite naturally: 'I mean politics.' Justice falls by the wayside, and he can leave it there because--and in this he is quite correct--in actions against urban guerrilla it is completely organized by the political police, becomes a function of the police.

Of course the historic causes he wishes to affect, presumably with such subtle tools as the new police law, will escape him--the system he serves and the machinery he is expanding do not affect the historic inevitabilities, they react within them, and this reaction develops the resistance it is meant to overcome.

Herold propagates the police state, and that is also one of the grotesque constellations, that explains the deformation of the imperialist state where the proceedings are taking place: It is Herold, the policeman, who wrestles for legal standards against the guerrilla--ultimately international legal standards--because they

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functional with regard to his claim to authority. While Prinzing, the judge--in his inability to arrive at the concept of his object, must liquidate them in the attempt to cope with an explicit confrontation in the puddle of a criminal trial, where he can chart the course. Herold is at the height of reaction, but both approaches reflect the legal vacuum and the gap in legitimacy in which the trial is run--since the first action of the RAF. Both characterize the trial as military execution, and both are the expression of the contradiction within which the state can react only against its constitutionality. Emergency laws, professional interdictions, special legislation against insurrection.

-- (the state apparatus) he breaks the constitution, and in this break any ideological accommodation is destroyed. All that remains is the ideological surrogate of the state security state--psychological warfare--it is the content of this event and therefore this has nothing to do with righteousness, the state here uses every means at its disposal--and Schmidt has said often enough that any means is good enough--and that means all organized means of repression, lies, manipulation, technology--

The self-portrait of imperial omnipotence against the historic tendency of our politics, consciously articulated in insurrection, when it /imperial omnipotence--translator's note/. turns antagonistic to society, in other words illegitimate.

It is the same development from which the guerrilla derives its legitimacy, the meaning of its politics, from the failure of legitimacy of the ruling power.

Because the political goals of the guerrilla and that which is conveyed by their method and structure, arouse expectations and attitudes oriented to use value, not exchange value; the latter's basis becomes invalid and corroded in the objective trend to the socialization of production. It loses its social sense, the material base of its ideological justification. This explains what a false analysis of the conflict must represent as an exaggerated, panicky and excessive reaction of the state to the politics of the guerrilla, in its tendency in fact as a conflict about the meaning of political practice. Because the state--as a function of monopolistic capital in and from the development of its crisis--is compelled in this conflict to extend by administrative planning its control to social sectors earlier eluding its grasp; in the function of maintaining the rule of the exchange value it is forced toward such expansion.

As a result counterstrategies against de-ideologization are necessarily developed, designed to compensate the above proportional (state) need for legitimacy; a consequence of its administration of social reproduction that earlier proceeded outside its control.

In this development the state attempts to produce the material reality and basis snatched from its legitimacy ideologies in the process of the nationalization of society, artificially as a surrogate ideology by psychological warfare, that is by the planned expansion of its repression. However, repression compels subjection without being able to legitimize it. On the contrary--growing with the resistance to it is the legitimacy of that resistance.

Guerrilla politics, illegality, is the opposite pole to the nationalization of society. It therefore attracts total state repression but also all hopes for liberation. In addition let us say that the project of the state's total pervasion of

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society--the fascist tendency to the total state, is a process qualitatively distinct from old-fashioned fascism, because it is scientifically conceived and organized.

(Should we ever get to a basically conceptual terminology, I will explain that--as a strategy at least in the conception, though not in reality, because the facts are the structures within which reaction shapes strategies without being able to arrive at a strategic notion--in this connection it is crucial how the strategies of repression are developed from the alienated production process as such.)

Last week Schmidt said that the vital threats to the Western industrial countries are of an "economic and psychological nature,"--this is what he was talking about. He, the apologist of the state, psychologizes society as a whole in this one sentence.

He replaces politics by psychology as one of the social processes and, thereby, programs the scientifically orchestrated repression and psychological warfare--for example

He propagates a set of concept that no longer needs nor has social legitimation. It elevates the state's manipulative penetration of society to a program--admittedly he also says something about its conditions. The trend toward antagonism between society and imperialist state, between productive forces and the production relation, reflected by the state.

(And not just reflects--but that he defends to the extent to which he himself becomes a capitalist in the increasing significance of his economic role not only as a forcible (despotic apparatus, monopoly of force) and political (and ideological) communication--but also as economic communication in the sectors where capital is needed for social reproduction but which yield inadequate profits). It is just this antagonism that makes the state react with the fascist strategies of internal security. They determine the conception of this method and the trial here in the greatest detail. The state represents itself here as the state in the class war at home--the trial termed by Brueckner the inner-state declaration of hostilities--in which every political opposition outside and inside the ideological state apparatus--because in the Federal Republic labor unions and parties are parts of the state apparatus, are virtually nationalized in the Federal Republic--are repressively fought, expatriated and finally illegalized and suppressed--by means of a control and investigative machinery consonant with the technological standard of production. To my mind that standard was quite obvious even before. Schily describes it here by the example of special cells in Bruchsal, that a machine to carry out executions was there conceived and constructed in accordance with the instructions of the federal prosecutor's office. The federal prosecutor's office remarks here "where do they get that from?" It is obvious they want to hide the thing, and if it surfaces anyway, they display police reflexes--but let's go on--I am talking about that because just this is a perfect example, most instructive--it is expressed in the nature of the trial as a show trial and even more in the methods used--: The compulsion to maintain a permanent and transparent lie, to manipulate, the need to fetter us, such as has been customary so far, the really quite automatic breach of the trial order, the brusque rejection of all defense motions--actually not a single defense motion has been admitted in 3½ months, not even those concerning

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small details, it is expressed in the malice on which Prinzing's conduct of the trial depends.

To return to Herold. He says--and by this he also talks about the program and the difficulties 'the trend...is the conscious build-up of counterforce with the aim precisely in a trial where the hope is for spontaneity at one or the other stage, to direct the loyalties of the citizens to itself.

That is why increasingly used in this entire struggle are not only military categories but also more and more categories of international law, so to speak.' And he cites a legal expert who says: 'We are here not simply dealing with a type of crime but with an international conflict that would require those fighters to be granted the benefits of the Geneva Convention.'

(Oh well, it doesn't look like that here, the benefits considered here are special cells, is that thing, that execution machine in Bruchsal that was ready even before the verdict.)

Herold is looking sideways at the legal standards--international ones--after the internal legal standards were dissolved in war in the conception of internal reaction.

And he surely does that in acknowledgment of those public opinion polls in 1972, 1973 and 1974 that sometimes turned up almost 20 percent--referring to the adult population--as RAF sympathizers--and that is after all 4 times more than voted for the party of the interior minister. Of course we do not claim that this represents a solid or even tangible political base, such a public opinion poll. In fact we consider it useless. But at least they show (after all they were not conducted for our benefit, but for the state, the state reaction takes these opinion polls very seriously indeed; we can trace back very accurately in the respective escalation of the hunt, how these public opinion polls have been built into the mobilization program), therefore at least they show that the state tends to develop resistance to the extent--directs loyalty toward us, by having to try and compel it by an unlawful mobilization such as the hunt for us.

Of course--given the information standard of his machine--Herold presumes that nothing can be done by the apparatus of justice. There is the fact of the continuity of urban guerrilla in the FRG, it is not destroyed by our arrest--on the contrary ...it is stronger than in 1972 and anyone with knowledge of the historic analogies of insurrection is well aware that it is furthered by inept spectacles such as Stammheim. Insofar the entire concept of the trials has foundered on the actual development.

It is not as if there were a proper manhunt--they cannot even make an attempt to do so--I think that has become more and more obvious in these 3 months--the judiciary organs necessarily seek in prisons and pretrial fortresses to pursue a militarily conceived operation by unsuitable means--as a military conflict. Admittedly with prisoners isolated for the past 3½ years. That is how I would also explain the abject propagandist efforts represented by such a trial.

Now to the notion of the entire matter.

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Once the judiciary conducts a war openly and in a public function, it liquidates, together with the legal standards that legitimate it ideologically as the intermediary between state and society, the entire ideological justification for the concept of the constitutional state and thereby sharpens the contradiction it is supposed to mediate. It turns into a judiciary of arrangements, a tool of counterinsurgency.

Evident and comprehensible in this split--and here particularly obvious, is the imperialist state as a function of capital against any attempt--in its psychologized propaganda and psychological warfare merely reaction to the contradiction--against any attempt to assert its social legitimation.

It could be that Herold means this contradiction which, historically, has always aroused resistance, while Prinzing who understands nothing still continues to "clout heads" by his isolation order and now the attempt to save himself by having us declared psychiatric cases. However, even psychiatry is unsuitable, is no solution--it cannot provide him with legitimation--what, admittedly it can get him as a consequence of his approach--in view of the personality structure of political prisoners--is this: It may destroy us physically. "Strike off the heads." Prinzing succeeded in doing that in Wittlich. I do not consider this an exaggeration--nobody who followed the trial can possibly consider it an exaggeration--because after all what is there for all to see is that this unlawful judge--in his unlawful step that is supposed to settle the contradiction in hour heads--but torments and psychiatry, though it did not come off there--but he beat us down physically. In this context it occurs to us that the suffering of these 40 prisoners in 3 years, at the limits as Schmidt thinks, of limitless constitutionality at all levels ultimately has a dialectic for us: Because the heads were not to be cracked despite the use of every possible means in special cells the daily torture of 6 months forcible feeding, the torments of the padded cells, and so on--this demonstration just did not work, the state's destructive interest in the prisoners was bound to progress--(up to its architectural expression in special cells of Bruchsal and 15 others), the trial had to be dragged out until the prisoners were unfit for trial, but resistance also had to arise--as was shown in Berlin and Stockholm. And because it did not help to clout heads--the group of prisoners was in any case more resistant to psychological destruction than to the physical consequences of psychological torture. Prinzing's trial is running aground in propagandist terms on our resistance and in terms of trial management on our physical weakness.

The solution and watching how he steers toward it--that still remains to him, in fact clearly emerged for probably everybody to see on the last day of the trial--

Our unlawful exclusion; a journalist discovered--the coup of the court, after it so carefully prepared the trial by the unlawful liquidation of the defensibility (and the defense) of the prisoners, it is now reduced to excluding us, in order to get rid of the contradiction developed by this indefensibility and unfitness to trial in the course of the trial, but this also dooms to failure the attempt to stage a trial here. At least as the attempt to provide that section of government reaction organized as the public with the legal outlines in terms of propaganda and thereby the legitimation that the military conception of state mobilization had to swallow in 5 years of unlawful measures. It cannot work--and that is the insoluble contradiction in which the event dragged on--because revolutionary politics are not

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not subject to justice. Political justice does not conquer the contradiction, the confrontation it is supposed to try--it expresses it--here by the complete subservience of the court to state security and government. No bourgeois justice is dealt with here--a military pragmatism, organized in the smallest detail by the executive, is being executed. All one has to do is look around.

Prinzing is already being reproached for not properly running the show--he is becoming dysfunctional because the traditional function of the judge is getting blurred in his brutal manipulation of the trial. Getting to be a problem is his mystification between the interests of his class, to make prevail fascism as the legitimation of all social relations--in other words by means of and by way of the form of the constitutional state, and the open breach of law that is constantly visible in the organization of this trial. It is Prinzing's contradiction that, in his capacity as judge, he is supposed to convey something that at least bears a semblance of justice--Busche put his finger on that--because his function here is crucial, in the form of the law to transcend--here the constitutional trial--its content--as the system of rules by which capital controls and rules its social reproduction process: As the propagandist project of the trial.

In fact that could be saved only by dismissing the charges--which would be a legal act of resistance against the state security service, itself not sure of its facts--otherwise he would not sit here as an unlawful judge, as has been made known in the meantime.

It had to happen that Prinzing, since bourgeois law is no longer his frame of reference, since he left it as per the scenario of the public prosecutor's office--certainly no later than after Holger's death, but probably already with the hanky-panky about his chair--that this judge was bound more and more openly and directly to cling to the powers that be--the line Wunder, Buback, Vogel, Schmidt. He dangles like a puppet on the wires of the executive, in this case Buback's, pushing the thing through at any price and with any means available--until it finally ends in the special cells at Bruchsal.

By now we are having a kind of fun with it--the trial--the proceedings turn into an antagonism to its function in the entire RAF trial--to that what was planned here, what is not working in Stammheim, the representation of inviolate bourgeois right--(as, so to speak, the eternal natural inevitability of the production relation it is protecting) and the senselessness of any resistance to it--all that is happening is the demonstration of its decay and with it the decay of the class for which Prinzing--the court here, is working.

The RAF--the guerrilla--is not subject to judicial proceedings because the state of capital as the reactionary side of the contradiction is compelled to persecute us, the guerrilla in the development of the social crisis and make an example of us because we offer the possibility and topicality of a revolutionary development. Necessarily in the categories of warfare, because the urban guerrilla, our politics, our strategy is part of the worldwide (international) anti-imperialist war of liberation that determines the crisis in the metropolises.

Herold once more--he tumbled to it, 'I see here a process, objectively begun; it is worldwide and in a certain way has as its aim the turning over of war to the

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police, while major wars between nations are increasingly losing their importance, because they have lost their power to determine and make history, a new type of discharge of aggression has arisen that can be understood only from the international aspect.' Just so.

... What he offers there is the criminalistic adaptation of the criminological concept of history of American fascists, ideologically founded of course in American psychology--'discharge of aggression.'

We think that the poverty of his ideas is rather comical--the poverty of his comprehension and his borrowing from American counterideology shows on whose behalf he is conducting this war--as part of worldwide U.S. reaction, for American imperialism.

Anyway--at least the cops hawking of international imperialist criminology to help the people here, the Prinzings who wish to run a political show trial actually as a criminalistic farce, because they don't even have enough brains of their own.

I will briefly contrast this with our concept of the conflict: If fascism as represented by Herold and Schmidt--as an institutional and governmental strategy of capital, is the reactionary expression of the production relation become antagonistic at the international level, internationalism

of the insurrection, the construction of a political and military front in the centers of imperialism, is the revolutionary reflection of the break in the metropolises and its strategy--or it will be.

This process of insurrection is the fair proceeding we value, that we aim for, and we are responsible only to it and we have to answer to it alone.

Chapter XI--Andreas on 18 June

Later Henck (the prison psychiatrist) admitted upon examination that isolation could be said to be torture but, as such, represented a 'philosophical problem.' Prinzing and the federal prosecutors interrupted Andreas 17 times--to prevent him from developing a reasoned argument, shows the torture/isolation in political terms, that is a direct part of it--also explains the gaps, and it clearly shows what is happening here every day.

The course of events was just that: Special cells--and when that did not work, no confession was produced but the consequences of isolation became apparent--the attempt to send Ulrike to a closed psychiatric ward for 8 weeks--'for observation'--as Goette said on behalf of the federal prosecutor's office. When that did not work--the attempt at forcible anesthesia and forcible scintigraphy /?/: The federal court's notion to have her skull opened to find out where the thoughts come from--the concrete project of the federal prosecutor's office was stereotactic surgical intervention in the brain; Witter was to carry out forcible anesthesia and forcible scintigraphy, and Loew offered himself for the brain surgery--both Homburg/Saar University. When mobilization prevented that project--special cells again, the hunger strike, the campaign. As reaction to the campaign the law which allows the exclusion of defense counsel and trials in the absence of the prisoners, in

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other words the removal of the last remnants of public restraint; because the 'hearing' at which unfitness to plead is noted, is not held in public. The court becomes part of the special treatment--as in Stammheim.

Last week in Zweibruecken it was demonstrated in Carl's (Manfred Grashof) case that prisoners can be made unfit to plead at the compulsory examination before such a hearing.

We certainly do not want to be identified with the argument on torture as developed by Schily's motion. I mean we do not make ourselves its object. To define the term torture by way of the one who is tortured is an ambivalent attempt, and it is impossible because here it can refer only, and without consequences, to the horror of a liberal interpretation of the constitutional state about the deformation of this state, and this deformation is inevitable because it derives from the very contradictions of capital movement. The imperialist state is bound to be clearly reflected in the state countermovement against revolutionary politics, a countermovement compelled to torture. It is merely obscured by the indignation of degenerate bourgeois antifascism. That is already so weak in its corruption by social democracy or fettered by revisionism that is not even able to conduct a relevant argument.

An example of the old miserable story--how it entered the service of the state in the hope of changing it--instead the state changed it, used it as long as it was opportune to escape radicalization and finally liquidated it as the reflection of traditional bourgeois ideology, bourgeois humanism, bourgeois freedoms, that interrupts the expanded reproduction process of capital in the sphere of ideological state systems.

Torture can be discussed only within the texts and the strategy that will abolish it: Those of revolutionary politics. From the standpoint of bourgeois antifascism the babble about it becomes a plaint and ends by accusing the victim of torture.

Of course isolation is torture. Lived as he lives it who is exposed to it, it is a slow and deliberate process of the destruction of revolutionary identity and therefore more terrible than any physical pain--and we have experience of that too. In the trap of the consumer society--the trap of alienated production and alienated consumption with its cultural and psychological communications against which alone identity can develop, political consciousness is always a process that has to be fought for. This process is to be broken up and revised in the agony of isolation--by the withdrawal of its prerequisites, practical life, conscious social interaction, the prisoner is deprived of his history. His history, insofar as it is his conscious, his political history.

That is also the end of his personality.

As history is the process that shapes personality, he loses himself with it. Not because he loses his memory (although that also occurs), but because the ability to respond to it, reflect it, recognize it, is destroyed. He becomes incapable of reacting to that which is inflicted on him, happening to him.

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The apparatus turns into the relationship. He regresses and struggles helplessly between the mystifications of bourgeois socialization that catch up with him and beleager him such as he is--alone--as a total, hostile and no longer comprehensible power.

He turns white, as we said, victim (and thus possibly also innocent) at the moment he stops struggling--is no longer able to struggle.

And it is the nature of his misery that he foresees that moment long before it happens and knows that isolation for years on end is just as unequivocal as a shot, only unimaginable and--that also is part of the method--this unimaginableness--much more painful.

"Man, in the most literal sense, is a zoon politicon, not merely a social animal but an animal able to assume a separate identity only within society. The production of the isolated individual outside society--a rarity which may happen to someone civilized accidentally lost in the wilderness, who already by his own dynamism has social powers--is as much of a chimera as the development of language without individuals who live and talk together." (Outlines)

It took us quite a long time in our special cells before we recognized the method and design of isolation. I would say that this measure has its logic in the outlook of the entire system: The compulsion to react by annihilation to the contradiction it generates, because it understands it as its ultimate destruction. Special treatment destroys that which could be "reeducated." It is not a product of forcible socialization--though that also can settle its obvious problem--social defect--only by the destruction inside the prisoner.

The attempt so to interpret and justify the thing and the torture involved in it comes from Klug, now senator for justice in Hamburg. Of course, because he is a corrupt liberal mask--who whitewashes its dirty job with the illusion of values--that would also call for reeducation--but which are no longer available to this society.

In this detail of the antagonism also it is its basic problem that reeducation or brainwashing as projects require legitimation by the apparatus. In other words, to subject it, the apparatus must be able to constitute the subject. In fact, though, the repressive state apparatus and the (imprisoned) revolutionary both know that, in their irreconcilability (as their relation) they are the expression of the tendency by which the legitimation of the bourgeois state has decayed. The suspicion of the force of this decay is what develops the state's destructive strategy against us. Posser as a Social Democrat thinks so--(and he learned it in concrete terms by the ineffectiveness of his panic denials). He was not even interested in reeducation, just in Ulrike's destruction and the smooth propagandist utilization of the destroyed prisoner at the trial to be provided by the confession: The collapse. As functionary of the governing party he is more pragmatic: The "smooth" ritual of power is the meaning he wants to communicate in order to close the gap that indicates the abyss of precisely his clique. When friction did arise--because the discretion needed for this thing was disrupted by the mobilization of the attorneys--he ran true to form, analogous with the truth of social democracy, its

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venality--after all, the entire party leadership Brandt/Schumacher was bought by American capital against the German proletariat--and had the idea to buy a witness for the state. Of course at government level. (... "against"... is not sufficiently accurate. The strategic function of social democracy is that of safeguarding the initiative of capital in the crisis.)

Therefore the crown witness, the state witness. As an institution he does indeed serve as a witness for the situation of the entire ideological conception of the constitutional state and certainly for our politics. Even if he is only an incidental expression of the break by which our definition of state reaction to armed politics must be comprehended.

Because, in this phase--the crisis of capital and the economic crisis of the state--of which each guerrilla action is the political interpretation--is to be changed by the continuity of the attack in a certainly long and contradictory process into the ultimate political crisis of the state, the collapse.

We will discuss this later.

Well, I cannot talk about the one who is tortured, either. Really he only serves as proof of the--at last--frank liquidation of the fiction of the object of state repression's status as a citizen, serves to show that the values of bourgeois ideology of justice have long turned into bothersome antiques as far as the imperialist state is concerned, because they no longer meet capital's expectations of usefulness.

We must talk about him who tortures. The state. And the trial where the state counterstrategy depends on torture and provides itself, in accordance with the development of a new fascism in the state apparatus, with the technology, the equipment and--always somewhat limping behind--the laws--(and finally the structural and organizational prerequisite in mass communications--that neutralizes reflexes), institutionally presumes torture.

We reiterate once again:

Torture is not a term of revolutionary struggle.

Shedding light on this may have a protective function--but the mobilization needed must be directed against the politics to which the state reacts by torture (and therefore ultimately against the prisoners themselves) as long as the vehicle of their politics is the moral reflex of those who still feel at home in this state--albeit they wish to take it over as revisionists--in other words mobilization is bound to go against us unless it is communicated by the propaganda of armed politics--propagates its morality and strategy, and that always means it must itself arrive at armed action.

Chapter XII--A. on 16 July 1975

So what,

Far more clearly than in the attacks of small revolutionary groups--and that is a transferable lesson of the history of insurrection--proved again here--

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Communicated is the breakdown of the system's legitimacy in the state reaction and its dialectic, after all, the tactic urban guerrilla develops and operates in its wake--in response to the bloated repressive apparatus and the excessive determination it reflects.

The RAF, every urban guerrilla group and every armed action is due to and legitimated by--it knows that or learns it sooner or later--the crisis of the imperialist system. That is what generates the guerrilla--it makes it possible as the conscious expression of the tendency. The openly repressive reaction of the system to its politics is also the communication by which the action of numerically small groups acquires an entirely new quality. It clearly shows the power of revolutionary politics, when it arms itself, and with it this may become mass politics.

One level of communication by which the guerrilla operates is open repression compelling the imperialist state

point by point to anticipate the fascist settlement of the crisis (which is not cyclical and in which its role as political function of international monopoly is absorbed by the militarily and strategically conceived capital movement)--in accordance with the terms of the conflicts, that we struggle for: As publicity. In other words, it recovers at home the mechanism of its reproduction on the outside--war--and it does so in ways bound to disintegrate the legitimatizing system.

The official strategies/organizations of the legal extra-parliamentarian left and--of course the left in the parliamentary parties, are chained to the reactionary side of the contradiction. They insist on legality as the terrain of socialist politics (or complain of its disintegration), that the state has so lightly relinquished, because it has lost its objective and its function--the defense of the utilization terms and the integration of national capitals. The capitalist national state is the political agency of the monopolization process under the hegemony of U.S.capital--

In the spheres directly gripped by the process of the international concentration of capital against the interests of the national bourgeoisie and the fossil national capitals.

The feasibility of the state's 'relative autonomy' assumed by the politics of left social democracy depended on the competition and contradictions of national capitals or on the non-simultaneities in the process of monopolization. Faced with international monopoly, the relative autonomy of the national state ceases to exist.

Consequently even a reactionary mass mobilization--always operated by nationalism--is nowadays dangerous in the metropolis and certainly not the form of transition. It could be directed only against the world domestic politics of international monopoly--U.S.foreign policy, that is military policy, because that organizes the capitalist national states in international--and domestic relations. It is also unlikely within the framework of tactical maneuvers that were at one time discussed, because that strips of his resources the operator of the institutional strategy of capital: Social democracy in power.

Its cause is not the consolidation of the social domination of capital by a type of political domination by the state--instead it replaces social domination of the

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workers by comprehensive political power over work itself. It is the direct communication of the all-encompassing command of international monopoly over the national proletariat, and thus it is a protagonist in the process--called "world fascism" by Italian workers.

Because the constitution as a U.S. dictate

is already the expression of this process, and this is at the bottom of, for example, the parallel constitutions of the three anticommunist counterstate establishments of the U.S.A.--South Korea, South Vietnam, FRG--it can neither be defended against it, nor can insistence on the intentions of their legality be the terrain of socialist politics. The only necessity for us is to understand the need for their radical rejection. For example by the fact that it has shaped the contradiction between national proletariat and U.S. capital--because that was its ticket, that since 1949 virtually all overt and covert wars of U.S. imperialism have been legally conducted from its territory--arising from a legality that in both aspects of the reactionary military doctrine at its core--'internal security' and nuclear annihilation by or against the nuclear arms of the American Army of Occupation on its territory (and that is interesting here, that the constitution is based on a military doctrine, not the military doctrine on the constitution) has been a function of American strategy from the beginning and could therefore never express anything except the nature of imperialism: War.

And:

What is meant by these motions: There is no possibility of antifascist mobilization as socialist politics (that also applies to strategy decisions of some discussion or other published by Maihofer), which could communicate anything except a helpless and scurrilous morality unless it refers to the illegality of resistance--that means against the legality of property, that is the terrain of fascism.

Chapter XIII--The Prisoners on 21 August 1975

This is taken from a statement by the prisoners on 21 August 1975 that originated from notes in the basement of the court building, here reconstituted as per the minutes.

A. further developed parts of it in his statement of fact in January 1976.

The struggle in the metropolises against the imperialist state defines this state not in its capacity as national state in the sense of "official political expression of the ruling class/bourgeoisie" (Marx, Lenin: State = revolution)--

Rather is the struggle against American capital necessarily confronted with the imperialist state. Where there is American capital, there are also American armed forces, consumer culture, secret services, marketing, and so on, and attacks on American capital are confronted directly by the structure, the know how, the technology, quite imply the strategy of American capital on the defensive: Counterinsurgency, institutional strategy of the imperialist state--the national state in its function for international U.S. capital.

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The aim of the urban guerrilla--and that is an essential point--is not the immediate conquest of state power, its assumption, the national revolution, and it cannot be simply mobilization within the national framework--

Not in a country where the proletariat was organized by American capital from 1945 on--by the control exercised by U.S. capital on social democracy and the labor unions since their reconstruction in 1945, committed to the anticommunist program of U.S. foreign and domestic politics, infiltrated, influenced and directed by the CIA--

Not in a country where, since 1945, the U.S. consumer culture has been the vehicle of the anticommunist brainwashing offensive, where industrial growth and thus rising living standards have been the vehicle of the depoliticization of internal class conflicts.-- Standard of living--structured as consumer culture, that is by the mass production of consumer goods, the condition of which is determined in production by Taylorism and Fordism, in the third real subsumption by MTM and automation, the totality of the alienation of the individual on the assembly line and piecework, and at the level of consumption the totality of alienation in manipulated consumption--

Essential there of course also the domination of the entire housing construction policy in the reconstruction phase by the lobby of building and real property owners, and their interest in housing warrens, tiny units at high prices per square meter, and their total disinterest in any type of community facilities. (The post-1945 SPD program: Village community houses in Hesse, and so on)--in other words a housing construction policy (social housing construction) that rooted in the living conditions of the proletariat the interests of building and property owners with the CDU's Catholic family ideology and the structure of the consumer culture, individual consumption as a result of the organization of profit production--

(As reaction to the October Revolution, the revolutionary strategy that presumed the skilled worker, and as reaction to the higher and higher organic composition of capital, that is to counteract the decline in the profit rate, maximum increase in productivity by job analyses and rationalization with MTM, and so on).

In contrast to Guevara's analysis we say that the world revolutionary process is a uniform process. It does not proceed in stages, but to the extent that the national territories are liberated from control by U.S. capital and in all states of the system--at the periphery and at the center groups arm themselves and fight--to the extent that the political and economic crisis culminates, counterpower develops by counterforce, the erosion of the political system of capital advances as a global process.

The proletariat in the imperialist metropolis can be organized, accounted for and controlled by the ideological state apparatus, labor unions and parties in all aspects of life by capital and is thus unable to become a class of its own in the national framework.

When we said (SPIEGEL interview), "proletarian politics can turn into the politics of the proletariat only in the capacity of armed politics"

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that means proletarian politics can constitute the class and become revolutionary strategy only as proletarian internationalism.

Inside the state the guerrilla represents resistance and the method of mobilization here possible is the polarization of the public by the open and exaggerated behavior of state reaction to the guerrilla.

As we said: Urban guerrilla is the method of intervention by generally weak revolutionary forces. Intervention is armed attack from the underground. The historic sequence from which it springs--we have explained that by the history and function of article 129--ever since that has been there, since the time the Reich was established--it has been used to criminalize any basic opposition--is political opposition as the expression of class antagonism in the legality of the constitutional state that, in contrast to the state security state, was tied to bourgeois values. As the expression of class antagonism, legal opposition, despite all its ambivalence as the result of its functionalization, always represented resistance as far as the state was concerned.

In the break between right and morality by the disintegration of the separation of powers in the imperialist state, political opposition gets to be illegal to the extent that the consensus between society and state, communicated by the values of the bourgeois constitution, itself breaks down. We will explain that here by the example of the professional bans--

Because the necessity of insurrection by now follows upon any state reaction to opposition movements within and without the institutions--because by the negation of bourgeois values in the imperialist state even the legal political opposition citing them needs to develop a new political dynamism as the legal reflex of insurrection in the metropolises and the wars of liberation at the peripheries of imperialism--for example in the movement against nuclear power plants.

Benjamin comments the bourgeois values in the proletarian revolution as follows:

"The class conflict that a historian trained in Marxism always keeps in mind, is a struggle for the crude and material things without which there are no refined and spiritual concerns. Nevertheless these latter are present in the class conflict other than as the notion of loot falling to the victor. They live as optimism, courage, humor, cunning, firmness in this struggle, and they have operated like that throughout the ages. They will over and over again contest every victory ever enjoyed by the rulers, just as flowers turn their faces to the sun, thanks to a secret heliotropism all men turn to the sun rising on the horizon of history. The historic materialist must appreciate this most inconspicuous of all changes."

Gramsci said the same more succinctly: "The proletariat is the heir of classic German philosophy." We are therefore speaking in detail about values, morality and the problem of legitimation of the imperialist state, because we are interested in the problem of justification as the problem of revolution. It is interesting in relation to such events. Its most extreme historic reflection was the Stalinism of the 1930's in the Soviet Union.

Justification or triumphalism--that is the certainty of ultimate victory not exclusively determined by the revolutionary struggle, the revolutionary use of the

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crisis by insurrection--were also the features of the theory and propaganda of the Third International and at the present time are incarnated by the Maoist Marxist-Leninist groups. They are the expression of alienation, also the alienation of Marxist theory from critical theory to alienated dogmatism by the absence of critical practice, in other words a practice confronting the ruling repression and free of the obligation to have another goal than the development of the struggle.

Revolution needs no justification and therefore no ideology. There are, however, transitions from bourgeois ethics to the revolutionary ethics of urban guerrilla--or, in Lenin's words, "the absolute is within the relative." The issue there is quite simple: Where is the break--where does bourgeois morality begin to turn immoral, or what use is bourgeois morality to the guerrilla? We would say nothing. But that is not all to be said about it.

This matter is topical in the professional bans, the thought police decreed by the Federal Court decision in reference to article 231 and in the Lower Saxon law on the defense of the constitution, designed to transform the entire state apparatus--administration, schools, universities, health system up to and including public institutions into a giant communication service, acting as an arm of the defense of the constitution and thereby opinions into the spotlight by which reaction polarizes society. The ban on opinions amounts to the destruction of ideology as such--and that also means that wherever groups produce a justification, they must necessarily move in a social vacuum. A system no longer spitting out ideology, on the contrary--regarding it as a "security risk"--as for Brandt and Strauss--can no longer be fought at the level of ideology. Even the notion of the ideological class conflict, still propagated by the Soviet Union, becomes superfluous now. This matter of values has many implications.

Bourgeois morality shaped the bourgeois citizen. Within this morality--as morality of social intercourse--it moved freely. It constituted the scope of society vis-a-vis the state, and it constituted a system in the scope of society vis-a-vis the state. Within the system of the bourgeois society, the freedom of the proletariat consisted in its ability to sell its labor by submitting to the command of capital--or to starve. Consequently freedom was never more than a euphemism for the proletariat within the bourgeois society.

The imperialist state, how its economic base--free competition--is abolished in it--abolished by its criminalizing those who insist on it as their right to think, judge and act for themselves. Institutional strategy replaces bourgeois morality and ideology as the consolidating communication, with the aim of constitutionalizing the class war, bureaucratizing the proletariat, nationalizing the social labor force.

For example the "individual-democratic constitution" was the object of the special loyalty owed the state by civil servants. However quirkily formulated in officialese, this meant constitutional rights: Freedom, equality and human dignity, physical inviolability. According to the Federal Constitutional Court's judgment on the ban on the employment of radical democrats in the public service, it is now "expected for civil servants to recognize and acknowledge this state..as an outstanding and positive value..." and so on.

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This Federal Constitutional Court judgment explicitly means the state that suspends the constitution: The emergency and special state. Because, according to it, the civil servant must "affirm" the constitution in effect "even insofar as it may be amended by way of a change in the constitution" and "carry on his office in the spirit of the regulations." The spirit and the direction of changes and regulations, however, must always be just the meaning and purpose of the latest constitutional change and the topical legislative projects--these are emergency laws, the legitimization of the execution of anti-imperialist fighters in the streets, the institutionalization of their smooth destruction in the prisons by isolation in dead cells, without publicity, by the defense counsel exclusion law, that is special article 231a which legitimizes a trial without defendants.

According to the Federal Constitutional Court's verdict, the civil servant's duty to loyalty and the right to resistance are mutually exclusive. The civil servant is put under the political obligation ("political duty to loyalty") in conflict situations to "take the side" of the state against the proletariat or the elements of proletarian organization and class consciousness that merely exist. Demolished by the Federal Constitutional Court's verdict is the civil servant's right, still part of the civil service legislation, to refuse obedience if what he is asked to do is evidently wrong--as the antithesis to the compelling obedience by which National Socialist defendants were able before West German courts to rationalize their involvement in the execution of partisans and Jews, because this enabled the judicial apparatus, itself involved in National Socialist terror, to excuse this involvement. The civil servant's right is abolished by the verdict, because that verdict elevates the state to an absolute value, against the individual's sense of justice. The state's commitment to the values it pretends to defend can only be that of the persons through whom it acts. In claiming absolute value for itself, the state has liquidated its commitment to the social values of its constitution.

The consensus society-state is no longer communicated by the tertium comparationes: The values, that is constitutional rights--

But by their surrogate: Psychological warfare, as propagandistic camouflage of the politics of the strong state, its institutional strategy to the nationalization of society, the purpose of which is war and the medium the militarization of society.

The imperialist state devours the bourgeois state. This process, the relative ease with which it is accomplished, the weakness of protest, all these show how shallow were the roots in the state apparatus of the bourgeois values, including freedom of opinion, freedom of the press, independence of the courts, lawful judges, a free bar, the proportionality of police deployment, the assumption of innocence until the verdict, the ban on discrimination for..., and so on. It is clearly visible what they have always been: Morely an expedient ideology for anticommunism. Freedom in the Federal Republic never meant freedom from the state. It was always simply anticommunist ideology and a propaganda postulate without political reality. West German democracy was rooted in the constitution for as long and as deeply as nothing corresponded to it in political reality.

It was abolished by emergency legislation upon the emergence of the first mass movement against anticommunism--the student movement--which intended to use it against

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the state, against the establishment, against the anticomunist elites here. Ever since anybody who cites article 1 of the constitution must also cite emergency legislation. Since then anybody wishing to cite article 1 of the constitution without citing the emergency legislation must take arms (from the logic of the constitution itself).

The movement against the professional bans cannot turn into a strong movement, because too few people are affected--all teachers, all journalists, all lawyers are affected, that is within these professional groups and organizations, within the ideological state apparatus all those who have not yet ceded the claim to their right to think their own thoughts, their own critical thoughts, or who, in the process of the transformation of the state, discover critical practice to be their cause.

The movement cannot develop any strength, because it has displaced the motive now used to justify the professional bans and earlier the strength of the student movement: The protest against the American war in Vietnam, by appealing to bourgeois values.

Because this movement itself has largely been a process of disappointment in the dual sense of this word, a process of disillusionment from which this state drew the consequences, that is recovered the initiative even before the movement had an opportunity to draw its consequences from having been criminalized at Easter 1968. Before the movement found its way to illegality and arms, the government offered an amnesty--

correctly speculating

that the class make-up of the student movement would not enable it to oppose its corruption, that is their deracination/desolidarization from the Vietnamese war of liberation.

Of course the right to resistance as a constitutional right amounts only to a proclamation. The fact that it was inserted in the Hesse constitution, inserted in the civil service law--as a phrase only, because, according to it, every prison guard would be obligated and have the right to refuse guarding the isolated prisoners--was this state's lip service to the dilettantism of the Prussian officer caste that had attempted the 1944 coup against Hitler to save the honor of the German monopoly bourgeoisie. Its liquidation now, in the verdict of the Federal Constitutional Court, is the open advance to the total state, the state security state that completely escapes any checks from the outside or from below.

Resistance is the continuity in the history of internal opposition in the Federal Republic since 1945, from the opposition against the restoration, against integration with the West, against emergency legislation, against American aggression in Vietnam through the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla against the imperialist state.

Resistance--not Marxism, the issue of socialization, in short various program points emerging in all these movements, as ideology.

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Resistance is the reference back to the values of the French Revolution, in other words bourgeois democracy in its human content, as the expectation of equality between human beings, as the frontier to cross which amounts to inhumanity and cannot be tolerated.

For resistance are the values, in the final analysis their social enforcement by the revolution--the authority limiting all state action; it determines the limit beyond which state action becomes illegitimate.

The right and the readiness to resistance stood/stands behind any state intrinsic opposition.

It is the reflection of class antagonism in the ideology of bourgeois democracy.

The right to resistance has entered the constitution of the Federal Republic really to camouflage the real nature of this state as a counterstate of U.S. imperialism, as lip service (see above) for distinguishing itself verbally, by the letter only, from the old fascism.

It disintegrates/is eliminated/illegalized the moment West German imperialism no longer needs it as an exchange value (can no longer use it)--

As function value it acquires revolutionary quality, because it has begun to be the immediate expression of class antagonism--expression of the new society that "approaches in the lap of the old one," as the topic of history. Its political anticipation is represented by the armed groups of the urban guerrilla, the subjectivity of the illegals.

Resistance, stripped of its exchange value, its function as make-up of the West German counterstate, turns into the basic right of the proletariat taking up arms, and with it the values on which it is based: Liberty, equality, fraternity--all rejected by the social democratic counterstate with the right to resistance which necessarily recognizes institutional strategy as antagonism. Because it is the aim of the institutional strategy to destroy resistance by the legitimation and nationalization of all conflicts in society and between society and state. It anticipates the political crisis, it anticipates it as counterrevolution.

The tie between the state and the bourgeois constitution was its imperative tie to the libertarian values of the French Revolution which has constituted the bourgeois state by the passion for the liberation of mankind, secularized the element of the absolute in the bourgeois state in contrast to the feudal claim of divine right.

(Of course it is not by accident that Schmidt now, when the values have been abolished in this state, quotes Kant's categorical imperative on order and freedom. Philosophy is meant to replace legitimacy.

The regulation in the cop's pants pocket is raised to an ethical postulate, exactly to the extent that it lacks any morally justifying relevance).--

The constitution linked to property values could afford to allow the right to resistance; as a concession it represented a means for the reconciliation of the

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classes, the integration of the proletariat and its organizations in the bourgeois state. It is necessarily illegalized at the very moment when it becomes necessary to make use of it, illegalized by the state against which it is then directed.

That is important. Because the history of the right to resistance defines in the superstructure of society the break between society and state, precisely

The point at which the capitalist production relation turns into the fetter of the method of production--socialization of production and advanced organic composition of capital. In its superstructure it precisely defines the historic moment when revolutionary struggle becomes necessary as armed struggle, armed struggle against the imperialist state--

The point where the proletariat becomes the heir of classic German philosophy, whether or not it assumes this heritage.

"The necessity" of the triumph of reason over myth, the victory of life over death cannot be proven by logical conclusions. Planck once said: "Logic alone is not able to lead anyone out of his own world, it cannot even compel him to acknowledge the independent existence of his fellow men." This necessity must rely on the tenet "that the claim to life, development and happiness needs no justification. It stands and falls with this. It is, though, its only prerequisite, undemonstrable as well as irrefutable." (Baran) We have advanced from there, because it is resistance which links us, the urban guerrilla, with the political opposition in the Federal Republic since 1945.

Resistance, whether well or badly conducted, is the spur generating armed resistance. Resistance as a definite, radical, existential and moral identity incorporating the values of the French Revolution, in other words not questioning them. Therefore it needs no justification.

Resistance is the quintessence of proletarian subjectivity as the negation of the imperialist state and illegal from the very beginning, even where it is not/has not been criminalized.

This also means resistance in contrast to political ideology/attitude, to matters of opinion. Because it is in principle outside the market, subject to neither buying nor selling.

The transformation from legal--albeit always only weak--resistance by the old left to the legal offensive of the new left in the protest movement against the war in Vietnam, to the tactic of armed intervention, may become strategy, insofar its action in the imperialist state identifies the reactionary aspect of the contradiction.

The movement against the construction of the nuclear power plant in Wyl, for example, has shown that it is the state of international monopoly, which sets itself above the values and proclaims illegal any appeal to them against its measures.

Rhineland-Palatinate Interior Minister Schwarz was quite consistent. (At the Hessenforum) he called the movement against the construction of nuclear power plants (which appeals to the right of physical inviolability vis-a-vis the state),

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"an example demonstrating the necessity of criminological research." As a state of multinational U.S. capital it is not interested in allowing energy bottlenecks to emerge, in other words to break out from the strategy of the oil multinationals and the U.S.A. against the OPEC countries.

The explosive power of the protest movement against the construction of nuclear power plants is derived from the fact that it is opposed to a strategic project of the imperialist state as a functionary of multinational capital, calling upon values that exclude war as a means of the class conflict. It appeals to the protective function of the state, so to speak to the factory legislation state of Marx in the first volume of "Das Kapital," the state defending the proletariat against the excesses of capital--excessive exploitation by unduly hard work--, by calling to account the individual capitalist in the interest of capitalism in general and making him toe the line of the bourgeois society in answer to the state as its official political expression.

However, the function of the state has changed. In the sectors of capital necessary for the reproduction of society but no longer profitable for capital, it now must take on economic functions and has also become a direct economic function of the world market, dominated by the U.S. monopolies.

Marx foresaw the "refeudalization of society," the point where society stagnates and decays, because the proletariat is too weak by itself--and that always means that the old state is too strong, bureaucratic and militarized, and therefore the social transformation and the contradictions induced by machinery cannot find political expression.

In its economic functions the state is directly and openly a repressive state. "Force is an economic potential" has always been its answer not only to revolutionary action of the organizing proletariat. Here also in the Federal Republic, where the proletariat is organized by nationalized labor unions as a capital function, it is the answer to the remnants of resistance or to its tentative new phenomena: Bourgeois and declassed protest--and the state cuts it off:

By way of the centralized structure of the apparatus of public opinion, which it is able to and does control--

and

by police deployment, carried out by units trained and equipped--physically and psychologically--for stamping out mass actions.

It becomes obvious here that the assurance of proper living conditions such as was organically produced and socially developed, has entered into antagonistic conflict with the reproduction condition of capitalist production decisive in the metropolis--the smooth flowing energy supply. This conflict is settled against the people, for capital, for machinery. The state forcibly represses the antagonism. In the case of the FRG this process has its counterpart in NATO nuclear strategy: The Federal Republic--all governments of the Federal Republic--by subjecting themselves to it, virtually beg for nuclear self-destruction in the interest of American strategy by the use of nuclear weapons in case of an aggressive or defensive war.

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In the meantime Schlesinger has openly claimed that this is a "sacrifice" to be expected from the NATO countries to maintain U.S. "credibility" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union (STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN, 11 November 1976).

The protest movement against the construction of nuclear power plants is the immediate expression of the North-South conflict, that is the most offensively developed line of demarcation between capital and the world proletariat. That represents the explosive power of this movement and explains why the state as the agency of U.S. monopoly can neither give up nuclear power plant construction or give in to the appeal to the constitution, the values "physical inviolability, right to life, human dignity, freedom of the choice of profession, protection of the family." At any rate it cannot do so without hazarding its project, the destruction of the revolution at the periphery because--as we could see in Vietnam--domestic consensus is an essential prerequisite for this; however, that broke down on both sides of the alternative as a formal democratic process.

Before the 1954 Geneva Conference Nixon said: "Our nation is the only one strong enough at home to adopt an attitude that will save Asia."

This was a wrong estimate: As the consequence and crucial function of the Vietnamese war of liberation it was the breach of the consensus--the FNL described the protest in the centers of "world public opinion" as its second strongest line of defense (after Russian anti-aircraft rockets). It forced Nixon to the table and finally the U.S. Government to withdraw its military machinery from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Due to the fact that the international corporations handle the national states now merely as instrumental media, the national state has nothing left but force for politics aiming to balance the interests of the ruling class with the interests of the ruled class. A narrow regional and politically diffuse movement may thereby acquire a dialectical and strategic relevance--even if it defends untenable economic interests of small farmers and traders. Important is its existential dimension arising from the reference back to bourgeois values, interpreted as the right to life and happiness, which objectively leads their protest to our side, moves the dialectic state--revolution against the project of the imperialist state--which is to freeze it.

Chapter XXVII--Drawing a Clear Line Between Us and the Enemy! Mao

Red Army Faction: The Concept Urban Guerrilla

If the enemy fights us, that is good, not bad.

It is my opinion that it is bad for us--whether for the individual, the party, the army or the school--if the enemy does not confront us--because this would mean that we are in cahoots with the enemy. If the enemy fights us, that is good; it is proof that we have drawn a clear line between us and the enemy. If the enemy confronts us resolutely, paints us in the blackest colors and does not admit anything of ours to be good, it is even better; it proves that we have not only drawn a clear line between us and the enemy but also that our work has yielded glittering successes.

Mao Ze-Dong, 26 May 1939

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Support Armed Struggle!

I. Concrete Answers to Concrete Questions

I firmly insist that nobody may have the right to speak, who has not conducted an investigation.

Mao

Some comrades have already arrived at their verdict on us. For them it amounts to "demagogy of the bourgeois press" to couple this "anarchistic group" with the socialist movement altogether. By using it wrongly and judgmentally, their concept of anarchism does not differ at all from that held by the Springer press. We would not choose to talk to anyone at such a debased level.

Many comrades would like to know what we think. The letter to 883 of May 1970 was too general; Ray's tape (excerpts of which were published in SPIEGEL) was in any case not authentic; it originated in the course of private conversations. Ray wanted to use it as an aide memoire for a free-lance article. Either she tricked us, or we overestimated her. If our operations were so precipitate as some of the phrases there, they would have caught us long ago. DER SPIEGEL paid Ray \$1,000 for the article.

Obviously almost everything the newspapers write about us--and the way they write it--amounts to lies. Kidnap plans involving Willy Brandt are designed to make us look like political idiots, the link between the abduction of a child and us, as criminals without scruples in the choice of their methods. That ranges up to the "guaranteed details" offered by KONKRET, although there merely irrelevant details were thrown together. That we have "officers and men," that someone is "in bondage" to someone else, that at any time someone was to be "liquidated," that comrades who have left us still need to fear us, that we have drawn guns to gain access to apartments or passports, that "group terror" is practiced--all that is so much bullshit.

Those who imagine the illegal organization of armed resistance to proceed on the lines of the Free Corps and the Vehme, are themselves pogrom-minded. Psychological mechanisms inducing such projections were analyzed by Horkheimer/Adornos in "Autoritaere Persoenlichkeit" /The Authoritarian Personality/ and by Reich in "Massenpsychologie des Faschismus" /Mass Psychology of Fascism/ in connection with fascism. The compulsive nature of the revolution is a contradictio in adjecto--a contradiction that does not work. Certainly in the prevailing conditions--if not at all times--a revolutionary political practice presumes the permanent integration of individual character and political motivation, in other words political identity. Marxist criticism and autocriticism is not concerned with "self-liberation" but very much preoccupied with revolutionary discipline. The "headline hunters" here were certainly not any "left organizations"--supposed to be the anonymous authors--but KONKRET itself. Indeed, its publisher normally acts as PR man and left hand to Eduard Zimmermann, to maintain this particular bootblacking text in a particular niche of the market.

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Many comrades, too, spread lies about us. They brag that we stayed with them, that they organized our travels to the Near East, that they are informed about contacts, about safe houses, that they do something for us, although in fact they do nothing. Some of them are merely out to show that they are "insiders." That came home to roost for Guenther Voigt who told Duerrenmatt that he had been Baader's liberator; he must have regretted his boast when the cops came for him. Even if true, a subsequent denial is not so easy. Others are out to show that we are stupid, unreliable, incautious and spacy. This serves to prejudice people against us. Actually they assume us to be like them. They consume. We have nothing in common with these chatterboxes who conduct the anti-imperialist struggle over coffee and cake. --There are many others who do not gossip, who understand the concept of resistance, who notice enough foul stinks to want us to have a chance, who aid us because they know that their bag of tricks is not worth lifelong integration and adjustment.

The apartment in Knesebeck Street 89 (Mahler arrest) was not traced due to neglect on our side but as the result of treasins. The informer was one of us. There is simply no defense against such an event for people who do what we do, no defense against comrades being worn down by the cops, against someone being unable to resist the terror exercised by the system against those who really fight it. If the pigs did not have the means, they would not retain power.

Some people feel exposed to an intolerable pressure to try and justify themselves to us. To avoid political disputations with us, to avoid questioning their own practices against our practices, some manage to twist simple facts. It is still being claimed, for example, that Baader would only have had to serve 3, or 9, or 12 months, although it is easy to ascertain the correct data: Three years for arson, 6 months arising from earlier probation orders, roughly 6 months for forgery, and so on--the trial was still to come. Fourteen of these 48 months Andreas Baader served in 14 Hesse prisons--9 transfers for bad behavior, the organization of rebellions; resistance. Diminishing the remaining 34 months to 3, 9 and 12 was designed to rob the liberation of the prisoners of 13 May of its moral significance. Thus some comrades rationalize their fear of the personal consequences a political dispute with us could have for them.

Evidently we can only return a "no" to the question whether the prisoners would have been freed if we had known that a leftist would be shot in the course of the undertaking--it is a question we are constantly asked. On the other hand, the question of what would have happened if...is highly ambiguous--pacifist, platonic, ethical, unbiased. Nobody seriously reflecting about the liberation of prisoners would pose that question; instead he would seek the answer within himself. It is asked because people want to know whether we are really as brutalized as we are described in the Springer press; we are to be asked for our credo. It is an attempt to fiddle with the issue of revolutionary force, to bring revolutionary force and bourgeois morality on to a common denominator, and that simply does not work. Taking into consideration all possibilities and circumstances there was no reason to assume that a civilian might and would get in between. We had no doubt that the cops would not have the slightest compunction about someone like that. To suggest that the liberation of a prisoner could be carried out unarmed amounts to a suggestion of suicide.

On 14 May, just as in Frankfurt where two of our number fled when they were to be arrested, because we will not allow ourselves to be quietly arrested--the cops shot first. The cops took aim every time. We either did not shoot at all, or, when we did, we did not aim the guns.

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In Berlin, in Nuremberg, in Frankfurt. That can be proved because it is true. We do not "ruthlessly use a gun." The cop who finds himself trapped in the contradiction between himself as the "little man" and as the serf of the capitalists, as a low paid employee and as the executive official of monopoly capital, is not confronted with the compulsion to obey orders. We shoot when we are shot at. If the cops let us go, we let him go.

It is quite correct for people to assert that the tremendous cost of the manhunt for us aims at the entire socialist left in the Federal Republic and West Berlin. The little money we stole, the few automobile and document thefts alleged to be the reason for the manhunt, not even the attempted murder that is to be pinned on us, really justify the hullabaloo. The rulers have been gripped by terror, because they believed to have a sound grasp on this state and all its residents and classes and contradictions down to the last and distant recess. They were sure once again to have the intellectuals reduced to their magazines, the left returned to their circle, to have disarmed Marxism-Leninism and demoralized internationalism. Unfortunately the power structure they represent is not so vulnerable as they would make it out to be. We should not be misled by their outcries and overestimate ourselves.

We claim that, at this time, the organization of armed resistance groups in the Federal Republic and Berlin is right, possible and justified. That it is right, possible and justified to act as urban guerrilla here and now. That the armed struggle as "the highest form of Marxism-Leninism" (Mao) now needs to and must be initiated, that, without it, there can be no anti-imperialist struggle in the metropolises.

We do not claim that the organization of illegal and armed resistance groups could replace legal proletarian organizations, nor that single actions are class wars, nor that armed struggle could replace political work in the factory and the city district. We merely claim that the one is the presumption for the success and the advance of the other. We are not Blanquists nor anarchists, although we consider Blanqui a major revolutionary and the personal heroism of many anarchists far from despicable.

Our actual operations are less than a year old. The time is too short to be able to talk of results. The large amount of publicity provided for us by Messrs Genscher, Zimmermann and company does, however, make it appear opportune from the propaganda aspect to offer some thoughts for general reflection.

"If you really want to know what communists think, look at their hands, not at their mouths."

II. Metropolis Federal Republic

The crisis is generated not so much by the stagnation of development mechanisms than by development itself. As its only goal is the growth of profits, this development more and more fuels parasitism and waste, disadvantages entire social strata, produces growing needs and is unable to satisfy them, and speeds up the decay of social life. It needs a monstrous apparatus to control the tensions and revolts it provokes, and does so by the manipulation of public opinion and open repression. The student rebellion and the Black Movement in

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America, the crisis prevailing in the political unity of American society, the expansion of student struggles in Europe, the violent return and new content of the workers and mass struggle up to the "May" explosion in France, to the tumultuous social crisis in Italy and the return of dissatisfaction in Germany--these all characterize the situation.

II Manifesto: Necessity of Communism. From Thesis No 33

In this enumeration the comrades of II Manifesto correctly list the Federal Republic in last place and rather vaguely term the characteristic features of the situation here as "dissatisfaction." Only 6 years ago, the Federal Republic was said by Barzel to be an economic giant but a political dwarf. In the meantime the FRG's economic strength has not diminished, and its political strength has grown, internally and externally. The 1966 establishment of the grand coalition disarmed the political threat that could have spontaneously ignited at the time as a result of the imminent recession. Emergency legislation provided the tool for ensuring the rulers united action in future crises also--unity between political reaction and all those who are still committed to legality. The social-liberal coalition largely succeeded in absorbing the "dissatisfaction" emerging in the student movement and

The extraparlimentary movement. Insofar as the reformism of the Social Democrat Party has not yet been played out in the consciousness of its followers, its promises of reform have delayed the topicality of the communist alternative for large parts of the intelligentsia too and were able to disarm the anticapitalist protest. Its Eastern policy opens new markets for capital, looks after the German contribution to the balance and alliance between U.S. imperialism and the Soviet Union, needed by the United States to obtain a free hand for its wars of aggression in the Third World. This government seems also to be succeeding in separating the new left from the old antifascists and thereby once more to isolate the new left from its antecedents, the history of the workers movement. The DKP owes its admission to the new complicity between U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism and organizes demonstrations in favor of this government's Eastern policy. Niemoeller--a symbol of antifascism--campaigns for the SPD in the forthcoming election campaign.--

Under the pretext of the "common weal," state regimentation complete with wage guidelines and concerted action took the labor union bureaucracies in hand. The September 1969 strikes showed that the scales had been excessively weighted in favor of profits; their course as exclusively economic strikes demonstrated how firmly the reins were held.

Thanks to almost 2 million foreign workers the Federal Republic will be able in the looming recession to use a nearly 10 percent unemployment rate to bring to bear the terror and disciplinary mechanism inherent in unemployment for the proletariat. We get a notion of the system's strength by the fact that it will be able to do so without having to cope with an army of unemployed, without being bothered by the political radicalization of these masses.

Involved in U.S. aggressive wars by development and military aid, the Federal Republic profits from the exploitation of the Third World without carrying any responsibility for these wars, without the need to clash with an internal opposition. No less aggressive than U.S. imperialism, it is even less vulnerable.

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The political potential of imperialism is exhausted here neither in its reformist nor its fascist variant; nor is imperialism at the end of its capacity to integrate or suppress the contradictions it has itself created.

The Red Army Faction's concept urban guerrilla is not based on an optimistic assessment of the situation in the Federal Republic and West Berlin.

III. Student Revolt

It follows from the recognition of the uniform nature of the capitalist ruling system that it is impossible to separate the revolution in the "strongholds" from that "in the backward regions." Without a revival of the revolution in the West it is impossible to prevent imperialism, by the logic of violence, from being carried to the point where it seeks the way out in a disastrous war, or prevent the superpowers from imposing a suffocating yoke on the world as a whole.

II Manifesto. From Thesis No 52

To dismiss the student movement as a petit bourgeois revolt means reducing it to its own exaggerated claims; it means to deny its generation from the concrete contradiction between bourgeois ideology and bourgeois society; it means, with the acknowledgment of its necessary limitations, to deny the doctrinal standard already achieved by its anticapitalist protest.

To be sure, there was a great deal of exaggeration in the students claim to identify themselves with the exploited peoples of Latin America, Africa and Asia, just because the students had become aware of their psychological degradation in science factories. The comparison between the mass circulation of the BILD-ZEITUNG here and the mass bombardment of Vietnam represented a crude oversimplification. The comparison between ideological criticism of the system here and the armed struggle there was arrogant. The belief itself to be the revolutionary topic--insofar as it was widespread in reference to Marcuse--amounted to ignorance in the face of the actual shape of the bourgeois society and the production conditions at its origin.

It is the merit of the student movement in the Federal Republic and West Berlin--its street battles and arson, its use of counterviolence, its declamations and, therefore, their exaggerations and ignorance too, in brief their practical operations, to have restored Marxism-Leninism in the consciousness of at least the intelligentsia as that political doctrine, without which the political, economic and ideological facts and their phenomena cannot be explained nor their internal and external connections described.

Just because the student movement started from the concrete experience of the contradiction between the ideology of the freedom of science and the reality of the university, exposed to the grasp of monopoly capital, just because it was not initiated only as an ideological exercise, it did not run out of steam until it had at least theoretically explored the connection between the crisis of the university and the crisis of capitalism. Until they and public opinion were convinced that the essence of this democracy is not "liberty, equality, fraternity," not human rights, not the United Nations Charter; that the same applies here as has always

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applied to the colonialist and imperialist exploitation of Latin America, Asia and Africa: Discipline, subordination and brutality for the oppressed and any who take their side, organize protests, resist, conduct the anti-imperialist struggle.

From the aspect of ideological criticism the student movement has recognized almost all spheres of state repression as the expression of imperialist exploitation: In the Springer campaign, the demonstrations against American aggression in Vietnam, the campaign against class justice, the Bundeswehr campaign, the campaign against emergency legislation, the school student movement. Expropriate Springer!, Destroy NATO!, Fight the Consumer Terror!, Fight the Education Terror! Fight the Rent Terror!--all these were appropriate political slogans. They aimed at the topicalization of the contradictions produced by late capitalism itself, in the consciousness of all who are oppressed, between new needs and the new opportunities for need satisfaction offered by the development of productive forces on the one side and the pressure of irrational subordination on the other.

What gave it its self-confidence were not advanced class conflicts here but the consciousness to be part of an international movement, to deal with the same class enemy here as the Vietcong there, with the same paper tiger, the same pigs.

It is the second distinction of the student movement to have broken through the provincial isolation of the old left. The popular front strategy of the old left in the form of the Easter March, the German Peace Union, the DEUTSCHE VOLKSZEITUNG, the irrational hope for the "great landslide" at some election or other, its parliamentary obsession with Strauss here, Heinemann there, its procommunist and anti-communist obsession with the GDR, its isolation, resignation and moral distraction: To be ready for every sacrifice but not for practical steps. Despite doctrinal inaccuracies, the socialist part of the student movement derived its self-awareness from the correct appreciation that "the revolutionary initiative in the West may rely on the crisis of the global balance and the emergence of new forces in all countries" (Thesis No 55, 11 Manifesto). They made the content of their agitation and propaganda that which they could mainly appeal to in view of conditions in Germany: That, confronted with the global strategy of imperialism, the outlook for national struggles must be internationalist, that only the combination of national concerns with international ones, traditional types of struggle with internationalistic ones, is able to stabilize revolutionary initiative. They turned weakness into strength, because they had recognized that this was the only way to prevent renewed resignation, provincial isolationism, reformism, popular front strategy and integration--these dead-end streets of socialist politics in postfascist and pre-fascist conditions such as prevail in the Federal Republic and West Berlin.

At that time the leftists were aware that it would be correct to combine socialist prepropaganda in the factory with the actual prevention of deliveries of the BILD-ZEITUNG. That it would be correct to combine propaganda among the GI's--advised not to let themselves be shipped to Vietnam--with actual attacks on military aircraft destined for that country, to combine the Bundeswehr campaign with actual attacks on NATO airfields. That it would be correct to combine criticism of class justice with the blowing up of prison walls, criticism of the Springer Corporation with the disarmament of its works security forces, correct to set up their own radio transmitter, to demoralize the police, keep illegal housing ready for deserters from the Bundeswehr, be able to forge identity papers for agitation among foreign workers, by factory sabotage to prevent the production of napalm.

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And it would be wrong to make their own propaganda dependent on supply and demand, no newspaper unless the workers are able to finance it, no car if the "movement"... is not yet able to buy it, no transmitter because no licence is obtainable, no sabotage because capitalism would not immediately collapse as a result.

The student movement collapsed when its specific student-petit bourgeois type of organization, the "anti-authoritarian camp" proved unsuitable for developing practical operations appropriate to its goals; its spontaneity could neither be simply extended to factories nor to a capable urban guerrilla, nor a socialist mass organization. It collapsed when the spark of the student movement--other than in Italy and France --failed to turn into the grass fire of developed class conflicts. They were able to enumerate the goals and concerns of the anti-imperialist struggle but unable to provide its organizational communication, because they themselves were not the subject of the revolution.

In contrast to the proletarian organizations of the new left, the Red Army Faction does not deny its prehistory as the history of the student movement. That movement had restored Marxism-Leninism as a weapon in the class conflict and produced the international context for the revolutionary struggle in the metropolises.

IV. The Primacy of Practice

He who wishes directly to familiarize himself with a certain cause or group of causes, must be personally involved in the practical struggle for the transformation of reality, the transformation of the cause or group of causes, because only thus does he get in touch with the phenomenon of the respective causes, and only by personal involvement in the practical struggle for the change of reality is he able to reveal and understand the nature of that cause or group of causes.

Marxism invests doctrine with serious significance only because it may offer a guide to action. If someone holds a correct doctrine but handles it only as something that is talked about and later put away in a drawer, certainly not translated into practice, this doctrine becomes meaningless, however sound it may have been.

Mao Ze-Dong: On Practice

When the left, the socialists who were also the authority figures of the student movement, turned to the study of scientific socialism, the topicalization of the critique of political economics as their autocriticism of the student movement, this amounted to their return to college desks. Judging by their output of papers, their organizational models; the lavishness of their proclamations, one might assume that revolutionaries here claimed the leadership of powerful class struggles, that 1967/1968 represented the 1905 of socialism in Germany.

In his 1903 "What To Do?" Lenin stressed the Russian workers need for doctrine and, against anarchists and social revolutionaries, postulated the necessity of class analysis and organization as well as revelatory propaganda. He did so because mass

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class struggles were proceeding. "That is precisely the point: The working masses are strongly aroused by the baseness of Russian life; we are not geared to collect all these drips and rivulets of popular anger and--if one may say so--concentrate them, though they pour forth in much greater volume from Russian life than we all imagine and believe yet need to be combined into a powerful flow." (Lenin: "What To Do?")

In the conditions currently prevailing in the Federal Republic and West Berlin we doubt whether it is at all possible to develop a strategy uniting the working class, to create an organization that may simultaneously be the expression and the instigator of the necessary unification. We doubt that the alliance between the socialist intelligentsia and the proletariat can be "welded," compelled by its call for proletarian organizations. As yet it is the Springer Corporation that collects the drips and rivulets on the baseness of German life, directing them to even greater baseness.

We assert that there can be no unification without revolutionary initiative, without the practical revolutionary intervention of the advance guard, the socialist workers and intellectuals, without concrete anti-imperialist struggle; that the alliance can or cannot emerge only from joint struggles where the conscious section of the workers and intellectuals must not direct proceedings but merely walk ahead.

We consider the organizations paper output mainly another example of the competition among intellectuals who dispute among themselves about their standing with regard to the better comprehension of Marx and do so on front of an imaginary jury that can most certainly not be represented by the working class, because its very languages precludes the latter's involvement. They feel greater embarrassment when caught out in a wrong quotation from Marx than in a lie when their practical work is mentioned. The page numbers of their footnotes are almost always correct, the membership figures issued for their organizations almost never. They fear the accusation of revolutionary impatience more than their corruption by bourgeois professions. To ultimately graduate with Lukacs is important to them, to be quickly excited by Blanqui suspect. They express their internationalism in the grades they award to one Palestinian commando organization by comparison with another--white gentlemen who set themselves up to be the genuine executors of Marxism; they express this in the manner of patronage by asking wealthy friends to contribute money to the Black Panthers and claim credit in heaven for their own contributions--not with an eye on "victory in the popular war" but concerned only with their good conscience. That is not the method of revolutionary intervention.

In his "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" (1926), Mao contrasted the struggle of the revolution with the struggle of the counterrevolution as "the Red Banner of the revolution, raised high by the Third International and calling upon all oppressed classes the world over to gather around its banner; the other is the White Banner of counterrevolution, raised by the League of Nations and calling upon all counterrevolutionaries to gather around its banner." Mao distinguished the classes in Chinese society by the criterion how they would decide between the Red and the White Banner in the course of the revolution's advance in China. He was not satisfied with merely analyzing the economic situation of the various classes in Chinese society. The attitudes of the various classes to the revolution were also an element in his class analysis.

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Marxist-Leninists will not exercise a leading role in future class struggles unless the advance guard itself raises high the Red Banner of proletarian internationalism and itself answers the question how to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, how to achieve political power for the proletariat, how to destroy the power of the bourgeoisie, and unless it is prepared by practical experience to answer these questions. The needed class analysis cannot be conducted without revolutionary practice, without revolutionary initiative.

All over the country proletarian organizations have set out "revolutionary transitional demands." They amount to struggles against the intensification of exploitation, for cuts in working hours, against the waste of social wealth, for equal wages for men and women and foreign workers, against speeded-up piecework, and so on. These transitional demands are no more than labor union economics unless an answer is simultaneously provided for the question how to get the better of the political, military and propagandist pressure that is going to aggressively oppose these claims if raised in massive class struggles. In that case, however--if nothing is added to these demands--they are merely economic garbage, because they are not worth to begin the revolutionary struggle and sustain it through victory, because "to be victorious means acceptance of the principle that life is not the greatest possession of the revolutionary" (Debray). These demands are good enough for labor union intervention--"The trade unionist politics of the working class simply amount to the bourgeois politics of the working class" (Lenin). They do not represent a method of revolutionary intervention.

Unless they raise the issue of arming themselves as their answer to the emergency legislation, the Bundeswehr, the federal frontier guards, the police and the Springer press, and stop their opportunist silence on these issues, the so-called proletarian organizations differ from the DKP only insofar as they are even less rooted in the masses, are verbally more radical and more knowledgeable in matters of theory. In practice they operate on the level of civil rights activists who aim at popularity at any price, assist the lies of the bourgeoisie that something can be done in this state by the means of parliamentary democracy, encourage the proletariat in fights that can only be lost--and in a barbarous manner--given this state's potential for violence. "These Marxist-Leninist factions or parties," Debray writes about the communists of Latin America, "move within the same political issues that are dominated by the bourgeoisie. Instead of changing them, they have helped root them even more solidly..."

By their proposal once again to adjust to capitalist exploitative pressure, these organizations offer no political future to the thousands of apprentices and youths who, influenced by the student movement, began for the first time to withdraw from the exploitative pressure in the factory. Confronted with youth crime these organizations assume virtually the standpoint of prison wardens, confronted with comrades in jail the standpoint of their judges, confronted with the underground the standpoint of social workers.

Without practical consequences, the reading of "Das Kapital" is no more than a bourgeois exercise. Without practical consequences programmatic statements are no more than idle chatter. Without practical consequences proletarian internationalism is no more than a sham. To adopt the standpoint of the proletariat in theory implies its adoption in practice.

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The Red Army Faction speaks of the primacy of practice. Whether it is correct now to organize armed resistance is something that will be decided by whether it is possible, can be ascertained only by trying it in practice.

V. Urban Guerrilla

It is therefore necessary from the aspect of its very nature and from the aspect of a long lasting strategy to consider imperialism and all reactionaries as that which they are in fact, as paper tigers. We must base our strategic concepts on that knowledge. On the other hand they are also living, steely and real tigers who devour people. We must base our tactical concepts on that knowledge.

Mao Ze-Dong, 1 December 1958

If it is true that American imperialism is a paper tiger, in other words that it can ultimately be defeated; and if the thesis of the Chinese communists is correct according to whom victory over American imperialism has been made possible because the struggle against it proceeds in all corners of the earth, so that the forces of imperialism are thereby fragmented, and their fragmentation renders them liable to defeat--if that is correct, then there is no reason to exclude or omit any country or any region from the anti-imperialist struggle because the forces of revolution there are particularly weak, the forces of reaction there particularly strong.

Just as it is wrong to discourage the forces of revolution by underestimating them, it is wrong to suggest to them to enter into conflicts in the course of which they are bound to be burnt up and destroyed. The contrast between the honest comrades in the organizations--never mind now the blabberers--and the Red Army Faction consists in the fact that we accuse them of discouraging the forces of the revolution, and they suspect us of burning out the forces of the revolution. It is true that this points the direction in which the faction of the comrades working in factories and city districts and the Red Army Faction put undue stress on the bow--if they do so. Dogmatism and adventurism have long been characteristic deviations at times of revolutionary weakness in a country. Since the anarchists have always been the most severe critics of opportunism, anyone criticizing opportunists exposes himself to the accusation of being an anarchist. That is old hat indeed.

The urban guerrilla concept was generated in Latin America. It is the same there as it can be here: Merely the method of revolutionary intervention by generally weak revolutionary forces.

Urban guerrilla assumes that there will never be the Prussian marching order preferred by many so-called revolutionaries for leading the people into revolutionary battle. It assumes that it will be too late to prepare for armed battle by the time the situation is ripe for it. That, without revolutionary initiative, no revolutionary orientation will arise in a country with such a potential for violence, such a collapse and weakness of revolutionary traditions as the Federal Republic, even if conditions for revolutionary battle were far more favorable than they are now--due to the political and economic development of late capitalism itself.

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Urban guerrilla is therefore the consequence of the long accomplished negation of parliamentary democracy by its very own representatives, the inevitable answer to emergency legislation and hand grenade law, the readiness to fight with the means the system has made available for its own use to destroy its opponents. Urban guerrilla bases on the acknowledgment instead of the apologia of the facts.

The student movement was to some extent aware of the capacity of urban guerrilla. The latter is able to translate into concrete terms the agitation and propaganda to which left efforts still tend to be reduced. This can be imagined relative to the Springer campaign of that time, the Cabora Bassa campaign of the Heidelberg students, the squatter movement in Frankfurt, in reference to the Federal Republic's military aid to the comprador regimes in Africa, to the critique of the execution of sentences and class justice, to works security guards and in-factory justice. It is able to transform verbal internationalism by the procurement of weapons and money. It can blunt the illegalization of communists--that weapon of the system--by organizing an underground permanently removed from the grip of the police. Urban guerrilla is a weapon in the class war.

Urban guerrilla is armed war, insofar as it is the police that ruthlessly uses guns, and class justice exonerates the Kurras while condemning comrades to death in life unless we prevent them from doing so. Urban guerrilla means not to allow ourselves to be demoralized by the violence of the system.

Urban guerrilla aims to destroy the state ruling apparatus at various points, render it ineffective in various places, to destroy the myth of the system's all-pervasiveness and inviolability.

Urban guerrilla presumes the organization of an illegal apparatus. That means safe houses, ammunition, cars, documents. In his "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," Marighela described the details to be observed. What else needs to be observed we will at any time tell those who need to know, if they want to do it. We do not yet know much, but we know something.

It is important to have gained legal political experience before finally deciding to take up the armed struggle. Where the commitment to the revolutionary left still originates with a need to be in fashion, it is better not to go any farther than may be done while leaving the possibility of retreat open.

The Red Army Faction and urban guerrilla is that faction and practice most severely fought by the authorities, because it has drawn a clear line between itself and the enemy. That presumes political identity, assumes that some learning processes have gone before.

Our initial organizational concept included the combination of urban guerrilla with rank and file work. We wished for all of us simultaneously to cooperate in the city district or factory in existing socialist groups, help to influence the discussion, gain experience, learn. It turned out that this was not possible. The political police control of these groups, their meetings, their discussions, is already so pervasive that it is impossible to attend them if one wishes to escape surveillance. It is impossible for the individual to combine legal with illegal work.

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Urban guerrilla presumes us to be fully aware of our own motivation, to be no longer affected by BILD-ZEITUNG methods, no longer hurt by the antisemitism-criminal-subhuman-murder and arson syndrome they use to describe revolutionaries, by all the shit that they alone are able to produce and pronounce, and that still influences many comrades in their judgment about us.

Of course the system does not leave us a free terrain, nor is there any means--including slander--that it is not ready to use against us.

Nor is there any media with any goal except that of looking after the interests of capital in one way or the other, not even any socialist media reaching beyond itself, its circle, its newsstand sales, its subscribers, media not mainly dealing in accidental, personal and bourgeois behavior. There is no media free of capital control, ranging from advertising to the ambition of the writers to be accepted in the establishment, to the radio councils, the concentration in the newspaper market. The ruling media is the media of the rulers, divided up into market shares, developing strata specific ideologies. Whatever it communicates is in the service of its grip on the particular market share. The journalist category comes under the heading "sales." News as merchandise, information as an item of consumption. It is bound to vilify anything that is not consumable. Readership figures for the advertising-intensive press media, ratings for television--neither of them can afford any contradictions between itself and the public, no antagonisms, no possible consequences. Anyone wishing to stay in competition must keep up with the most powerful opinion shapers on the market. In other words, dependence on the Springer Corporation grows to the extent that the Springer Corporation grows. It has now begun to buy up local newspapers too. The urban guerrilla has nothing to expect of these media than the utmost hostility. The urban guerrilla must orient itself to Marxist criticism and autocriticism, nothing else. As Mao comments, "he who does not fear drawing and quartering, dares to drag the emperor from his horse."

Long-term planning and attention to detail are postulates for the urban guerrilla, especially insofar as we do not only talk about but act in accordance with them. Without keeping open the retreat to bourgeois professions, without being able once more to hang the revolution on the nail in the tract home, without implacably willing that which Blanqui rhetorically expressed by the words "it is the duty of a revolutionary always to fight, to fight regardless, to fight unto death."

-- There is no revolutionary struggle, nor has there ever been one, where that tenet did not apply: Russia, China, Cuba, Algeria, Palestine, Vietnam.

Some say that the political potential of organization, agitation and propaganda is not nearly exhausted, and only when it is should the issue of armed struggle arise. We claim: The political potential cannot be fully utilized as long as the goal, the armed struggle, is not noted as the goal of politicization, as long as the strategic appreciation of all reactionaries being paper tigers is not visible behind the tactical appreciation of their being criminals, murderers and exploiters.

We will not talk of "armed propaganda," we will make it. The liberation of the prisoners was not undertaken for propagandist reasons but to get out our comrade. We are alleged to have carried out bank robberies; we would do that only to get

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money. Mao says that "glittering successes" need to be achieved "when the enemy paints us in the blackest colors." These glittering successes are only relatively our successes. We owe the great howl going up about us to our Latin American comrades, to the clear line they have already drawn between themselves and the enemy. As a result, merely on suspicion of a few bank robberies, the rulers here "confront us as resolutely" as if there were really something firmly built upon what we have just begun, the urban guerrilla of the Red Army Faction.

VI. Legality and Illegality

Revolution in the West

The challenge

To the capitalist power in the strongholds

Is the command of the hour

It is of crucial significance

The current world situation knows no place nor forces

Able to guarantee peaceful development

And democratic stabilization

The crisis tends to sharpen more and more

Now to insist on provincial isolationism

Or postpone the struggle to a later time means

To be dragged into the maelstrom of the general decay

Il Manifesto. From Thesis No 55

The anarchist slogan "destroy anything that destroys you" aims at the direct mobilization of the base, youths in prisons and reeducation camps, in schools and training, aims at those who are worst off, aims at spontaneous comprehension, is the invitation to direct resistance. Just that was meant by Stokely Carmichael's Black Power slogan: "Trust your own experience!" This slogan is based upon the recognition that everything, absolutely everything in capitalism that oppresses, torments, obstructs and burdens us has its origin in capitalist production conditions, that every oppressor, in whatever guise he may present himself, is always a representative of the class interest of capital, in other words a class enemy.

From that aspect the anarchist slogan is correct, proletarian and class combative. It is wrong insofar as it communicates the erroneous concept that no more is needed than to hit out, to hit them in the face, that organization is secondary, discipline bourgeois, the class analysis superfluous. Exposed without defenses to the more severe repression following their actions, their organization lacking regard for the dialectic of legality and illegality, they are legally arrested. The tenet of some organizations "communists are not so stupid as to legalize themselves" merely suits class justice, nobody else. Insofar as it affirms that the legal opportunities of communist agitation and propaganda, organization, political and economic struggle must definitely be used and should not be frivolously hazarded, it is right --but that is not what it means. It means that the limits set by the class state and its justice to socialist efforts are adequate for utilizing all opportunities, that we should keep within these limits, that we must always draw back when confronted with the illegal excesses of this state, just because they will always be legalized--legality at any price. Illegal imprisonment, terror verdicts, police excesses, blackmail and duress by the public prosecutor--like it or lump it, communists are not so foolish.

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He is an opportunist. He does not maintain solidarity. He writes off the comrades in jail, he excludes from the socialist movement the organization and politicization of all those who, due to their social origin and situation, cannot survive by other than criminal actions: The underground, the subproletariat, innumerable proletarian youths, foreign workers. He serves the theoretical criminalization of all those who do not join the organizations. He is their alliance with class justice. He is stupid.

Legality is a question of power. The relation of legality and illegality is to be defined by the contradiction between reformist and fascist exercise of domination. Their current Bonn representatives are the social/liberal coalition on the one hand, Barzel/Strauss on the other, its media representatives the SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, DER STERN, the Third Program of the WDR and the SFB, for example, and the FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU on the one hand, the Springer Corporation, the Free Berlin Transmitter, the Second German Television Service, the BAYNERKURIER on the other; its police the Munich approach on the one hand, the Berlin model on the other; its justice the Federal Constitutional Court on the one hand, the Federal Court on the other.

The reformist approach aims at the avoidance of conflicts, by institutionalization (codetermination), promises of reforms (for example with respect to the prisons), the ending of old conflicts (for example the chancellor's kneeling down in Poland), the avoidance of provocation (the soft approach of the Munich Police and the Federal Administrative Court in Berlin, for example), the verbal acknowledgment of abuses (in public education in Hesse and Berlin, for example). It is part of the conflict avoidance tactics of reformism to move somewhat within and a little less outside legality; that gives it the appearance of legitimacy, of sticking to the constitution, that aims at the integration of contradictions, allows left criticism to spin in a vacuum, that aims at keeping the Young Socialists within the SPD. There can be no doubt that the reformist approach is the more effective approach from the standpoint of the long-term stabilization of capitalist rule. However, it does depend on certain assumptions. It assumes economic prosperity, because the Munich Police force's soft approach, for example, is much more expensive than the hard line of the Berlin police--as was succinctly explained by Munich's police president: "Two officers with a machine gun can keep 1,000 people at bay; 100 officers with rubber truncheons can keep 1,000 people at bay. Without any such aids it would take 300-400 police officers." The reformist approach assumes no organized anticapitalist opposition--as we again realize from the example of Munich.

Incidentally, the monopolization of state and economic power increases under cover of political reformism. Schiller is doing this by his economic policy and Strauss carried it through by his financial reform--the sharpening of exploitation by the intensification and division of labor in the sphere of production, by long-range rationalization in the sphere of administration and services.

We have all learned from the student movement and the Paris May that the accumulation of power in the hands of the few proceeds more smoothly if done quietly, if unnecessary provocations are avoided that might cause uncontrollable solidarization processes. That is why the Red Cells have not yet been banned, that is why the KP was admitted as a legal institution in the guise of the DKP--without lifting the

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KP ban-- , that is why there are still liberal television programs, and that is why some organizations can still afford not to consider themselves so stupid as they actually are.

The scope of legality offered by reformism is capital's reply to the attacks by the student movement and the Apo /extraparliamentary opposition/--as long as the powers that be can afford the reformist reply, it is the more effective reply. To rely on this legality, to extend it in metaphysical terms, to wish to statistically generalize it, just simply defend it--that means to repeat the mistakes in strategy committed by the self-defense regions in Latin America, to leave time for reaction to assemble and reorganize to the point when it not merely illegalizes but destroys the left.

Willy Weyer, for instance, does not even pretend to tolerance; he acts and, in answer to the accusation by the liberal press that his alcohol checks make potential criminals of all drivers, returns the brazen answer: "We will carry on regardless!"--thereby reminding the liberal media of its insignificance. Eduard Zimmermann turns an entire people into policemen, the Spring Corporation controls the Berlin police, BZ columnist Reer instructs Berlin interrogating magistrates about the issue of arrest orders. Taking place here is mass mobilization in the spirit of fascism, drastic proceedings, the death penalty, striking power and deployment--the new look bestowed on Bonn politics by the Brand/Heinemann/Scheel administration is no more than a false front.

Evidently the comrades who so superficially deal with the issue of legality and illegality have swallowed whole the amnesty that, after the event, served to draw the fangs of the student movement. By amnestying hundreds of students, these got away with no more than a scare, and further radicalization was prevented. Regardless of the university science factory, the students were sharply reminded of the material privileges bestowed by bourgeois college attendance, including the ascent of the social ladder. Accordingly the class barrier between them and the proletariat was restored, between their privileged daily life as students and the daily life of the assembly line workers who were not amnestied by the same class enemy. Thus theory was once again divided from practice. The calculation "amnesty equals pacification" proved to be correct.

The social democrat voters initiative launched by a few honorable writers--not only the fucked up Grass--as an attempt at positive and democratic mobilization, intended in other words to be a defense against fascism and therefore to be duly noted, mistakenly considers the whole of political reality to be represented by some publishing houses and editorial offices in radio and television institutions not yet subjected to the rationality of the monopolies, institutions which lag behind as left-overs. The areas of more severe repression are not the ones first encountered by a writer: Prisons, class justice, speeded-up assembly lines, accidents at work, consumer debt, schools, BILD-ZEITUNG and BZ, the residential barracks of the suburbs, foreign worker ghettos--writers experience that at most as an esthetic impression, certainly not as a political reality.

Legality is the ideology of parliamentarism, social partnership, the pluralist society. It turns into a fetish if those who boast of it ignore the fact that telephones may be legally tapped, the mail legally censored, neighbors legally

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interrogated, informers legally paid, surveillance exercised legally--that the organization of political work must be legal at one and the same time unless it wishes permanently to be exposed to the grasp of the political police.

We do not bet on spontaneous antifascist mobilization to be aroused by terror and fascism nor do we consider legality mere corruption. We know that our work provides pretexts, just as alcohol does for Willy Weyer, the rise in crime for Strauss and Eastern policy for Barzel, and as the red traffic light run by a Yugoslav for the Frankfurt taxi drivers, and the movement of the hand to the pocket for the murderer of the car thief in Berlin. And pretext for even more, because we are communists, and unless the communists are going to organize themselves and fight, terror and repression will arouse only fear and resignation instead of provoking resistance, class hatred and solidarity. It will depend on that, whether or not everything here will proceed smoothly in the spirit of imperialism. It will depend on whether communists are so stupid as to allow themselves to be dealt with at will, or whether they use legality, among other means, to organize illegality instead of raising the one rather than the other to the status of a fetish.

The fate of the Black Panther Party and of the Gauche Proletarienne presumably had its roots in that wrong assessment that failed to appreciate the actual contradiction between constitution and constitutional reality nor the exacerbation of this contradiction once organized resistance emerges. They failed to realize that the terms of legality are necessarily altered by active resistance, and that it is therefore imperative simultaneously to utilize legality for the political struggle and the organization of illegality, that it is wrong to wait for illegalization as for a blow of fate delivered by the system, because illegalization then simply implies destruction, and the system's calculations triumph.

The Red Army Faction organizes illegality as an offensive position for revolutionary intervention.

To conduct urban guerrilla war means offensively to conduct the anti-imperialist struggle. The Red Army Faction produces the connection between legal and illegal struggles, between national and international struggles, between political and armed struggles, between the strategic and tactical destination of the international communist movement.

To be urban guerrilla means, despite the weakness of the revolutionary forces in the Federal Republic and Berlin, here and now to intervene in a revolutionary fashion.

Cleaver says: Either they are part of the problem or part of the solution. There is nothing in between. That shit has been examined and studied from all sides for tens of years and generations. I simply maintain that most everything happening in this country no longer needs to be analyzed.

Victory in the Popular War!

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FRANCE

DEBRE ON SECURITY, COURTS POLICIES: TERRORIST DESTABILIZATION

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 23 Apr 82 pp 76-77

[Article by Michel Debre: "The French Will Not Pardon Insecurity--the Government Risks Losing Its Legitimacy in This Matter"]

[Text] "We must have an overall approach to the security of the French people." This recent declaration by the prime minister would have deserved to be stated above. Indeed, we have been experiencing for some months an ardor for reform whose benefit to France and the French people is hard to perceive.

The proclamation of an amnesty so generous that the police receive orders to follow certain dangerous recidivists from the time they leave prison. Abolition, in an impassioned outburst, of the death penalty. Elimination, without serious examination, of the Court of State Security. Elimination of the high-security sections in the prisons is announced. Promulgation of a memorandum ordering the Public Prosecutor's offices not to apply certain measures that have the force of law. Modification of the Code in order to soften the procedures for rapid punishment. Announcement of the elimination of the armed-forces courts. Indulgence toward the occupations of factories and the sequestrations of engineers and managers. Contradictory instructions to the police. A Justice system that is criticized or disavowed when it seems severe. For several months, the government has been improvising or appearing to improvise, for while the laws have been prepared hastily, they all derive from one ideology: not to be severe, not to be repressive.

Was everything so bad? Even if yesterday's government intervened arbitrarily in too many judicial matters, we were not living under a regime of tyranny. So is it desired, by weakening the people's confidence in the democratic institutions, to provoke troubles from which a so-called popular dictatorship would emerge? Unquestionably, some trade-union animators are putting their shoulders to the wheel. In fact, things appear to me to be both simpler and more serious. During years of opposition, the present majority made promise upon promise to all those who complained about the existing state of affairs, whether they were right or wrong. And on top of everything, we are witnessing the success of an ideological affirmation according to which the faults of a person are due above all to society. Thus society is not supposed to have sufficient moral virtue to mete out punishment.

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But public opinion does not philosophize. It sees the reality and bristles at it. This haste to disarm the state and society appears all the more incomprehensible to it in that every week brings one or more examples of crimes and offenses from which it draws the conclusion that the security of persons and property is no longer assured.

Does the "overall approach" announced to us express a new awareness of the ill-considered approach that the ministry has taken, or simply an entirely temporary retreat due to circumstances unfavorable to the popularity of the governments?

Let us hope that it means a new awareness.

The feeling of insecurity comes from three quite distinct sources.

1) The information media are giving publicity--as is natural, for that matter--to the striking but normal fact of the traditional delinquency and criminality. At the same time, modern technical means are giving some of their manifestations a more spectacular aspect: I am referring to certain hold-ups.

This better knowledge of doings that are as old as the world is creating a new sensitivity that is a social fact that the government must heed--just as any government should pay heed to the fact that new means of communication, such as television, can incite to violence.

2) For a great many reasons, there are situations that provoke an increase in antisocial acts. This is the case with overpopulated cities, old neighborhoods or modern apartment houses. Boredom and promiscuity encourage various forms of violence, with or without gangs of youth, with or without motorcycles. This is the case also with unemployment, which leads idle young people and not-so-young people to join in with the wild ambition of a gangleader or a professional hooligan.

Apart from the situations that create a state of mind propitious to delinquency or criminality, there are vices that have the same consequences. This is the case with drugs, which, along with alcoholism, have become a scourge whose effect on the insecurity of the citizens is becoming aggravated.

3) In an entirely different area, we are experiencing a phenomenon whose seriousness is too often, for political reasons, hushed up: terrorism.

Is there an Internationale of terrorism? The answer to this question is negative if one takes it to mean a unity of objective. The Irish terrorists do not have the same objective as the Palestinian terrorists; the Baader-Meinhof gang in the FRG does not have the same designs as the Spanish Basques; the Moslem Brotherhood does not have any common point with the Armenians or with the Italian Red Brigades. But the answer is positive if one means a complicity in the trade and transport of weapons, the training of people and the networks for getting the assassins and the bomb-setters from one country to another. Finally, there is a very strong bond among all of them, albeit a negative one: a

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general desire to "destabilize." That is why, apart from the professionals--both mercenaries and traffickers--one often finds militants who receive political aid and support, and also brainpower. The flareup of outrages in Corsica is in no way an insular creation. External aid has been necessary, and is still necessary.

This diversity that public opinion feels without always being able to analyze it puts the problems of security at a higher level. Security is no longer the affair of the minister of interior, or the minister of justice alone. For some years now it has been a state problem requiring overall action in which any contradiction should be eliminated as much as possible. It is useless to increase the police forces if convicted criminals are freed early. It is useless to blame the antisocial effects of the big prisons if new ones are built without more precautions. Inversely, it is dangerous, in order to justify certain precautions, to belittle the importance of international terrorism, or to treat drugs as if they were a fashion that will go away by itself. All the more so in that beyond the diversity there are bonds among all those who, for reasons of occupational misfortunes or ideological madness, place themselves openly in the field of crime.

Prevent the damage of the drug trade--yes. But one should not be indulgent toward the dealer just because the addict has suffered from an environment that has exposed him to temptation.

Prevent the tendencies toward delinquency--yes. But one should not be indulgent toward the procurer or the gangleader just because the young delinquent has suffered from an absence of family.

Prevent certain serious social frustrations--yes. But the fact that a confederate is animated by disinterested motives should not close one's eyes to the crimes of the professional killers or lunatics who do not shrink from recidivism. Let us therefore know how to associate humane morality and a collective concept of life with social firmness and national affirmation, for the legitimacy of democracy is at stake.

There is, of course, humane morality.

Before punishment, there is education. But in the times we live in, there are serious gaps in our education. Are children and adolescents ever told that liberty means respect for others and for the law? When school is out, who supervises the leisure-time activities of young people whose families are broken up or nonexistent, who looks after them? Consider also the seriousness of insufficient occupational training, and, since the rise of unemployment, the fact that young people are not received into the world of work at the end of their studies.

There is, of course, the concept of collective life.

Urban development is not just the construction of houses and architectural complexes. Are people sufficiently aware of how bad the laissez-faire of the beginning of the century was, with its ill-conceived, ugly and inhuman neighbor-

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hoods? It is not enough today to create green spaces in order to humanize the citadels of concrete. It is necessary, by means of cultural centers that are not politicized, to orient the new inhabitants toward social solidarity and devotion to a collective effort.

But there is also social firmness.

It is possible that the merchant who defends himself is egotistic or that he once committed tax fraud, or that the policeman who waylays a burglar is too quick on the trigger. But this does not justify the person who steals from the merchant, or justify the acquittal of a hardened criminal who fires on a policeman. We are no longer in the times when an incredible poverty could justify criminal or senseless actions. And while it is good to develop the social services, we must know how to judge and restrain. It is not shameful for a democratic society to defend itself and punish, it being clearly understood, of course, that all offences that fall under the law should be subjected to the justice system. Let us not be more compassionate toward murderers than toward those who sponge off savings [as published].

But there is also national affirmation.

The right of asylum that France generously affirms has its counterpart: severity toward those who come to French territory to settle their accounts. Failure to be severe toward them amounts to compromising the right of asylum. As regards us directly, political liberty forbids passiveness in the face of the attacks aimed at the unity of the Republic, the integrity of its territory and its national sovereignty. From this point of view, the elimination of the Court of State Security has been a mistake: it was an exceptional court only in function of the exceptional but real threats posed against France. The war being waged against us is not to be eliminated by a law.

Finally, there is the legitimacy of the government.

A government, even if animated by the best intentions in the world, cannot stand up against a popular feeling of insecurity. The path that leads a body of voters who yesterday sometimes found fault with excessive severity toward some people to declare that the government, through lack of authority, is being indulgent to thieves and murderers--i.e., that it is trembling before them--is a short one. Now the first duty of a government is to ensure the security of its citizens. Insufficiency in this domain can spell the end of democracy.

Failure to take all action to guarantee the security of the citizens means putting liberty at peril.

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ITALY

BRIEFS

RIGHTWING TERRORISTS ARRESTED--Rome, 1 Jun (ANSA)--After lengthy investigations, Italian police have arrested 5 rightwing terrorists, one of whom has been implicated in the attempted murder of Bernardo Leighton, senator and founder of Chile's Christian Democratic Party, and his wife Anita. The attack on the Chilean couple occurred in Rome on October 6, 1975. Bruno Di Luia, 26, a member of the rightwing "National Vanguard" movement, is accused of taking part in the ambush. Four others were implicated in the attack: Pier Luigi Concutelli, Adriano Thilger, Paolo Signorelli and Giulio Crescenzi, all arrested some time ago. The others arrested along with Di Luia in Rome Monday were: Rodolfo Massimo, 27, Felice Zebbi, 37, Angelo Bartocci, 19, and Vittorio Basioni, 26. They are all accused of a long series of terrorist actions, including murder, attempted murder, robbery and bombings. [Text] [AU010839 Rome ANSA in English 0828 GMT 1 June 82]

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SPAIN

GRAPO TERRORIST TRAINING MANUAL

Madrid EXPERIENCIAS DE TRES ANOS DE LUCHA ARMADA in Spanish May 78 pp 1-36

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[Text] I. Conditions under Which Activities of 1 October Antifascist Resistance Groups Are Developing

The GRAPO [1 October Antifascist Resistance Groups] is not the first organization that has taken up arms to fight against fascism in Spain. The peoples of the various nationalities of Spain have a long tradition of revolutionary armed struggle directed against the regime of the exploiter, parasitary, and reactionary classes. The appearance of the GRAPO means no more and no less than the continuation of that long tradition under the new economic, political, and social conditions prevailing in Spain.

The GRAPO constitute a revolutionary military organization which has sprung from the heat of the mass struggles to support and strengthen the organized people's resistance movements against fascism in Spain. The GRAPO are turning out to be the response of the masses to the lack of real political and labor union freedoms; they are in line with the defense of the immediate and future interests of the vast masses of the people; and their objective is none other than to serve the people at all times and to become, at the proper time, the revolutionary people's army which the mass movement needs in order to defeat and once and for all to do away with fascism and monopolism in Spain.

When the GRAPO appeared, no antifascist and no democratically minded citizen doubted the necessity for this organization, nor its type of struggle. Indeed, the blows which the GRAPO have struck against the reactionaries over the past 3 years have greatly contributed to the retreat of the fascist regime in all areas and very particularly they helped raise the fighting spirit and improve the development of the organized struggle of the masses. Today, after the electoral and pseudodemocratic masquerades prepared by the monopolies and all of their reformist lackeys, masquerades behind which they intend to hide their real countenance and conceal their real setbacks in the face of the revolutionary mass movement, one must ask oneself the following question: Do the organization and the antifascist armed struggle continue to be necessary?

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"He who holds the rifle, holds power." This principle is valid both for Spain and in all of the countries of the world and our enemies have always been very much aware of it. All we have to do is recall the operations in response to the shootings of 27 September or the series of attacks against fascist monuments and centers on 18 July 1976 or the campaign in support of release of political prisoners which centered around the seizure of the fascist policemen and other more recent actions of a propagandistic and mass-aid type, which were so well received to point up the need for our work, its importance to the mass movement, and to prove that we will be invincible if we continue on this road.

Fascism tries to camouflage itself but it is present in all manifestations of the state and of economic, social, and cultural life in Spain; it has not disappeared, as they are trying to make the popular masses believe, and they are still waiting for another opportunity to impose themselves upon the Spanish people with blood and fire. For this purpose, they are strengthening the entire repressive machinery while the domesticated reformist parties try to wash the face of that monstrous apparatus and to give it a moral force which it never had. They are carrying out a real moral and material rearmament of the forces of the police and the army, of the courts and the repressive laws, etc.; reaction is throwing dirt into the eyes of the masses so that they will not see this new preparation intended to keep the country in a permanent state of war. What does this mean, if not the continued presence of the police in the boroughs of the big cities? It is not "crime" which worries them (here the only criminals, thieves and major criminals are "our respectable rulers"); what really worries them is the upswing in the development of the revolutionary mass movement as well as the spread and strength displayed by its armed organizations.

Under the current conditions of serious economic crisis, with a constant rise in unemployment and poverty, an increase in repressive measures taken by the state, etc., and the resultant development of the revolutionary mass movement, it is necessary and therefore inevitable that popular armed organizations should spring up which put a stop to the abuses and excesses of the big capitalists and their state.

We must therefore realize that the revolutionary organization and armed struggle will not only continue to be necessary but that we are today facing a situation that is much more favorable than when we began. The regime has been retreating continuously and today faces major problems and is more beset than ever before by the struggle of the masses and the armed actions which are assuming great significance throughout the country. But the situation is not only changing shape in a very favorable fashion for us; in addition to that one must keep in mind--and perhaps that is a less favorable aspect for us--that the enemy has learned and now has much more knowledge about us than when we began. This is why it is necessary to analyze this experience. But we can already say that, for a long period of time, we are going to have to keep moving under these conditions which are favorable from the political viewpoint but which are relatively unfavorable from the viewpoint of our movement's organization. We must therefore as minutely as possible analyze all of our experiences in order to bring our methods of organization and all of the actions we carry out into line with this new situation.

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The First of October Antifascist Resistance Groups, as we said earlier, constitute an organization which has more than 3 years of experience in the intensive fight against fascism; in other words, the GRAPO already have a history, albeit a short one, which supplies us with valuable lessons.

We can say that in the beginning, the GRAPO started almost from scratch; they had no experience and they did not have the means necessary to conduct the fight and it could not be otherwise in a military organization which has its roots among the popular masses. This is why we were guided by the principle according to which "you acquire military knowledge and resources by fighting the enemy"; this principle continues to retain its full value for us. For a certain period of time, our activities were developed with relative ease; the police and other information media of the state lacked data and knowledge about our organization; that enabled us to keep accumulating the means and experience necessary to initiate the battle. Indeed, the GRAPO did not reveal themselves except a long time after they had initiated their actions and after an infrastructure capable of withstanding the blows of the enemy forces had been created. These forces, for their part, took more than 2 years to gather the data necessary to "zero in on us" and, in turn, to launch their repressive and propaganda operations against us. But it was already late; the initial battle, the most important in any war, they had already lost. During that time, we continued developing our strength, we acquired the means necessary, we struck very hard blows against fascism, and we won the heart of the masses. The struggle, on the part of the fascist state, was concentrated on wiping us out before the influence of our actions would make itself felt among the masses but we can say that they did not attain this objective. The repression unleashed against our organization did cause numerous losses but did not prevent us from continuing our actions which grew in scope. On the other hand, their campaign of slander has also backfired against them, ruining those periodical organs which had initiated those lies. We definitely emerged triumph from that difficult stage. This was mainly due to the fact that, to destroy us, the monopolies had to create economic and political conditions different from those existing in Spain and thus eliminate the resistance movement which had been growing in Spain for a long time; and this, as we can understand, is completely impossible for them to accomplish. We must always keep this aspect of the question in mind: The popular resistance movement is the thing that nurtures and gives life to the armed organization; we must never separate ourselves from the mass movement; in that way we will be invincible.

The conditions under which our military struggle is developing are those of a capitalist and industrialized country. We have a powerful proletariat and we have big, heavily populated cities. The government of the big monopoly bourgeoisie and all of the reactionaries have concentrated all of their repressive and administrative functions in a few capitals. This is why our actions must be carried out primarily in the cities, not in the rural areas. At the same time one must keep in mind that, both because of conditions and because of the popular content of the struggle we are fighting, that struggle has the character of a prolonged war and will have to be developed along a rising line, from less to more. On the other hand, we have to keep in mind that, under current conditions and for a long period of time to come, we

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will not be able to count on foreign aid; this must make us rely only on ourselves and exclusively fall back on our own forces and the forces of the people.

For a long period of time, we are going to have to face the political police and the Civil Guard as our main enemies. At any rate, our actions have always been directed against the fascist state as a whole and this is how it will continue in the future because it would be very harmful to our movement and to the popular cause if we were to devote ourselves to a "particular" struggle against the state's repressive forces.

In their vain attempts to wipe us out, we must keep in mind that the police and the Civil Guard are familiar with our methods of struggle and organization; they have arrested and they have files on a large number of our fighters and they especially seek to wipe out our infrastructure. All of this, combined with the numerous losses we have suffered, is the price which we inevitably had to pay for our earlier advances. But this price, as we have seen, has its counterpart and that is that our struggle has contributed decisively to the change in the political situation in a manner favorable to the masses, a change which has taken place in Spain over the past 2 years; all of this, along with the continuation of our actions, puts us in an immeasurably better situation to continue the development of the movement with ever greater strength each day.

II. Political and Organization Principles of the 1 October Antifascist Resistance Groups

As a military antifascist organization, the GRAPO want to become the armed arm of the organized movement of popular resistance. The objectives and interests of the GRAPO are not distinct from the objectives and interests of the masses. We are not fighting for narrow objectives, nor for private or group interests; we are fighting to defeat fascism, to expropriate the monopolies, and to restore the true liberties to Spain which were wrested from the people by force of arms and which can be recovered only by force.

The principles that guide us in our action are those of always serving the people, always remaining united with the people, at all times being prepared to carry out any kind of action that can promote the mass movement and our own growing strength and development and, for this purpose, to keep the equipment available to us in perfect operating condition, taking care of it as we would take care of our own lives.

Serving the People

Our struggle has a popular character and therefore must always be based on the masses and then we will never be lacking in the aid of the masses. Everything that is good for the working people, everything that advances their organization independently of the big bourgeoisie, everything that helps increase confidence in their own strength, everything that inspires the struggle and isolates and weakens fascism, all that is good and all that will be supported by the GRAPO. Experience has shown time and again that, under conditions of acute economic crisis, from which capitalism suffers and, very particularly, as part of the political and social crisis which Spain is experiencing, the

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armed struggle directed against the fascist state exposes its extreme weakness and the real face of the lackeys of the monopolies, forcing the latter continuously to retreat in the face of the mass movement, clearing the way to the organization and uninterrupted development of the struggle of the masses. The popular masses and the real democrats and antifascists in turn view the GRAPO and the other armed organizations to be the road which they must follow to their liberation as the only possibility for victory. This is why it is not at all strange that they hasten ever more actively to support those who take up arms against the exploiters and the oppressive regime; it is not at all strange that they are organizing themselves independently of the institutions, the parties, the labor unions, etc., which are controlled by reaction and imperialism; they become stronger in the course of their struggles and they actively join the resistance movement.

Like other parties and organizations with propaganda and political agitation, etc., we are going to win the minds and hearts of our people with arms; this is the strategic objective which our organization intends to achieve during this first stage of our work. To prove the correctness of this line, it suffices to make reference to the broad solidarity movement with our imprisoned fighters, a movement which is spreading throughout the land and among the most varied social strata and classes, a movement which is bound to get them out of prison.

To win the sympathy and support of the working people, our military operations at all times were in keeping with the mass movement's political necessities; in other words, these were not isolated actions and the workers and other working people many times asked for them; this demonstrates the necessity for and correctness of those actions.

From acts of people's justice, such as the execution of paid assassins for the criminal acts carried out by the forces of repression, all the way to expropriation and the distribution of food among families of those "without work," via the capture of notorious fascist forces--all of these actions of ours have always had a very clear political and popular character, that is, to respond to the fascist crimes, to encourage the masses in their resistance struggle against exploitation and the terror of the monopolies, to denounce the electoral masquerades and the continuation of the fascist regime, to promote the movement of struggle for the liberation of political prisoners, etc. The masses of the people view all of these actions with sympathy because they feel and understand the true need for such actions, just as we do.

The fighters of the GRAPO must study and develop those aspects in depth, along with the clear political, popular, and revolutionary meaning of each of our operations because that is the only way we will be able to orient ourselves during the prolonged and complex fight we make. The correct estimate of the political situation will tell us when, how, and where we must strike.

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Every GRAPO Fighter Must Always Be Ready To Go into Action

In our organization, as in any military organization, we observe the strictest and most iron discipline. But this discipline is not based on terror; it is not imposed through physical and moral coercion, as happens in the armies of reaction; instead it is based on and is the product of the profound conviction of its necessity in each and every one of the fighting men because only this kind of discipline can enable us to accomplish the greatest miracles, to overcome all obstacles and difficulties, and always to defeat the enemy. This conscious discipline is complemented in practice through the application of democratic methods of internal discussion, at the same time, eliminating everything that smacks of privileges for leaders, fomenting political and ideological discussion, etc. Freedom of discussion to promote and strengthen unity of action--these are our disciplinary principles.

The principle to the effect that "every fighter must always be prepared to go into action" must at no time be understood as a simple call to discipline.

War is an art and demands sacrifices of those who make it; it is also an assembly of techniques. This is why, in order properly to master that art and to reduce sacrifices as much as possible, it is necessary to have a command of both these things, that is, the art and the techniques. We must start with the principle to the effect that "knowledge, like weapons, is acquired with practice, by fighting." During this long process of learning, which is not devoid of defeats and painful experiences, the study of military topics also plays an important role, particularly the study of the lessons learned during the people's war, both in Spain and in other countries or parts of the world, as summarized by great theoreticians such as Engels or Mao Zedong. We must force ourselves to assimilate and creatively apply to our own conditions the rich experiences accumulated by the revolutionary peoples of all countries over scores of years of struggle.

Every GRAPO Fighter Must Care for and Preserve Equipment, as well as His Own Life

We acquire weapons, as well as military knowledge, in the course of the struggle against our enemies. We are fighting a ferocious enemy who spares no effort, who is highly professional, and who has resources way out of proportion to our own. We have two things to use against those differences. First of all, the masses of the people. This is a strategic weapon which the enemy will never have. In second place, we have our ingenuity, our tactics, and the strategy of the people's struggle. Little by little, we are going to get better arms for ourselves, we are going to create a broader and safer infrastructure, and we are definitely going to improve the means available to us for our combat. In this respect, all effort we make will always be little. But above all, to have superiority over the enemy, the conditions under which we must fight do not matter; we must establish a correct ratio between men and arms. It would be wrong and very harmful to forget that, above the resources, above the weapons to be used, there is always the man who must handle them. The GRAPO fighter at each moment employs some specific work methods and has some means available to him which have been useful to him under

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earlier conditions, similar to those he encounters at a given moment, but not identical. We must never entrust our own security, nor the result of an operation, to the quality or quantity of arms to be used. We must constantly improve our work methods, our combat tactics, we must use all means within our reach, we must vary them as much as possible and in keeping with the character of the operations, etc. We must avoid routine like the pest because the opposing forces are also working and are trying very hard to discover how we work, how we move, what type of weapons we use, where we strike our blows, etc., and that means that we must always be on the alert and completely or partly change our form and resources to do what has to be done. In short, we must never slip into routine and that duty is another one of our working principles.

Finally, every fighter must pay the proper attention to the problem of resources; he must obtain for himself everything needed to conduct the fight, he must have a perfect knowledge of the employment of equipment, and he must always keep it in perfect operating condition.

Organization

The strength and unity of a certain number of individual wills aimed at the attainment of certain objectives are impossible without organization. Organization is a basic and fundamental question for every army. The form which this organization may assume will vary according to the character and the objectives pursued. Independently of that, we must keep in mind that the correct distribution of forces, the possibility of their efficient employment at the proper place and moment, constitute the center of the organizational problems which we face daily.

Throughout the struggle, the organization of our forces will be perfected continually through the lessons we are learning. On the other hand, the conditions under which our activity must be developed also change constantly. The basic objective pursued by any military organization is to conserve its forces and destroy those of the enemy, in other words, to shield our army and its equipment and to find a way to strike so as to weaken and ultimately destroy the opposing forces. To this end we must get the most out of our rank-and-file fighters, out of the leadership cadres, and the available resources.

Our organization has always taken this very much into account, analyzing each of its actions. In this sense, we are going to present some experiences below.

"Operation Cromo," that is to say, the capture and detention of Oriol and Villaescusa, was mainly aimed at the release of political prisoners and the denunciation of the fascist election masquerade; in other words, the fundamental objective was political denunciation and the attainment of political results. Militarily speaking, the operation, throughout its entire execution, was the most complex of all of those we had undertaken until then. It was the first of its kind, we lacked experience and that came out in the course of the operation.

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The situation became increasingly complicated after the strikes which permitted the capture of the two bosses something which was carried out with great military precision due to the prior experience we had here. Holding them for a long time, in an organization as weak as ours, in the midst of a vast display of enemy forces, facing the entire repressive machinery of the state--that was a very complicated and risky task. But we were sure of being able to carry it out and this is why we started it; indeed, in spite of the display of enemy forces, we managed to attain our objective to a good extent in holding the prisoners for almost 2 months. This enabled us to revive the propaganda campaign for the release of antifascist prisoners and to keep the fascist election masquerade out in the open.

What was it that motivated the outcome of the operation which ended with the rescue of Oriol and Villaescusa and the arrest of a large number of our fighters? Could we not have avoided this outcome? We always maintained that this defeat was the result of our own mistakes. The arrest of the team that was watching the prisoners and the capture of a portion of the equipment by the police and, what is even worse, the subsequent arrests of a good portion of the GRAPO leadership--all this was due to the fact that we made serious leadership mistakes during "Operation Cromo."

This leadership mistake began the moment when--due to the necessities that arose--the team that was to direct the entire operation was little by little sidetracked into carrying out minor tasks which were not within its assigned mission. In that way, almost without realizing it, we found ourselves without leadership for the entire operation. Difficulties, minor failures, unforeseen events, etc., kept piling up; many of them could have been avoided or corrected if we had had firm leadership from the beginning to the end. Instead of that, we quickly faced a situation of rather very considerable discoordination among the various parts of the detachment, along with a lack of information; the forces we had available were not correctly distributed and we faced a situation in which the leadership almost without knowing it left its post and carried out functions that it was not supposed to carry out; along with that, a considerable segment of our forces was kept inactive and was also rounded up by the police.

Lack of leadership, incorrect distribution of forces, incorrect ratio between the primary mission--such as holding the prisoners--and secondary tasks, such as responses to the criminal attack at Atocha, etc.--these were the mistakes that led to the failure of Operation Cromo which we are all familiar with.

After this setback, we analyzed all of these experiences and on the basis of that we corrected the mistakes and strengthened the organization.

We established strict division of labor and of responsibilities in each group, starting with the principle that nobody, not even a leader must know anything about any other fighter, nor anything about the equipment depots, unless the men and the equipment are directly under his command. The men in charge of Central Command must not be known to the members of any group and, to be able to do their leadership work, they must be connected only and exclusively with the network of the group that is under their responsibility. To make sure

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that the work is done properly and to prevent possible casualties among the leadership group, it is absolutely necessary for both the leadership group and its links with the groups not directly to participate in the operations.

This structure and functioning of the military organization raise a series of problems concerning cadre training. Since there are no direct relations between men with greater experience and training, who are members of the leadership, on the one hand, and the rank-and-file fighters of the groups, on the other hand, there may be a weakening in the political, ideological, and military training of the teams and this can delay their own training and development. Nevertheless, experience, the new conditions under which we find ourselves forced to work, and the very requirements of the overall development of the organization obligate us to proceed in this fashion although in practice this may turn out to be very expensive for us and may take us more time in fully developing our work.

This new structure and operating procedure, adopted because of the loss of the commando involved in "Operation Cromo" demonstrated their effectiveness after the failure in the month of August, a failure which to a considerable extent was due to a kind of continuation of the earlier one. Two members of the Central Command and a part of the Madrid group fell into the hands of the police. In spite of that, no other fighter--except the female comrades of some of the men who were arrested--were affected by these losses and did not even have to move from their homes. The police caught nothing more than a small portion of the equipment under the control of the Madrid group. In spite of the damage such a loss always inflicts on our organization--especially if some leading members are included--we can say that there are some positive aspects in this setback. This loss again confirmed in us the idea of protecting the members of the Central Command even more, putting various firewalls between them and the direct action groups.

New Stage

We can say that we have covered a highly important stage in our struggle against fascism and in the area of organization. The strategic objective we had proposed to attain during that stage--winning the masses over to us and demonstrating the vulnerability of fascism's repressive apparatus--was attained to a good degree. But, as we saw before, the conditions under which we had to do our work became more difficult. Many of our fighters were identified and arrested and the combined repressive forces of the state were unleashed against us. Now, one of our main tasks in the area of organization is to prevent or to hinder as much as possible the identification of the major portion of the GRAPO members who are so necessary both because of the relative ease with which they can move around and in order to keep setting up a strong and safe infrastructure.

Recruiting

Most of the GRAPO fighters come from the popular sectors who have a greater degree of organization, preferably from the working class and the students;

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this could not be otherwise. To the extent that new social classes and strata find themselves facing fascism and monopolism in a more resolute fashion and obtain for themselves an organization independent of the reformist parties, we get members of those strata, especially peasants, professional men, etc., in our ranks. Our link with the masses is now relatively weak; but we are going to broaden and strengthen it as time goes on and through the development of our activities. In any case, we must keep in mind that it will be the maintenance of the antifascist, democratic, and truly popular character of our actions and our participation, whenever possible, in the mass movements and organizations, which will guarantee us--as is already happening in practice--a situation where a growing number of fighters joins our ranks, thus by far making up the gaps which inevitably will arise in our ranks during the struggle. We must make sure that for each of our fighters who falls, 100 new fighters, ready to take up arms, will spring up in our popular ranks. This will make us invincible.

In recruiting new members for the organization, we must always very much keep in mind that the police and the Civil Guard continually seek to infiltrate our ranks. An infiltrator can cause heavier losses than a hundred battles fought against the enemy. This is why all measures we take to prevent infiltrations will never be sufficient.

On one occasion, the Civil Guard managed to infiltrate an agent provocateur who caused an entire group to be burned. This experience must serve us as a lesson and make us always be vigilant. But we must at all costs prevent the creation, in our ranks, of a climate of suspicion which would be utilized by our enemies to destroy us. We must handle applicants who want to become members of the GRAPO in a just and judicious fashion, subjecting them to a trial period which must extend as long as necessary before they can be considered full members ready to join our ranks. During that period of time, we must conduct an extremely detailed investigation where the applicant was picked up or came from and during that trial period, when the applicant is ordered to perform various actions, he must not get to know any leader and he must have contact only with one or two militants. The applicant must prove his valor and discipline and above all his determination to comply with the three fundamental principles of the GRAPO.

III. Always Keeping in Mind the Political Necessity of Every Action

All military actions carried out by the GRAPO must be aimed at promoting the development of the popular movement of resistance to fascism and must therefore always be aimed at the overthrow of that regime. Losing sight of this great mission will cause us to become a group of adventurers. This is why it is very important for all of our actions to be in accord with the political situation at any given moment and we must therefore know how to differentiate that which is of primary importance from that which is of secondary importance. Let us give some examples. Were the executions of 1 October necessary or were they not? During the summer of 1975, the regime had unleashed an escalation of terror to nip the mass movement in the bud; this escalation culminated in the shootings of 27 September. They had also planned to carry

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out other actions of a similar nature. Our organization had for some time been preparing itself to confront this new terrorist escalation by fascism which we saw coming; even before that we found ourselves forced to come up with some forceful response to these murders. The fact that we had a clear political view was the thing that persuaded us first to carry out our preparations and then to make the decision to carry out the action which was accomplished without any mistakes. The combination of these conditions, the broad mass movement which was triggered, both at home and abroad by the shootings of 27 September, and the fact that the enemy had not expected our action, obligated the ruling class to pull back on all of its plans and permitted the masses again to take the initiative in the class struggle. And so we can say today without fear of contradiction that the action of 1 October was correct in all of its aspects and this was due to a correct political situation estimate and a correct political leadership. Another one of the operations carried out by our organization and against which the government marshalled the very last lackey of the domestic opposition, was the seizure of Oriol and Villaescusa. Let us recall that the election masquerade--with which the regime was trying to camouflage itself--was being prepared at that time. On the other hand, the masses were out in the streets, calling for release of the antifascist and patriotic prisoners; the government had refused to release the prisoners and went ahead with its camouflage plans. Our action was carried out under these conditions, after an operation aimed directly against the principal means for spreading lies, against the fascist state. "Operation Cromo" kept the result of the regime's demagogic campaign in suspense for more than 2 months and in fact promoted a higher level of people's struggle for the release of the prisoners. At the same time we demonstrated that fascism is not as strong as it appears to be, that it can be hit, that it can be made to withdraw and finally that it can be defeated by means other than the polls, which will never give the people victory. Today, the facts speak for themselves. The government found itself forced once again to retreat by releasing many prisoners; its political maneuver was brought to light in the best possible way and after that the masses continued the resistance struggle on a higher level.

These and many other experiences enable us to conclude that we need a certain type of action at each particular political moment; at a moment of relative calm, it is generally not a good idea to undertake actions directed against the forces of repression. On the other hand, during those moments we must make use of the situation to carry out another type of action, such as an action of a propaganda nature or we must supply ourselves with weapons and strengthen the organization's infrastructure so that we may be prepared in all areas when the moment comes to take action against the enemy's most sensitive nerves.

From this we can deduce that it is not sufficient to have clear political ideas; if we lack the willpower and the means necessary to intervene in the political process in a manner favorable to the masses, then we can do little or nothing. Hence we must include in our consideration of our political mission and of the operations aimed at that goal all those whose objective it is to supply ourselves with equipment and to strengthen the organization as such.

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It sometimes happens that a sudden change in the situation or the measures taken by the enemy force us to change our plans or to postpone some of the operations we had scheduled for a certain date. Failing to take these eventualities into account in a struggle as complex as ours more than once caused us to improvise and to turn everything upside down, with a resultant danger to the fighters, to the equipment, and to the organization's prestige. We must avoid this at all costs and this is why the only solution is always to be prepared for several types of actions in order, at each particular moment, to mount the action we consider most opportune for the attainment of our strategic objectives. Keeping this in mind is one of the most important missions of the Central Command; but all of the organization's groups must in turn be prepared to act at any moment and to attain a wide variety of objectives.

Confidence among All Members Is Essential for Smooth Operation

It is vitally important that all members constituting a group are completely united and together not only politically but above all in action. Having a liberal or lukewarm member in a group creates bad relations and lack of confidence among the rest of the members and has very negative repercussions throughout the entire group and therefore impairs the effectiveness of its actions. During all actions carried out by a group, one must keep one fundamental principle in mind which keeps the unit united in an iron fashion and makes for a high degree of confidence and aggressiveness in the entire group: "Everybody goes into action and everybody has to come out." It is the leader who initiates the operation and who gives the order for withdrawal. Another important detail to keep in mind is to try to make sure that the same members of a group will operate during the various actions since this enables them to get to know each other better. It also strengthens confidence, it facilitates the study of each and every one's reactions and ways of acting and in the end this is the way you achieve total togetherness. In the course of an operation, one must speak as little as possible so as not to provide any data and members with less experience must be accompanied by the stronger ones. It is a very good idea for all members of a group to discuss an operation before carrying it out, to bring themselves up to date on the smallest details of the operation and to have each member express his opinion on the various problems that might arise until, if possible, the group arrives at unanimity. In no case is it permitted to discuss an operation's necessity or convenience before the action is carried out or to debate the orders which for that purpose may be issued by the higher organ. This will promote the group's unity and the execution of the assigned task even more. Only after the operation has been carried out can the group's members discuss and analyze the lessons learned, both from the operational and from the political viewpoint.

Minor and Major Actions Must Be Given Same Importance

We must start from the principle that all major or minor operations have the same importance; there is no good enemy and there is no target that does not offer resistance. Very often, the execution of some apparently "easy" actions causes us to drop our guard, to leave ourselves exposed and move without sufficient preparation; this is why many of these actions fail from the very beginning. Here is an example: The seizure and interrogation of an agent provocateur are carried out without taking all of the measures necessary in

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this case. The men in charge of this mission consider it a picnic from the very beginning; they fail to understand the response capacity of an cornered individual and they almost always fail to leave him under guard. Under these conditions, the provocator cleverly manages to escape and one of the interrogators is arrested shortly thereafter. Here is another example: Placing our banner at a bridge in Leganes (Madrid). There is no doubt that this is a very simple thing, almost child's play, when we compare this operation to others carried out by the GRAPO. If the proper precautions are not taken, if the information obtained is not considered, if we go out at a time that was not the specified time, then as a result of all that, the group will be caught. We suffer two casualties who are arrested at the time. Mistakes such as these have been made and continue to be made every day. This is the result of a liberal concept which can cause much damage to the organization and to those who permit these infractions. If we keep in mind the manner in which the enemy proceeds, we will see that it is not only the fear among the members of his forces of repression that causes them to take all kinds of measures to back up their operations. They are guided by an elementary principle in military art and technique and that is that one should always assume that anything might happen at any moment and that one must therefore be prepared to respond accordingly. Failure to keep this principle in mind very often causes us to engage in daring adventurism with the consequences known to all of us.

Operations Must Be Planned Minutely

To carry out any kind of action, we must absolutely from the very first moment on have the most complete information possible on the place, the persons, etc. The information has to be checked out in the field by the group that must mount the operation; the group must have a detailed knowledge of everything that may be of interest, such as how many persons will be in the place and their characteristics, how they are deployed, whether there is any alarm or whether there are firearms, whether there are any guards in the surrounding area, picking the best time, seeking routes of escape, etc.

The group leader, who knows every member and his capacity, must know how to distribute his manpower and assign to each member the mission best suited to his qualities or temperament. We must avoid operations dragging out longer than necessary; the fighters become nervous when they have too long and besides that causes suspicions to arise. It is of the utmost importance for each group member to have a perfect knowledge of his mission and to carry it out perfectly; it is recommended that the strongest members take over as lookouts and that they protect those who actually carry out the operation since it has been found many times that this is one of the key posts where we can be taken by surprise. As an example of this, we have the failure during the assault on an armory in Barcelona; when the lookout job was assigned to a rather inexperienced fighter, the latter did not know what to do when the police arrived; he acted nervously and the entire team was machinegunned. Result: Several wounded and two arrested.

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A well-prepared and planned operation is an operation in which the forces are properly distributed and in which the men are taken into action without causing any suspicion. An operation must be launched by the entire group at the same time.

The best guarantee for success springs from the element of surprise, in other words, hitting the enemy unawares and not giving him a chance to respond. This prevents unnecessary casualties and accidents.

There is one aspect which is ignored entirely too frequently and which must be taken more seriously. It involves cover and tracks. In order not to leave a trail that can facilitate the work of the police, each group must provide a suitable cover for itself before launching an operation. To comply with this requirement, the group leader must appoint someone who will have the job of obtaining the necessary elements and making sure that the procedure is carried out in practice. Each action requires a different cover and the elements necessary for it must be considered like the weapons we need in our work. Upon termination of the operation, it is necessary to abandon the vehicles and means used which can identify us, of course not before they have been wiped so as not to leave any fingerprints. We must not complete an operation before contacts or security checks have been carried out. If some group member does not show up, it must be considered that he has fallen and all proper measures must be taken.

Determination, Initiative, and Discipline

Once an operation has been carefully studied and all steps have been laid out and once the group is in the position from which the action is to be carried out, the main factor is determination, boldness, and discipline. Indecision can create serious problems and permit the enemy to take the initiative, thus causing the failure of the mission and the possible arrest of the group. Once the operation has been launched, another very important factor is to retain the initiative from the beginning to the end. It might happen that conditions change after the information has been checked out, as we launch the operation, or in the course of the operation itself. This will force us to improvise and to keep solving the problems that arise as we go along and without hesitation since hesitation is the first step before losing the initiative. Only if conditions have changed very considerably will we decide to abandon the operation before launching it; but in all cases, the group leader must be the one to give the order. In case of danger, we must resort to the masses and ask for their help and collaboration.

Finally, another important factor involves the observance of discipline during the course of the operation itself. The entire group must submit to the orders of its leader, no matter how crazy they may seem. One must never discuss an order given by the leader in the course of an action; his orders must be carried out as one man, with audacity and initiative. The success of any operation depends on that.

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The GRAPO leadership must take special care in picking the leaders for each group, selecting the best trained for these positions and always trying to make sure that they win the confidence of the group and in turn can have confidence in the group. In this way, operations can be carried out with great probability of success.

IV. On Cadres

The task of training cadres and employing them properly has always been a matter of great concern for our organization.

We must above all keep in mind the objectives which we have set for ourselves and the vast scope of the job to be done in order to grasp the real importance of this question. In the final analysis, it is the cadres, the persons, not the weapons that decide everything. Now, how do we train our cadres? Military cadres are trained in the practice of battle, in daily combat operations, as they confront and resolve the most complex situations and problems with determination. This is sufficiently clear among us because, as we said before, we started from scratch and all of our knowledge on military questions comes from noplac other than combat and from the fact that we confront organizational, political, and other problems that spring from combat.

Today we can say that we already have a good number of cadres and that many others are being trained in the daily struggle of our people against fascism. Analyzing the lessons learned during our operations, summarizing them in order later on to apply them again, all of this along with political discussion, also presupposes another fundamental part in the task of training military cadres. Finally we must also study military topics to enrich our knowledge and to try to apply it to our conditions.

But all of this is not yet enough. We must not confine ourselves to fighting, discussing, studying, and trying to apply the lessons we have learned. In addition we must also arm ourselves with a concept of the world of the working class. At this time, as we still constitute a weak and small army, at a time when we lack experience, at a time when our work is essentially military and when we do not have very direct relations with the masses, it is of the utmost importance for us to pay much attention to ideological questions. This means not only considering each combat action and its immediate political context but taking a look at the war as a whole and our ultimate objectives. We already have some very bitter experience which shows us that neglect of the in-depth study of the classical authors of Marxism-Leninism, excessive orientation toward practical aspects, etc., very often creates lack of confidence in the justness and invincibility of our cause; if this spreads among the organization's leading cadres, this can cause us much damage.

Most of us were drawn to the GRAPO by action, by the firm conviction that you get nowhere with little words and proclamations and that what really has to be done is to strike the enemy, to strike and strike at the enemy. This is a good quality which we must feel proud of. But it is not enough to want to strike at the enemies; in addition to wanting to strike we must also know how to strike, where to strike, and all of this requires study, it means putting an end to the tendency toward blind activism. On the other hand,

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this activism leads to a rather disorderly, anarchic way of life, it leads to a lack of relations among members so that each member stays by himself. Under our condition, this is very dangerous.

It is the responsibility of the organization's leaders or higher-level cadres to train, support, and properly employ the cadres and for that purpose they must know them well, they must help them continually improve themselves in their work.

Brotherly relations and real comradeship must be established among leading cadres and the group's fighters since this is the only way to create good togetherness among all, to strengthen discipline, and to create an environment very propitious for study and discussion, for the exercise of criticism and the development of initiative as well as the qualities in each and every member.

V. The Man and the Weapon

We must at all times establish a correct relationship between the man and the weapon and we must not assign an excessive importance to the resources we may have since that can have grave consequences. What is the most important thing between man and weapon? We maintain that the most important thing is the man; it is the man who handles the weapon and not the weapon that handles the man; therefore, no matter how good the weapons and the means available to us may be, if we do not know how to put them into their subordinate place with respect to the individual, then we will never be able to make proper use of them and in the end they will turn against us. An example well known to all involves vehicles. In the course of Operation Cromo, due to its great usefulness, we placed excessive confidence in this instrument without realizing that the police would be able to track us down through that instrument. There is no doubt that vehicles, like any other weapon or working instruments, are very necessary for us in obtaining our objectives. But material things do not think, they have no "brain"; they serve at all times for the kind of use which man wants to make of them and if we use them badly, for example, then we can run into trouble. This is why we must always keep in mind the relationship existing between man and the means he uses to attain certain ends; we must always be very alert because the enemy is also using certain means which most of the time are very superior to ours and that superiority of enemy resources we can compensate for only through our ingenuity, our astuteness, our inventiveness, at all times avoiding to become victims of them. For this purpose we must always know how far we can go in using a weapon or a certain tool and we must discard it at the right time or exchange it for another one.

To supply ourselves with the necessary resources, we must always start with the principle that those resources are obtained by fighting, by grabbing them from the enemy. This is something only we ourselves can do.

Our struggle is prolonged in nature; it is developing under the conditions of a capitalist country where we cannot count on a single foot of liberated area nor can we count on any foreign aid, at least for a long period of time. These features and conditions of our struggle determine our necessities and

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the type of weapons and equipment to use during this first stage: Light weapons, apartments, warehouses, workshops, documentation, support points, vehicles. It is of vital importance for us to learn the functioning and handling of all these resources and to know how to use them; a good part of those resources are supplied to us by modern industry. For this purpose we must assign a certain number of cadres to research. We not only need capable militants but we also need a good quantity of weapons and equipment and we must create a safe infrastructure which will enable us to develop our struggle with success and effectiveness.

On Arms

Arms are one of our main combat resources; this is why we must get them for ourselves and this is why we must take care of them as we would of our own lives. We must not forget that a weapon in poor condition threatens our life and that of the other comrades and can cause the failure of the operation we are carrying out. This explains the importance of familiarizing ourselves with weapons, learning how to handle them properly, keeping them in perfect condition, ready for use, etc. We must do the same thing with ammunition and explosives.

All groups have the duty to supply themselves with weapons and other equipment so that they will not have to depend on others.

VI. Intelligence and Investigation

The intelligence services are like the eyes and ears of any army. Without this kind of information we would have to grope our way and provide ourselves with the staffs of blind men and we could not detect the actions the enemy might undertake against us in time. Knowledge of the enemy's movements, prior reconnaissance of the place where an operation is to be carried out, the study of its various aspects, etc.--these will enable us correctly to plan our operations. Having good information on the place where we are going to go into action will strengthen the confidence of the fighters in the leadership and in the possibilities of success; this will considerably reduce the risks and unexpected developments that might arise during the operation.

Information is all the more important when, as in our case, we are fighting an enemy who has forces and resources very superior to ours. We must keep in mind that, in spite of that great disproportion of manpower and resources between the enemy and us and his tight vigilance, the latter can be made a mockery of and through good information on our part we can make up for the disadvantage in manpower and resources. The enormous complexity of the monopolist state and the latter's need to employ individuals coming from the popular strata renders useless all of his efforts to keep secret his vital installations, his files, etc. All of this can be penetrated by the revolutionary organization because, in reality, if we work hard and if we remain linked to the masses, the fascist state will present itself before us like a big box of glass.

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On the other hand, it will be impossible for the enemy to place guards at all those points which at any particular moment may be the target of our attack. The enemy cannot place a platoon of guards at each TV repeater station, at each high-voltage station, in each government building, in each police station, etc. How many mercenaries will they need to protect each army headquarters, each finance office, each torturer, or each informer? Experience shows that, no matter how hard they may try, we will continue to get information through ever more varied and safer channels; good information will be true, objective, concise, and complete and we will have to check it out to determine the source of the information.

It is very necessary to check the information out. Conditions keep changing continually; this means that something which is easy today, because the place is not guarded, for example, may on the next day not be so easy because they have posted a guard or they have reinforced the guards. Besides, our eyes will always see military targets in a manner different from those of our informers. Experience in this field teaches us to distinguish the primary from the secondary and to separate the wheat from the chaff; that enables us to complete the original information item.

Information Sources

The main information source for any revolutionary army consists of the popular masses. The organized people's resistance movement is our best information source and in the development of that movement we are going to find an inexhaustible quantity of data, of first-ranking military and political importance. In the barracks, there are soldiers, men of the people; in factories of strategic importance to the regime of the monopolies, there are thousands of men and women workers; in the neighborhoods live millions of workers who every day observe the movements of the components of the repressive forces. Everywhere, thousands of eyes and ears among the broad popular masses observe and gather information on the enemy. If we organize the reception of this abundant information well, this can become a very powerful weapon in our hands.

Throughout the past 3 years of military activity, our organization has received thousands of addresses of police officers, members of the Civil Guard, military personnel, etc.; we have received scores of reports on the movement of large sums of money; hundreds of data on how to get explosives, weapons, and equipment of all kinds necessary for our struggle.

The legal media constitute another important data source. The very complexity and the necessity of the bureaucracy of the monopoly state mean that the enemy himself must publish, for his own use, abundant information which is of great value for us.

Finally, a very important source in getting information consists of direct observation of everything that goes on in the surrounding area by our own militants. Most of our men and women come to the GRAPO "with their loaf of

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bread under the arm," as we put it; they come to us with extremely valuable information, taken from their own prior experience which in most cases is very useful for us.

VII. Behavior in Dealing with the Police

A good number of our militants have gone through the tough test of torture with intrepidity and valor; we are very proud of that; but it is no less true that others have broken and did not come up to the high expectations we had placed in them.

Going through the DGS [General Directorate of Security] or through any other police precinct or barracks must be considered as another battle to be fought against fascism. It is true that this battle takes place under conditions that are very difficult for us but this is no reason to jump to the wrong conclusion that the battle is lost before we start. Before getting down to work, the torturers try to create a feeling of defeatism and pessimism among the fighters so as to get all kinds of information out of the them and to turn them into collaborators.

Any member of the GRAPO must be prepared to face an interrogation. He must keep in mind that he may be caught at any moment. Failure to view the question from this angle has caused some of our fighters to underestimate the enemy, to drop their guard, thus facilitating not only the work of the police but also being completely disarmed in ideological aspects at the moment of their arrest. This is what later on led to almost complete demoralization. Carrying out an adequate political discussion within each group is a fundamental thing not only in order effectively to carry out all actions that are ordered but also to confront the most difficult situations with determination and valor. Torture can accomplish nothing against a fighter who is imbued with the reason for and unquenchable faith in the final victory of our cause.

On the other hand, one of the best guarantees for making sure that police interrogations will not yield the desired results is for each militant to know as little as possible about the organization and about the life of the other militants in his group. This increases the feeling of self-confidence among the arrested individuals because they know from the very beginning that, no matter what the police may do to them, they will not get far in their interrogations.

If we keep our fighting spirit high and if we strategically despise the enemy, we can face torture with equanimity and we can win victory. The time we spend in barracks or with the DGS is always a relative factor. We must keep in mind that they cannot hold us there indefinitely and that, if we remain firm during the first few days, time will work in our favor and will continually demoralize our torturers. To that end, it is important not to allow oneself "to be prepared" for torture. One must abandon all peaceful or passive attitudes. One must insult them, one must pull them below the level on which they are. In this way we can make them nervous and we will be taking the initiative, thus winning the first skirmishes.

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We must also defeat the enemies at the police station and we must turn a relative defeat into a victory.

We must follow the examples of Hierro whose hands they burned with a blow-torch without getting a single word out of him; of Angel Collazo who remained firm as a rock in spite of the fact that he was in the hands of the Civil Guard for 10 days, being burned with electrodes all over his body; we must follow the example given by Louis Alvarez who did not sign the statement drawn up by the police; we must follow the example of many other fighters who managed to counter the sadistic tortures of men such as Conessa and company with their faith in the victory of our cause.

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SPAIN

THREAT POSED BY ETA-M EMPHASIZED

Madrid EL SOCIALISTA in Spanish 28 Apr-4 May 82 pp 28-30

[Article by F. Castano: "The ETA Will Strike Before the 1982 World Soccer Championships"]

[Text] Neither Operation Mint planned by the state security bodies in connection with the coming world football championships nor the warning given the government by the secret service concerning the imminence of an ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] attack on a major scale have been able to stop the most recent terrorist campaign, which, according to information obtained by EL SOCIALISTA, is a part of a definitive effort to put the democratic system on the ropes, making use of the full potential the military branch of the ETA has available at the present time.

Police sources consulted by this magazine stress that the Basque terrorist organization is beginning to feel pressured by sectors which formerly enabled it to continue, morally and strategically, with its bloody pursuit. The more or less unplanned consolidation of the Basque left wing in the direction of socialism, following the merger of Euskadiko Ezkerra and the communist faction of Lertxundi, the criticisms by the ETA (political and military) of the hard-line faction in the organization, culminating in a long-term truce, and finally, the constant blows being dealt by the police to the weakened information infrastructure of this organization have contributed to a great extent to wresting the entire apparatus thanks to which, years ago, the ETA managed to deal with the government on an equal footing.

In the experts' opinion, there is sufficiently clear data to support this diagnosis. First of all, the terrorists' use of semiheavy war materiel, in the knowledge that it has more disastrous and logically, therefore, more spectacular effects, cripples the vulnerability of the terrorists if their comandos are made inoperable. The abandonment of the grenade launcher and the weapons used several weeks ago by the group which attacked a light tank belonging to the National Police in Pamplona was no happenstance, by any means.

On a different level, but within the context of the same analysis, are the appeals to the government to negotiate, first by the ETA (military) and later by Herri Batasuna. This is the only occasion on which both the terrorists and the political organization which supports their beliefs have simultaneously

launched a campaign in all directions which can only be interpreted in terms of the muddy and bloody weakness of a terrorism which is lacking in the attitudes and rational goals that might justify it to the people.

The Decline Begins

The decline of the more murderous branch of the ETA began on the very day its executive committee gave the order for the assassination of one of the country's leading nuclear energy experts. The death of Jose Maria Ryan, chief engineer at the Lemoniz plant, affected the Basque population much more forcefully than the 300 attacks perpetrated against the Iberduero installations. The hatred of the ETA by thousands of Basque citizens who had maintained an indifferent attitude toward the continual shedding of innocent blood began then.

The 23 February coup and the clarity with which the Basque people are beginning to understand the symbiosis between terrorism and the efforts to promote a coup are forcing the two branches of the ETA to revise their attitude, with a logical weakening in the already reduced unity of the activists in both groups. While members of the political-military faction agreed to initiate a truce, broken by a minority faction at the beginning of this year, their hated comrades in arms persist in sowing terror, making capital of the residue of fear left in Spanish society by the February coup venture. But the ETA assassins do not have everyone behind them. They have come up against the loss of the support previously provided by an "abertzale" sector of the population, the progressive weakening of its infrastructure, the new French attitude toward the refugees on the other side of the Pyrenees, the intensive internal debate between the supporters of a technical truce and those desirous of continuing desperate killing, the then firm policy of the political-military faction and, finally, the reorientation of their terrorist strategy toward much more selective action.

The goals of the ETA have then been temporarily buried, thanks to the meritorious work pursued jointly by the security bodies. Throughout last year, the executive committee of the terrorist organization had to deal with the break-up of 51 commando units--37 of them intelligence groups--and the arrests of 600 militants, including activists and collaborators. The figure of 40 murders from the beginning of 1981 to the present means nothing if compared with the carnage which the activities planned by the ETA would have caused had the police not intervened in time.

The collapse of the Madrid commando unit, headed by Antonio Madariaga Erezuma, was one of the keys allowing intensification of the police campaign, with satisfactory results, in the last 4 months of the year. Toward the middle of November the security forces broke up a commando group made up of eight persons, whose plans included blowing up the headquarters of the civil guard in Algorta, Biscay, on the same day it was to be commissioned by the high command of the security forces. The cautious, silent work of the police has given the country much more than some people believe. For example, just days before the last anniversary of Franco's death, the police frustrated the plans to blow up a bus carrying 50-some commissioned and noncommissioned officers of the armored division in Madrid, which the ETA thought would put its army a step forward in combating democracy and the constitution.

The police campaign against terrorism of Basque origin has revealed the identity of a large majority of the intelligence commando units serving the ETA throughout the nation. The police investigations even turned up the terrorists' blacklist, containing the names of more than 600 persons, the majority of them highly placed militia, political and court personalities, on whom the ETA plans to turn its machineguns sooner or later. Prestigious military officers such as Jose Gabeiras, former head of the Army General Staff, leaders of the main political parties, outstanding national law court judges and businessmen on the level of Eduardo Aznar and Luis Olarra can see their usual daily movements noted in the reports of the operational commando units of the terrorist organization.

Economic Blackmail

But the decline of the ETA also involves, setting aside the police strategy, a firm attitude in opposition to terror on the part of the political forces with the greatest influence in the Basque territory. Barely 3 months ago the Basque terrorists dispatched from France several hundred letters to Basque businessmen and leading property owners forcing them to choose between two equally tragic fates: economic blackmail or death.

The terrorist threats against some outstanding PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] militants have led the Basque government to seize control of the situation for the first time, and Garaicoechea has publicly stated the negative aspects of filling the ETA coffers. The response of the terrorists to this attitude was seen some months ago in the kidnaping of industrialist Jose Lipperheide, who was released after his family paid the ransom demanded by the terrorists.

The attitude of the PNV and the Basque government concerning the inaptly named "revolutionary tax" has been clearer since that time. Despite everything, an official of that government said recently that "the terrorist factor is that which has exerted the least influence on the economic crisis in the Basque territory. I do not believe that the behavior of the ETA," he added, "has halted any investment here." Other parties, such as the PSE [Spanish Socialist Party]-PSOE, do not share such singular opinions. The secretary general of this latter party, Txiqui Benegas, thinks where the economic blackmail of the ETA is concerned that "the national government, the autonomous government, the police, the political parties, the trade unions, and finally the business organizations should deal with this phenomenon as a collective threat and to provide the ways and means, both human and material, as well as measures of solidarity and the mobilization of society, to ensure that the tax will not calmly be collected in the bars of the south of France." In the opinion of Txiqui Benegas, economists should be clear about the fact that in the Basque Country "violence, terrorism and extortion must be ended or the possibility of economic recovery will be very remote for our people."

The ETA Revival

When analyzing the ETA revival and the recent attacks upon the security forces and the telephone building in Madrid, experts in the antiterrorist struggle make clear reference to four circumstances coinciding in time with this new campaign: the last phase of the 23 February trial, the imminent parliamentary

debate on the LOAPA, the legal basis for the establishment of the autonomous state, and with special importance for the Basque territory, the advancement of the entry of our country into the Atlantic alliance and the beginning of the 1982 world soccer championships.

According to reliable sources, the executive committee of the ETA has decided to bring all of its operational commando units into Spain in order to launch its attacks at the moments best suited for the plans the organization has established. The Spanish police know this from informers who work confidentially for them in France, and also in part thanks to data provided by the police in that neighboring country. It must be borne in mind that in recent months the collaboration between the authorities in the two countries has become increasingly close, to the point of making available to the Spanish police entirely reliable information about front-line commando units of which our secret service was previously unaware.

The investigations pursued to date by the police have established the certainty of the entry into our country of some of the bloodiest--and commonly known as butchers--commando units included in the ETA organization. They include those organized by Maria Belen Gonzalez Penalva, Jose Maria Bereciartua Echarri, Jose Leon Mazusta Astidia and Martin Apaloaza Azcagorta. These two last-mentioned terrorists are being sought in Madrid because of their possible involvement in the attack on the telephone building on Rios Rosas Street. From what we have learned, they may have gained entry to the company building by using false identification belonging to the two Spanish police inspectors who were found murdered several years ago on the beach at Bayonne.

"The ETA needs blood like a fish needs water," a police official close to the antiterrorist campaign told EL SOCIALISTA. "If its activities did not have the publicity given them by the mass media, their effect would be reduced by half...."

In the view of another police source consulted by this magazine, the optimism concerning the antiterrorist campaign created by the statements made by high Ministry of Interior officials should not be bandied about so joyfully. "One cannot speak of a final blow, because we all know that the struggle may be long, unless certain factors which facilitate the efforts of the ETA are changed," he added.

These factors can be summarized in the following points: The ETA continues to have some safe and certain sources of financing through economic blackmail. Secondly, this organization continues, logically, to keep its leading cadres abroad, so that the head of the terrorist monster remains invulnerable. Thirdly, the Basque terrorists continue to have safe places for training themselves in the handling of weapons and explosives. Through publicity, the ETA has seen to it that on the popular level there is talk of armed struggle, the revolutionary tax, revolutionary warfare, etc. These are terms which place the terrorist phenomenon on a higher pedestal than is merited by assassination and mere monetary blackmail.

If these considerations are set aside, there are facts which justify a hopeful view of the future. It will be necessary to wait for this coming month of May

to see what role the new autonomous Basque police force, of 700 men initially, in which more than 3 billion pesetas have been invested, will be called upon to play in this struggle. On the other hand, new results can be expected from the men which the Central Intelligence Brigade has skillfully placed as informers in the Basque provinces. It is known that the Spanish police have succeeded in infiltrating the ETA and that in the next few years it is hoped that a much greater advance can be made in this realm. Hope can be placed in the strengthening of one of the statutes, that of Guernica, to which the Basques cling, persuaded that this is the only tool for achieving their identity as a people—the only one and that which can provide the greatest quota of political justification for an organization which knows of no form of dialogue other than a bullet in the back of the neck.

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SPAIN

CARRILLO SPEECH TO CC DEALS WITH TERRORISM, POPULAR FRONT

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 30 Apr-6 May 82, pp 9-12

[Text] In his address Monday afternoon, the secretary general of the PCE, Santiago Carrillo, began by stressing the importance of the report submitted during the morning by Nicolas Sartorius "as a whole political style, involving making the basic problems of the workers class and the peoples masses the focus of our debates."

It is a matter of a style, and Mauricio emphasized it rightly this morning, which tends to locate the political work of the party within the framework of the real concerns and preoccupations of the people, the framework of the specific reality, and to rise above ideological abstraction as the sole content of debate.

In this connection, an effort is being made to overcome something which thanks to practice was in danger of becoming a concept--the idea that the major social problems affecting the labor world should be dealt with by the trade unions, whereas these problems constitute the basis of what should be our policy, the specific field of the class struggle which should concern the workers party, although this does not mean interfering in the specific sphere of the trade unions. It does not suffice for us to have a trade union policy, which is without a doubt very important, in order to assert our influence in the labor world. We need to integrate the concerns and the worries of this world in our daily policy, experience them and embrace them daily, and not only in election periods.

Sometimes our discussions may give the impression that we are a party which is constantly preparing for the final battle and that we do not give the daily battles, left to the trade unions as their problem, all of their due importance. By denying the reformist principle to the effect that the movement is the only thing which is justified, we may take on the appearance--which on the other hand would be wrong and dangerous--that we are a party valid only for the day of total change, which in reality takes us farther from instead of closer to that transformation in society which must come about through an accumulation of quantitative changes prior to qualitative changes--the kind of quantitative changes in which the party must be ever increasingly the active and dynamic protagonist.

A Distorted Image of the Party

And this attitude, which we may have seemed to reflect at some times, can on occasion provide certain workers sectors with a distorted image of the party--an image which suggests that in a period in which reforms must be effected, it is better to support the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], which works toward this, while the communist party is a kind of revolutionary reserve for the day when grandiose dreams of liberation can be made a reality.

And then, these same sectors which allow the PSOE to engage in pacts, AMIs [Framework Collective Bargaining Agreement], LOAPAs [Organic Harmonization Law of the Autonomous Process] and to support the UCD [Democratic Center Union] government, which contradicts itself daily, and which continue to vote for it because they think this is useful voting, do not allow the communist party to engage in pacts, in alliances which are indispensable if the crisis is not to produce daily more catastrophic consequences, in order to achieve intermediate solutions, and think that the communist party must keep itself uncontaminated and virginal, in the final analysis like a testimonial group awaiting the great day of the radical revolution.

Without a doubt we are faced with the need to undertake a great ideological effort to educate our party, our sympathizers and our voters, the broad workers masses, to the effect that the revolutionary party, the party of radical change, the communist party, must also engage in politics every day, must negotiate intermediary solutions, must promote reforms, must engage in pacts if it wants to put itself in a position to achieve this radical change. We must make a stubborn effort in the ideological sector to reassess political action, the prestige of politics as a task of the party and the masses themselves, as a commitment for all.

And although objective circumstances may be unfavorable due to the economic crisis, due to the persistence of characteristics, styles and even aspects of the preceding regime in this one, politics, not only where main principles but also daily questions are concerned, must be rehabilitated. If we do not succeed in this, the popular masses will continue to regard politics as an alien issue, one which concerns only what in an ambiguous and false phrase is called the political class, and they will not be active protagonists in the destiny of the country, deciding not for what is good, but for what is least evil in each election. And this ideological effort must be sustained by practical political activity. As we have done today with social security, we must continue to do with the great social problems which affect the majority of the population in all sectors.

This is the first conclusion I would like to extract from today's discussion.

Terrorism Conceals the Risk of a Coup

The second subject on which we have been informed and which we will have occasion to discuss more fully when it is over has been the court proceedings against the 23 February rebels. And I would warn you that we have superimposed upon it the subject of terrorism, despite the fact that there was a discussion on this issue in the Cortes last week, in the awareness that what gives the current terrorist campaign its most dramatic aspect, serious though it is in itself, is not so much the ETA action as the reaction it is attempting to provoke.

And the attitudes of those who are the defendants in these proceedings and of all of those behind them, both in military institutions and in civilian society, are evidence of the dangers of this reaction.

In the morass of statements contained in thousands of files and in the long weeks of questioning, there is clear evidence of a desire to divert responsibility, attributing it basically to the chief of state, whose attitude was decisive on 23 February in revealing and frustrating the coup.

But even clearer than this lack of graceful acceptance of responsibility is the desire to begin again to regard 23 February as a failed attempt which there are plans to try again, turning for the purpose, above the interests of Spain, to the corporative spirit of the military institutions, which a collective effort is being made to compromise by the uprising. The nature of the extremist propaganda designed to create rebellion in the armed forces is well known and public, with EL ALCAZAR as its boldest expression, one which this government does not dare silence, despite the fact that we have provided the legal means of doing so through the Cortes.

The public has the clear impression that the plot continues, although its dimensions are not known, nor are the capacity, strength and even the determination of the present government to thwart it. There is an impression which it is very difficult to cast off that this government sees no solution but in multiple and repeated concessions to the positions of the rebels or those who are behind them. With the justification of depriving them of their pretext, it surrenders to their demands. And in the political sphere we are seeing how the situation is shifting daily farther to the right, disarming democracy instead of strengthening it. Thus the discussion on terrorism in the Cortes can be regarded, and not without a certain justification, as excessive, as an effort to assert the strength of the government on this front in order to excuse its weakness on others.

The terrorist campaign conceived within the framework of the 23 February proceedings has every aspect of a provocation leading to a coup d'etat. The ETA, which had some legitimacy in opposing the dictatorship and which has lost it entirely under the democracy, becoming a monstrous degeneration with assassins' methods, which can be termed nothing other than fascist, is trying to provoke another coup d'etat, in the belief that a new dictatorship would justify its methods and its ends.

Therefore we must denounce and combat terrorism, that of the ETA and any other, with full energy. Therefore we are ready to support the perfecting of the necessary action, which does not alter the fact that the main weapons against terrorism are the reduction of its current social base, and not emergency measures. To an even lesser extent can Spain reduce and eliminate terrorism with any dictatorship. Spain has experienced states of emergency, Spain has already experienced a dictatorship, and that did not prevent the spread and the development of terrorism.

Democracy Against Terrorism

Terrorism is combated in the political realm by broadening and strengthening democracy, by correctly applying the statutes of autonomy, by opening ever

clearer paths toward self-government for each of the peoples which make up our country. Terrorism is combated in the political realm not by LOAPAs, not by restrictions on autonomy, but by the sincere and strict application of the statutes of autonomy, which absolutely do not threaten or compromise the unity of Spain.

In other words, the base for terrorism will be reduced the more readily when the peoples of Spain feel that the freedoms won are not endangered by the threat of a coup.

Just as we have said that terrorism nurtures and encourages coupism, it must be said that the treat of a coup nurtures and encourages terrorism and deprives those who are basically committed to combating terrorism of key arguments.

Confidence in the stability of democratic development will in the final analysis be the factor contributing to stifling the support terrorism has today in the social environment of the Basque Country and Spain. Therefore, one of the basic weapons for eliminating terrorism is the conclusion of the proceedings against those who promoted the 23 February coup with a just sentence consistent with the law, which will persuade everyone of the potential for maintaining, developing and deepening democracy in our country.

And the argument put forth by Fraga Iribarne to the effect that it is Spain that is threatened by terrorism is a dangerous sophistry. It encourages those who speak of promoting a coup in order to save Spain.

And what is in danger is not Spain. Because the people or a complex of peoples is indestructible and can survive the harshest and most difficult tests. What is in danger is democracy and freedom in Spain. It is indeed freedom and democracy which are threatened, and which we have a priority duty today to defend.

Faced with the threat of a coup, faced with terrorism, we communists are prepared to defend the democratic institutions. Moreover, this is the only way of saving Spain in the sense of guaranteeing its progress, its economic, cultural and social growth.

And we believe that one must not compromise with terrorism. We believe that terrorism must be eradicated. But as we said in the Cortes, the government, giving guarantees of its sincerity, must offer those who put down their weapons an opportunity to participate in social life and to defend their ideas, whatever they may be, within the realm of democratic legality, of the constitution.

The Jurisdiction Problem

And as to coupism, there is an aspect into which we must go deeper at a time when we are going deeper into a study of the court proceedings. And this reflection leads me to two questions: is it not necessary to correct the error we committed in eliminating the summary proceedings for crimes of a military nature? I think that we should consider seriously whether this was not an error on our part, and on the part of the left wing, with this defensive

attitude the left wing has traditionally had, thinking that if repressive laws are approved they will be applied to it, forgetting that if there is a coup, a reversal, in this country, those in command will not be bound in any way by the laws which have been passed in this period. They will in practice pursue their own law and their repression, without being bound by any considerations of a legal nature.

And the other aspect into which we should go deeper and into which I propose we look further in the development of this discussion, when the time comes, is whether we should not think of a single civil jurisdiction, preventing the military from being judged by the military in peacetime, which creates, among other things, the problems of conscience which have aggravated the duodenal ulcer of the president of the Higher Court of Military Justice.

In any case, this situation--the coup, the court proceedings, the idea of a continuing conspiracy which has a civil extension which we see not only in EL ALCAZAR but on the third page of YA--it is under the weight of this situation that the elections in Andalusia will take place. And possibly, as a result, in the best of cases, of the appeal the defenders may make, the general elections too, when they are held.

The Specter of the Popular Front

And I believe that it is worthwhile to devote a moment here to the manipulation taking place with the specter of the Popular Front. In the mind of the public in our country, the concept of the Popular Front is linked with that of civil war, because of the propaganda pursued for long years, among other things. And it should be said that the Popular Front was not in the first place a coalition of "reds," as there seems to be an effort to get the public to believe. It was a coalition which under the current conditions would include a large part of the UCD, even one sector of the Democratic Coalition. It would, naturally, include the Basque and Catalan nationalists. In other words, socially and politically, this specter of the Popular Front represented something which is basically a component of the present Cortes, the present political situation. And the transition of the Popular Front to workers class hegemony with the outbreak of the Franco uprising, and the declaration of war, is something else. And the Popular Front would now have acquired, because of a war which it did not cause, which the Franco uprising caused, a much more advanced and more radical nature than it had at its origins.

And the regrettable thing is that it is precisely the Spanish Socialist Workers Party which is pushing the effort to create an atmosphere of fear where the concept of the Popular Front is concerned. Because the PSOE veto on cooperation with the communist party basically means engaging in manipulation of the fear of the Popular Front created by many years of right-wing propaganda. And therefore, it simultaneously means an attitude which weakens the socialist party and the left wing in this country.

And in this connection, the step taken in Asturias is of importance on the level of Spanish politics, because the Asturian comrades have succeeded in breaking with this veto, with the PSOE strategy in that region.

But what does this break show? And this should be the link we should seize. This break shows that there is a spirit of unity at the PSOE base, among the PSOE ranks and many of its cadres. A spirit of leftist unity. And we must strengthen this spirit of unity, this inclination toward unity on the left. We must develop it, issuing an appeal to such unity throughout our campaign, and being very cautious as to how we criticize the socialist leaders.

I believe that both in Andalusia and in other places we should avoid crude breaks with the socialist leaders, while seriously criticizing their policy, in order not to clash, not to wound the feelings of the socialist base, mobilizing them, on the contrary, for use in counteracting anti-unitarian positions.

I believe that in this whole process, activities such as those undertaken the other day in Getafe, in which we socialists and communists spoke to 15 or 20,000 workers, and we had, of necessity, to speak of unity, are of great importance.

The coming 1 May holiday is of great importance. In fact, the party should make an effort to make it a great 1 May, a great united mass mobilization, for it is these mass mobilizations which can contribute to influencing the PSOE leadership in the direction of unity.

I want to say in connection with our relations with the PSOE, with our policy of cooperation with it, that there are levels on which we can temporarily agree to support, to participation from outside in support of the PSOE, if it can acquire the necessary parliamentary strength. And there are levels on which we cannot accept what would simply be discrimination. In other words, if tomorrow there were to be a leftist majority in the chamber--I am not anticipating any judgment here--I believe that the CC would have to assess whether or not it is desirable to impose communist ministers in a situation like this in a government on the national level. But on the level of municipal government, on the level of the provincial governments, on the level of the governments of nationality and regional groups, we cannot accept discrimination in any form--discrimination which would serve only to classify the communist vote as a useless vote, a vote which decides nothing, changes nothing, when the contrary is the case.

And I believe that the importance of the Asturian decision lies not only in the break with the PSOE strategy, but in that it graphically shows that the communist vote is a useful vote, a vote worth casting.

And I will not further stress the importance of the Andalusian elections. Comrade Antonio Romero has provided a report which seems to me brief and concise but complete, concerning the situation with regard to these elections.

Both the elections in Andalusia and the coming general elections will be a test for our party which is not easy. And they will not be an easy test because there can be no doubt that the dogmatic split which has been confirmed in Catalonia and the spread of which to the rest of the country is being promoted, and on the other hand the project being discussed--it is still not very clear how far it will go--call for transforming the ARI into a political

party, may have a negative influence on our voters. Not in the sense of giving these groups the possibility of winning representation, but rather in terms of limitation, causing us to lose, in some cases, representatives who could have been ours by some hundreds or thousands of votes.

Therefore it seems to me that we should already now begin to study our electoral campaign. We should begin to prepare our electoral programs, persuaded that it will be a harsh battle for the party, in which we must maintain and increase our strength, something which I believe is possible if we wage our campaign well.

Because even though I stress the difficulties we will face and which we did not have in 1979, for example, I am persuaded that the party can maintain and even strengthen its support if we prepare well for this campaign and if we use all our energies, all the combativity there is in our party and all of the climate of thinking which can be created, in my view, following the Asturias affair, in the sense that there will not readily be a government inclined toward the left in Spain, but that the communist party, for which in this connection there is no substitute, can indeed have strong representation, representation which can have real weight in national politics.

And as the desire of our country for change, for ever more real change, for ever more profound change, is certainly authentic, we can base our effort to counteract the difficulties which lie ahead of us on this feeling, on this desire for change, in order to maintain and even exceed our 1979 electoral results.

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SPAIN

CARRILLO SEES TERRORISM AS LINKED WITH COUPISM

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 30 Apr-6 May 82 p 13

[Text] The secretary general of the PCE, Santiago Carrillo, spoke during the debate last Thursday on the recent terrorist activities. His speech was preceded by those of Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo; Minister of Interior Juan Jose Roson; the spokesmen for the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party], CD [Democratic Convergence], PSA [Socialist Party of Andalusia] and the Catalan minority; and Francisco Fernandez Ordonez and Juan Maria Bandres, speaking for the Mixed Group. The following is the text of the address by Santiago Carrillo.

"Mr President and esteemed deputies: The communist parliamentary group mounts this rostrum to indicate its desire to support both such measures as this government may take and any others which will be effective in the struggle against terrorism.

The prime minister was asked the reason for this accumulation of assaults sponsored by the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] in this recent period, and the answer is clear. The answer lies in the court proceedings which have been pursued and are still being pursued against those responsible for the 23 February coup. These proceedings, and some of the events which have occurred in the course of them, have encouraged the ETA terrorists to undertake these activities, with a view to seeing if they can provoke a coup d'etat to justify what has thus far had no political or moral justification--the terrorism of the ETA.

It must be said that the ETA did not develop nor was it born under democracy. The ETA developed in opposition to the Franco regime, to a dictatorship, and if at that time, faced with a dictatorship which repressed all freedoms and all the rights of the Spanish people, it was legitimate--although we did not share in it, the use of terrorist methods, of criminal methods, today against a democratic system is intolerable. Whatever the ideas of these men who supported it in other eras may have been, they are revealing now that a deterioration has occurred among them, producing behavior suited to fascists and not to those who truly want to struggle for the freedom of their people.

I want to say that legal measures, police measures, are needed to deal with terrorism. It is necessary to improve the police apparatus further every day. Perhaps it is necessary to provide better equipment and training for the bodies responsible for public order. But there is only one defense against terrorism, and that defense is the exercise of democracy.

No Limitation on Democracy

The only opportunity there could be for terrorism to continue to enjoy popular support would be if freedoms were repressed, states of emergency declared and liberties reduced to combat it. And in this connection, I endorse some of the ideas expressed here.

One basic weapon against terrorism is the integral application of the Basque statutes, because these statutes do not destroy the unity of Spain. Let there be no threat to the Basque statutes, or the others, by those who do not realize that the unity of Spain and the battle against terrorism are only possible in freedom.

I want to state that there is no revolutionary warfare on the part of the ETA. the ETA is not waging any revolutionary war. The ETA is engaging in fascist terrorism. And that is not revolutionary war. And we cannot challenge the crimes of the ETA by saying that we must kill more people than the ETA does.

That is not the solution. The solution is to strike at the ETA by defending democracy, and above all, ensuring that the Spanish people, and in this case the Basque people, have increasing confidence in democracy and autonomy. There must be deeds and confirmation to show the country that the government, just as it has come forth here to say that it wants to put an end to terrorism, also wants to put an end to coupism (golpismo), which is basically the greater danger and which nurtures the ETA, just as the ETA nurtures coupism.

The Main Concern of Spanish Citizens

For, gentlemen, the fear of Spanish citizens at this time is obviously fear of terrorism and the consequences of terrorism, but the greatest fear, the greatest concern of Spanish citizens is that the government may not be able to defend democracy against coupism, that this government may not be able to safeguard democracy, that the present public authorities are not strong enough to create confidence in the Spanish people in the fact that this democracy is indestructible.

For Spain will not be destroyed as a country. A country cannot be destroyed. Nothing destroys it, unless nuclear bombs should fall here. What can be destroyed is democracy.

And this is what we must defend so that Spain can be Spain and so that Spain can present itself to the world as a modern, democratic and free country.

I would like to add that there has been talk of negotiations and pacts. We believe that it is not possible to join in a pact or to negotiate with terrorists. We believe it is necessary to isolate them, to limit them and to combat them, knowing in fact that it will be a long and difficult struggle in which it will be necessary to avoid overoptimism and the tendency to regard each battle as the last battle.

But at the same time, while we reject any negotiations, what we believe must be done is to offer all those who put down their weapons, all those who are ready to defend their ideas, if ideas they have, on the grounds of democracy and the constitution, an opportunity to join in civil life if they give sufficient evidence that they will respect democracy and freedom. This is what we believe is necessary, and this is what we believe must be done.

Gentlemen, first of all and above all, what we must achieve in the struggle against terrorism in order to win the support of Spanish citizens and to reduce the base for terrorism is to see to it that the Spanish people gain real confidence in the fact that democracy is a solid force. If we achieve this, we will have dealt the decisive blow to terrorism, but we will not achieve it only by combating terrorism. We will achieve this if we present to other terrorists the same image of firmness and solidity we are presenting to ETA terrorism today."

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